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The development, in the early lJOts, of the Theories of 
Monopolistic and Imperfect Competition, provided a valuable con-
tribution to the toolkit of the theoretical economist. Sub-
sequent work has both amplified and clarified the area of general 
applicability and a sophisticated body of analysis has been 
established. 
In certain respects however, the framework has not received 
sufficient attention. There is difficulty in explaining the 
phenomena ~perienced in retailing without placing 3 great strain 
upon the fabric of orthodox theory. 
The purpose of this study is to provide a picture of the 
theory as it has been developed over almost four decades, and 
ultimately, after discussion, to proceed to the development of 
an expanded analysis. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE ORIGIN OF THE THEORIES 
In the Foreword to her Economics of Imperfect Competition(l) 
Professor Robinson points out that her ideas owe much to the work 
of, among others, Hr Pi ero Sraffa. In his article on 1 The Laws 
of Returns Under Competitive Conditions( 2), Mr Sraffa provided the 
first discussion of the possibility of establishing the theory of 
value on the basis of monopoly analysis, and also suggested that: 
11 0f course, when we are supplied with theories 
in respect to the two extreme cases of monopoly 
and competition as part of the equipment 
required in order to undertake the study of 
the actual conditions in the different industries, 
we are warned that these generally do not fit 
exactly one or the other categories, but will 
be found scattered along the intermediate zone, 
and that the nature of an industry will approximate 
more closely to the monopolist or the competitive (3 ) system according to its particular circumstances ••• 11 
This concept provided the basis for the work of Professor 
Robinson, since it introduced the possibility of an "intermediate 
theory11 ( 4), capable of accounting for the situations which lie 
between monopoly and competition. 
The most striking similarities, however, arise in the co~ 
parison of the works of l'ir Sraffa and Professor Chamberlin, Here 
the relationship is less obvious, since Professor Chamberlin's 
study was in the processes of completion at the time that Mr Sraffa's 
article appeared; Mr Sraffa's recognition of the importance of 
"product differentiation", as Chamberlin came to call it, made 
itself evident thus: 
11 ••• we are led to ascribe the correct measure 
of importance to the chief obstacle v.rhich hinders 
the free play of competition, even where this 
appears to predominate, and which at the same time 
renders a stable equilibrium possible even when 
the supply curve for the products of each 
individual producer is decending - that is, the 
absence of indifference on the part of the buyers 
of goods as between the different producers. 11 (5) 
This view resulted in the demand curve which characterises 
(1) Robinson, Joan: The Economics of Imperfect Competition, 
London, 1965. 
(2) Economic Journal, December 1926. 
(3) Ibid., p. 542. 
(4) Chamberlin, E.H.: .The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, 
7th edition, Cambridge, ~~ss., 1960. 
( 5) Sraffa, p •. 544. _ 
the 11 intermediate theory!' of orthodox monopolistic competition 
analysis. The belief that each producer possesses a degree of 
monopoly over the product he is selling was expressed by Sraffa 
in terms of elasticity: 
11 In the intermediate cases ••• the significance 
of a moderate elasticity in the demand is that, 
although the monopolist has certain freedom 
in fixing his prices, whenever he increases 
them, he is forsaken by a portion of his 
purchasers, who prefer to spend their money in 
some other manner. 11 (p. 545). 
2 
In this a~ea, the ideas expressed by Sraffa are almost identical 
to those discussed at greater length by Chamberlin. 
Where there is correspondence between the works of Chamberlin 
and Robinson, it is safe to conclude that the connecting link lies 
in Sraffats original article. 
Professor Chamberlin has pointed out(l), however, that there 
is a danger in believing that the 11 increasing returns 11 thesis, 
developed by Sraffa and others( 2) has some bearing on the issue 
of competition, and suggests that this misconception is partly 
due to the heavy emphasis which Professor Robinson places on such 
works. He indicates that both he and Professor Robinson have 
11 clearly defined the problem (for the case 
of large numbers) with reference to factors 
affecting the shape of the demand curve, 
and without reference to cost conditions 11 (3), 
and for that reason, Sraffats observation- valid though it is-. 
that equilibrium is achieved at the diminishing cost phase of the 
firm's cost of production curve, is one of the points in his 
analysis which is of little value in placing the works of either 
Robinson or Chamberlin in historical perspective.<4) 
(1) tMonopolistic or Imperfect Competitioil?•,Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, August 1937, p. 560. 
(2) Particularly: Shove, G.F.: 1 The Representative Firm and 
Increasing Returns', Economic Journal, March 1930, and 
Harrod, R.F., in a series of articles published in the 
Economic Journals over the period 1930-1933 inclusive. 
(3) 1Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition7' ,p. 560. 
(4,) Sraf.fa concluded that undsr 11 competitiveu conditions, costs 
of production would be constant in the face of minor 
variations in output. For this reason, the tendency for 
costs to change with changes in output implied that the 
principle of monopoly merited further examination. 
.3 
To Chamberlin the development of the theory of Monopolistic 
Competition required intense analysis of the duopoly systems of 
Cournot and Edgeworth(l), particularly Cournot' s 11 determinate11 
solution 1rlith price lying between monopoly price and perfectly 
competitive price, and Edgeworth's indeterminate solution, with 
price "oscillating continually between the two extremesn (2 ~both of :which 
provided a rough guide to further theorizing. However, as Chamber~ 
lin himself has pointed out(J), there was little besides this, and 
the recognition of the possibility of developing an intermediate 
theory was left to him. It was simply a question of observing 
two extreme theoretical alternatives for the analysis of business 
behaviour. It became quite obvious that the theory of 11 pure 
competition11 could not admit the elements of monopoly vfhich 
characterize business activity, since it implies a type of com-
petition which is free of monopoly interest, and therefore free of 
any control over price which might be available to an individual 
producer. This implies, in turn, that all producers sell a 
homogeneous good on an identical market, since if any individual 
seller produced a good different - no matter to what small degree -
from those of his COffipetitors, he would possess control over price 
and would therefore not fulfil the requirements of pure competi---
tion. Similarly, the theory of Monopoly, as it had been developed 
prior to the publication of Chmnberlin1 s study, was based on the 
principle that pure monopoly could only exist where one producer 
had complete control over supply. Since the question of 
substitutability arose at this point it became necessary to 
define the 11 product11 with great care. The fact that a seller 
has complete control over the supply of a single product does not 
imply that there is not competition from more or less imperfect 
substitutes. The fact of these substitutes is one of the 
reasons why the theory of Monopolistic Competition originated. 
Chamberlin has pointed out that the 11 isolated monopolist" 
(a monopolist who need not allow for the reactions of his com-
petitors) is,like anyone elsei'beset by the competition of others 
locating as near him as they can in economic space. 11 (4). However, 
the degree of competition - a function of the nature of the 
(1) Ivlonopolistic Competition. This point is made in the discussion. 
(2) Ibid.,. p. 4. 
(3) Ibid., p.5. 
(4) !Monopolistic Competition Revisited', Econornica, November 1951, 
p. 353. 
substitutes- is not necessarily a determinant of the monopolist's 
level of profits, since these may be large or small depending on 
the demand for his product. Similarly, the 11 pure competitor11 . 
has no control over the market for his output and is obliged to 
accept the price prevailing at the time of sale. 
4 
Since neither 11 pure11 competition nor 11 pure11 monopoly serve 
the purpose of describing adequately the intermediate case, the 
term Monopolistic Competition is used to qualify the hybrid system. 
Professor Robinson has indicated that 
uwhen a single producer controls the whole 
output of ••• a commodity the plain man 1 s 
notion of a monopolist and the logical 
definition of a monopolist as a single 
seller coincide ••• 11 (l) 
She observes that 
nEvery individual producer has the monopoly 
of his own output - and if a large nuraber of 
them are selling in a perfect market the 
state of affairs exists which we are 
accustomed to describe as perfect 
competition. 11 ( 2) 
In this respect, the definition of monopoly can be used as a. 
starting point for the analysis of 11 competition11 • 
Professor Charrtberlin has suggested that there are some 
difficulties in assuming the analytical process to apply in reverse. 
Whilst he follows an argument similar to that of Professor Robinson, 
in so far as he maintains that the theory of Pure Competition 
provides a less than adequate explanation of economic reality, he 
tends to regard the economic order as Perfectly Monopolistic. 
11 Differentiation implies gradations, and 
it is compatible with perfect monopoly 
of one product that control stops short of 
some more general class of which this 
product is a part. 11 (3) 
In this respect, Chamberlin's attitude must be clearly under-
stood. Whilst he reasons that the theory of Pure Monopoly is 
capable of providing an insight into the theory of Monopolistic 
Competition, it doe·s not fulfil the analytical role of the latter. 
Chamberlin merely indicates with great forcefulness that the theory 
of Pure Competition is far less useful as a starting point for Monopo-
listic Competition theory than is the theory of Pure Monopoly (an ar-
gument implicit in Robinson's comment -above) •. Pure Competition theory, 
(l) The Economics of Imperfect Competition, p. 5 •. 
( 2) Ibid. , p. 5. 
(3) The Theory of lvionopolistic Competition, p. 65. He proceeds 
to a detailed investigation of the argument, but fails to find 
fault with it. 
5 
which ignores the significance of monopoly elements, or regards 
them as 11 imperfections", only considers one aspect of the problem. 
Pure Monopoly theory on the other hand, allows for the principle 
of competition amongst monopolists and therefore is of greater 
analytical value. 
The question of group equilibrium arises at this point. 
Since Monopoly theory is developed on the assumption that the 
individual producer is faced with a given demand curve, the problem 
of group interdependence cannot be provided with an adequate 
solution. Where it is the case that a number of monopolists are 
in competition with one another, the Demand curve for any single 
producer will be a function of the price-output policies of his 
rivals. In this respect, the assumption that a producer is in 
no way subject to the influence of his rivals cannot accommodate 
the real-life situation and the theory of Monopoly proves inadequate. 
Similarly, the theory of Pure Competition is unable to provide the 
· 1 ""I:.~OA"\·..t;;:,~l · · · b f. ·t· analyt1ca wherew1tha 1n such a case, s1nce 1t cannot, y de 1n1 10n, 
be applied in situations where the market is chRracterized by 
product differentiation - the basis of monopolistic competition 
analysis. 
For this reason, the theory of Honopolistic Competition came 
to be an accepted part of the economist's tool-box. It was the 
first system to provide a valid examination of competitive inter-
dependence and product differentiation. 
It has already been indicated that Professor Robinson's work 
was based extensively on the writing of Sraffa, Shove, Robinson and 
others, while Professor Chamberlin's analysis was completed either 
before or concurrently vdth, such authors, but certainly did not 
constitute a follow-on in any respect. We have noted 
that Chamberlin's The Theory of Monopolistic Competition and 
Robinson's The Economics of Imperfect Competition display certain 
common characteristics in so far as they both recognize the inter-
mediate zone between pure competition and pure monopoly. They 
also appear to correspond on the idea that monopoly analysis 
holds more for Monopolistic Competition theory th:'tn does pure 
competition analysis. At the same time, a great deal of debate 
has accompanied the development of the two theories and the 
possibility of major distinctions between them has arisen. 
In his 'The Origin and E::1.rly Development of J.i.ionopolistic 
Competition Theoryt(l), Professor Chamberlin attempts to show the 
(1) Quarterly Journal of Economics, NGvember 1961. 
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11 intellectual history" of his book.(l) According to the author, 
the origins of the theory lie in the Taussig-Pigou controversy 
over joint cost in the railway industry(2), in which Professor 
Taussig held that coal and copper were charged different railroad 
rates as a result of joint-cost, while Professor Pigou held that 
this was due to monopoly. The question of monopoly raised the 
issue of "different markets" and the possibility of a 11 slight 
differentiation11 which would allow adjustment of price and the 
recognition of mutual dependence. Chamberlin pointed out in a 
footnote to his thesis in 1927 that an argument could be provided 
which would support both points of view, and the development of the 
idea resulted in an attempt at working out a 11 synthesis between 
monopoly and competition11 (3). The controversy itself is not 
important here, except in so far as it serves to clarify the origins 
of Chamberlin's theory- a subject about which there appears to 
have been a good deal of disagreement. (4) At the same time, 
Chamberlin goes to great lengths to explain the distinctions which 
exist between his approach to the theory and the original proposals 
made by Sraffa. We have already made a brief mention of the 
question of 11 increasing returns", but there are a number of other 
issues which have become a trifle clouded with the passage of time. 
Where theorists have fallen into the error of identifying the 
works of Chamberlin too closely with those of Sraffa, it should be 
explained(5) that (i) Sraffa made no use of the concept of 
11 oligopoly11 to criticise the current state of the theory. 
Chamberlin, on the other hand, devotes a good deal of his analysis 
to a discussion of the duopoly problem. (ii) According to 
Chamberlin, Sraffa had "neglected the problem of entry (and by 
inference exit), not through oversight, but deliberately ••• 11 ( 6) 
(l) Ibid., p. 515. This attempt was made in the hope that greater 
clarity would be achieved with regard to the nature of his 
theory and the aspects which he held had been overlooked or 
misinterpreted by others. 
(2) Ibid., Chamberlin refers to the Quarterly Journals of Economics 
of February, Hay and August 1913. 
(3) Ibid., p. 520. 
(4) Chamberlin mentions the fact that his work has been diversely 
held to be a result of the collapse of Marshall's doctrine and 
a product of the depression. 
(5) For a more detailed discussion of the matter, see Chamberlin, 
Quarterly Journ:=tl of Economics, 1961, p. 532 ff. 
(6) Ibid., p. 535. 
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A discussion of the reasons for the omission would not be relevant 
at this point,since we are concerned essentially with the fact that 
the omission did arise. The result was that Sraffa tended to 
disregard the importance of competitive forces within the system, 
so that he could not allow adequately for the principle of price 
competition ( l). Ho\'Iever, in her r Imperfect Competition and Falling 
Supply Price,( 2), Professor Robinson develops the concept of falling 
supply price originally considered at great length by Nr Sraffa 
and provides the 11 tangency11 solution which has today come to 
characterize the equilibrium of the industry under conditions of 
monopolistic competition. Professor Robinson points out that: 
11 In short, an increase in the total demand 
for the commodity, when the market is imperfect, 
is far more likely to lower the average cost 
curves of the firms than when the market is 
perfect. 11 (3) 
She concludes that: 
"It therefore appears, after all, to be highly 
probable that falling supply price is a result 
of imperfect competition11 ,(4) 
which would appear to confirm the views expressed in the article 
!Increasing Returns and the Representative Firm: A Symposium! .< 5) 
The above argument on the subject of tangency was in no way 
implicit in Sraffa's paper. (iii) Sraffa devotes most of his 
attention to the Industry, and far less to the firm. Chamberlin 
places most of his emphasis on the latter, and makes the observation( 6) 
that Robinson folla£ Sraffa 1 s example in her The Economics of 
Imperfect Competition in that she only devotes Books II and 
V to the firm, and the rest to the industry. 
11 The difference between the two worlds (i ... e. 
one in which each seller has a monopoly 
of his own distlnguishable product, and one 
in which there is a three-way comparison 
between monopolized industries of 
imperfectly competitive industries and of 
perfectly competitive industries), is 
explained by the fact that one of them 
arose out of the increasing returns 
controversy and the other did not."(?) 
(l) Ibid., p. 535, note 6. "In his 1 turn towards monopoly', 
Mr Sraffa seems to have gone far indeed 'in the opposite 
direction' in his elimination of competitive forces from the 
system. 11 
(2) Economic Journal, December 1932. 
(3) Economic Journal, December 1932, p. 554. 
(4) Ibid., p. 554, 
(5) Economic Journal, March 1930. Articles were contributed by 
D.H. Robertson, G.F. Shove and P. Sraff~. 
(6) QmrterlyJournal of Economics, November 1961, p. 537. 
(7) Ibid., p. 537. 
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At this point a brief discussion of the major distinctions 
between the works of Professors Chamberlin and Robinson would be in 
order, since a clear understanding of the concepts introduced and 
the terminology employed is necessary before a discussion of 
theory can be undertaken. 
The more significnnt distinctions between the two works were 
the subject of a series of articles published shortly after the 
appearance of the theories in 1933 and to which a number of writers 
addressed themselves(l). In his 'Monopolistic or Imperfect 
Competition?'Professor Chamberlin attempts to show that neither 
the theories of 11:rvionopolistic 11 nor "Imperfect" Competition are 
in any way related to the ~brginal Revenue Curve. He suggests 
that this misconception is the result of Professor Robinson's 
expressed belief that 
"this piece of apparatus plays a great 
part in my work, and my book arose out 
of the attempt to apply it to various 
problems ••• 11 ( 2) 
Although Chamberlin would concede that it has moderate analytical 
value, he would also point out that, so far as the determination 
of either price or profits is concerned, it is not at all a useful 
tool.C3) In each case, although it reveals output quite readily, 
it has to be supported by Average Revenue Curves, and where it is 
employed in order to give an idea of group equilibrium, as opposed 
to single firm equilibrium, it can be entirely replaced by these 
curves. As Chamberlin has pointed out(4), Professor Robinson's 
11 double condition" ( 5) for equilibrium (with Marginal Revenue equal 
to Marginal Cost, and Average Revenue equal to Average Cost) is not 
necessary, since the equation of the latter will imply the equation 
of the former and, therefore, the necessity for including Marginal 
factors is displaced. 
(l) Joan Robinson, tWhat is Perfect Competition?', Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, November 1934; E.A.G. Robinson, 1Monopoly and 





E.H~ Chamberlin, 'Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition?l, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1937; N. Kaldor, 
'Equilibrium of the Firm', Economic Journal, March 1934; 
E.H. Chamberlin, 1Reply to Mr Kaldort, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, IViay 1938; and others (see Bibliography below). 
p. 558. 
Ibid., p. 558 ff. 
Ibid., p. 559. 
Robinson, The Ec anomies of Im12erfect Com12etition, p. 94 
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Y~ Kaldor has criticized Professor Chamberlin on this issue(l), 
and suggests that there are essentially no differences in the subject 
matter of the two theories. In the case of the Marginal Revenue 
Curve, he points out that 
11 in order to know the relation of price to 
marginal cost, we have to know the position of 
marginal revenue. Ivloreover, the only simple 
criterion that enables us to distinguish 
between degrees of impurity in competition 
is the relative magnitude of price and 
marginal revenue i.e. the actual elasticity 
of demand at the equilibrium level of output. 11 (2) 
According to Chamberlin, however,C3) the establishment of the relation 
between Price and Marginal Cost could quite easily be undertaken 
using only the average curves to discover monopoly output and price 
and observing the Marginal Cost for this output. In this context, 
Professor Chamberlin's argument appears to be more convincing. 
Another misconception which Chamberlin finds it necessary to 
point out, and which has its roots in Robinsoni.~.m literature(4) , 
is the belief that differentiation of the product is largely a 
function of the number of sellers in the market and, should such 
number increase, the effect would be to render the demand curves 
for each seller more elastic. This argument can be countered 
fairly readily by the suggestion that an increasingly large number 
of dissimilar products does not necessarily imply that any one 
product is likely to become more like any other and the degree of 
substitutability might well remain unchanged. At the same time. 
the competition of a wide range of substitutes, while it might 
induce a shift in the position of the demand curve from a level of 
11 above-normal!1 profits to one of tangency with the Average Cost 
curve,~ need not induce a change in the slope. This consistency 
would Le indicative of stability of consumer preferences and would 
tend to counter the argument'that increasing elasticity of demand 
would arise. 
Mr Kaldor has also dealt with this point( 5), and indicates 
that a shift in the demand curve to the left will have the effect 
of increasing demand elasticity at the 11 equilibrium level of 
output 11 ( 6) and bringing price closer to marginal cost. Market 
(1) 1 Professor Chamberlin on Monopolistic and Imperfect Competition', 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Hay 1938, p. 513. 
(2) Ibid., p. 515. 
(3) 1 Reply to Mr Kaldor 1 , Quarterl.y Journal of Economics, 111ay 1938, 
p. 531. 
(4) Ibid., p. 559 ff. He quotes Robinson, p. 101. 
(5) 1 Professor Chamberlin on Monopolistic and Imperfect Competition', 
p. 516 ff. 
(6) Ibid., p. 519 •. 
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Imperfection will be diminished and the whole situation will tend to 
approximate Perfect Competition more closely. Chamberlin has 
replied to this suggestion by informing Mr Kaldor that, in terms 
of his definition, the addition of new "products" to those already 
existing in the range would, as already indicated, tend to shift 
the Demand curve to the left, but would not necessarily change its 
slope since the fact that a new product has been added would mean 
that the range of products would have to be redefined, with the 
result that the type of competition prevailing amongst products 
would have changed and old conditions would no longer apply. 
The net effect of this is to render the concept of changing 
elasticity vaguearrlCBequally as subject to criticism as is the idea 
of constant elasticity. 
As far as the question of freedom of entry is concerned, 
Chamberlin and Robinson appear to display certain differences, in 
that, as the former points out: 
11 The question remains whether 'freedom of 
entry' is compatible with l-J:onopolistic 
Competition. There seems to be no 
doubt that Mrs Robinson thinks it is, and 
I have, up to this point, vvritten as if 
it were. I should like now, however, to 
record a change of view in the matter. 11 (1) 
He adds that freedom of entry is incompatible withM.onopolistic 
Competition if it implies freedom to duplicate, since under these 
circumstances, the principle of product differentiation must 
necessarily collapse. (2) In so far as this freedom of entry only 
implies that a substitute similar to the original product is 
introduced, the concept remains analytically valid, because 
11 in this sense freedom of entry is universal, 
since substitutes are entirely a matter of 
degree."(3) 
Chamberlin regards Professor Robinson's attempt to show that 
11 imperfection11 is not the same as product differentiation, as 
another misconception.(4) The difficulty appears to lie in the 
use of the terminology and the fact that both writers take different 
positions on the question of "pure" and "perfect" competition. 
In his The Theory of l"'Ionopolistic· Competition, Professor Chamberlin 
draws a distinction between the two. (5) 
(1) Chn.mberlirr,·Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1938, p. 566. 
(2) Ibid., p~ 567. 
(3) Ibid.,. p. 567. 
(4). 'Monopolistic Jr Imperfect Competition'?', 
(5) f', 7. 
11 tPure' and 'Perfect' Competition must 
not be identified; and to consider the 
theory of monopolistic competition vaguely 
as a theory of 'imperfect' competition 
is to confuse the issue. 11 
11 
Chamberlin considers 11 pure 11 competition as a form of competition 
completely 11 unalloyed with monopoly elements 11 (l), as opposed to 
11 perfectt' competition which may imply a number of characteristics 
other than merely a lack of monopoly elements. These might be, 
for example, perfect mobility of the factors of production and 
instantaneous reaction (in theory) on the part of the owners of 
these factors, to changes in the conditions of denmnd, or perfect 
knowledge of the future on the part of the entrepreneur. The 
implications of 11 pure11 competition, limited, as they are, to an 
absence of monopoly, are not nearly as complex as those of 11 perfect" 
competition, and the concepts may very well be employed in 
differing contexts. At the same time, Professor Robinson has 
pointed out that 
11 ••• Professor Chamberlin's terminology 
is somewhat misleading, and pays a verbal 
tribute to the old confusion." (2) 
She suggests that it would have been better to define 11 perfect 11 
competition in the terms used for 11 pure" competition, with the 
. . 
result that the particular theorist would be obliged to state 
specifically his assumptions for each problem. As far as Cham-
berlin's view of 11 perfection11 is concerned, Professor Robinson 
appears to regard him as being not sufficiently explicit. 
11 He seems to associate imperfection 
simply ~Qth differentiation of the 
product. 11 (3) 
Professor Robinson denies the validity of this argument and 
suggests that 
"Physical differentiation is not a 
necessary condition for market 
imperfection. 11 (4) 
She proceeds to the example of two firms producing articles which 
are exactly alike, distinguishable only by the manufacturers' 
names and therefore experiencing different scales of preference 
(1) Ibid., p. 6. 
(2) 1What is Perfect Competition?' ,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
November 1934, p. 105. 
(3) Ibid., p. 112. 
(4) Ibid., p. 112. 
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amongst buyers. (l) At the same time, she points out that differen-
tion is not a sufficient condition for imperfection either, and 
indicates that two firms may be producing differentiated commodities 
which they sell in a perfect market. (2) If all individual buyers 
displayed the same preferences for one of the two products and, 
depending on the relative prices of each, would deal with only 
one of the two firms at any one timeJ demand for any one of the 
products would be perfectly elastic and competition could thus be 
perfect. In the case of "necessary conditions 11 for imperfection 
on the market, Chamberlin(3 ) has pointed out a flaw in Professor 
Robinson's argument by sho'!Ning that The Theory of ~wnopolistic 
Competition explicitly recognizes the significance of Trade Names 
as a means towards product differentiation. (4 ) As far as the 
"sufficient conditions" are concerned, Chamberlin has attempted 
to indicate that Professor Robinson's example, although true, is 
impossible to parallel in real life, and therefore of little 
analytical value. Triffin, in his Monopolistic Competition and 
General Equilibrium Theory( 5), points out, with the aid of com-
parative extracts from the writings of both the authors, that both 
Chamberlin and Robinson are 11 tackling, in fact, the same general 
problem", with the exception that Professor Robinson does not 
mention Patents in her examples of product differentiation. 
Triffin considers this omission to reflect partly the suggestion, 
made by Professor Chamberlin, that 
11 Mrs Robinson still conceives of monopoly 
and competition as mutually exclusive, 
and not as analytical and complementary 
aspects of one and the same reality."(6) 
In this respect Mr Kaldor makes a helpful distinction(?) between 
monopolies (in the form, for example, of patents) and 11 imperfect 
competition" (in the form of competition between monopolists). 
(1) Ibid., p. 112. R.F. Kahn, in his article, 'Some Notes on 
Ideal OutputtJ Economic Journal, March 1935, writes: 
"Competition is imperfect if the price obtainable by an 
individual firm is not independent of its own output, or, in 
other words, if the demand for the individual firm is not 
perfectly elastic." (p. 20) 
(2) Ibid., p. 111. 
(3) 'Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition?',p. 568. 
(4) The Theory of Monopolistic Competition; p. 56 
(5) Cambridge, Mass., 1949, p. 37. 
(6) Ibid., p. 42. 
(7) 'Professor Chamberlin on Monopolistic and Imperfect Competi-
tion' , p. 528. 
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Horace G. White, Jnr., in an article entitled 'A Review of Hono-
polistic and Imperfect Competition Theories'(l), points out that 
Professor Robinson holds Chamberlin's terminology (in so far as it 
refers to perfect competition) to imply that perfect competition 
is identifiable with the notion of "free entry into, and normal 
profits in, an industry in long period equilibrium. 11 ( 2) He points 
out that in this respect Chamberlin's terminology is superior~ 
since his "perfect" competition includes the concept of free entry 
while Professor Robinson's suggestion that costs of entry are not 
exclusive to "imperfect" competition, (but apply also under conditions 
of 11 perfect 11 competition), would indicate that they must exist under 
conditions of 11 pure" competition as well. As v.Jhite points out, a 
valuable feature of Chamberlin's terminology is that it possesses 
a greater degree of clarity and also that 
" ••• an attractive feature of the distinction 
between 1 pure' and 'perfect' competition 
(is) that the traditional association of 
mechanical perfections with the latter 
is not upset, while a wholly new term is 
applied to the conditions which Mrs 
Robinson postulates."(3) 
The issue which might now be raised is that the Robinsonian 
analysis fails to combine the two extremes of monopoly and competi-
tion and indeed tends to regard the two as being mutually exclusive. 
Chamberlin, on the .other hand, has striven for and achieved a blend 
of ·both. 
Professor Chamberlin, in his article, 'Honopolistic Competition 
Revisited' (4) indicates that one of the major differences between 
the "Theory of Monopolistic Competition" and the 11 Theory of 
Imperfect Competition" is the fact that, while the former takes 
cognizance of the possibility of fusing "Monopoly" and "Competition11 
into a single body of analysis, the L~tter treats them as if they 
were separate entities, leaving the "conventional dichotomy as 
sharp as ever". ( 5) He points out that "monopoly" in the Robin-
sonian vievl means control over supply in the industry sense, 
and, should the industry consist of one firm, only in this sense 
would it apply to the firm. In this regard, Professor Robinson's 
analysis retains a Iviarshallian quality. In order to clarify 
(1) American Economic Review, December 1936. 
(2) Ibid., p. 642. 
(3) Ibid., p. 642. 
(4) Economica, November 1951. 
(5) Ibid., p. 360. 
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the position, Triffin(l) suggested that Professors Chamberlin and 
Robinson held divergent views on the definition and nature of 
monopoly, and maintained that the latter's diagrams resembled cases 
of simple monopoly, while the former's contained analyses of the 
final equilibrium position of one seller in relation to his 
competitors. The difference in approach then becomes clear. 
Professor Chamberlin assumes that all firms will be selling the 
same quantities at the same prices, and proceeds to examine the 
reactions which take place throughout the system in so far as 
individual and group equilibrium are concerned. Professor Robinson 
on the other hand, assuines that all firms, but one (within the group), 
are in eq~librium, and devotes most of her analysis to 
considering how that individual firm will achieve equilibrium. 
The structure of mutual interdependence evolved in The Theory o! 
Monopolistic Competition and based on the price/output relationships 
of all firms within a group, is absent from the work of Professor 
Robinson, who 
"retains for study, not changes in 
production by other firms in the group, 
but only the entry or exit of firms and 
arbitrary shifts in the total demand for 
the commodity turned out by the industry. 11 (2) 
Another distinction between Chamberlin's and Robinson1 s points 
of view has been indicated by Triffin. In this connection, he 
attempts to show that the different definitions of the sales curve 
of the individual seller used by both of the authors, has an 
important influence in determining the direction of the theories~J) 
Professor Robinson writes 
11 In an industry which is conducted in 
conditions of imperfect competition, a 
certain difficulty arises from the fact 
that the individual demand curve for the 
product of each of the firms composing 
it will depend to some extent upon the 
price policy of the others. 11 (4) 
In this respect, she is obviously in agreement with Professor 
Chamberlin. However, as far as the incorporation of this concept in 
diagrammatic form is concerned, Professor Robinson holds that 
the individual firmts demand curve is able only to indicate the 
(1) Honopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, p. 42. 
(2) Ibid., p.44. 
(3) Ibid., p. 44. 
(4) The Economics of Imperfect Competition, p. 21. 
"full effect upon the sales of that 
form which results from any change in the 
price which it charges, whether it causes a 
a c.hange in the prices charged by the others 
or not. 11 (1) 
This is additionally interesting, since Professor Robinson does 
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not distinguish between conditions of equilibrium for 11 smalll' and 
"large" groups as Professor Chamberlin does. Triffin has pointed 
out( 2)that among Chamberlin's solutions, only one for the small 
group fits the approach taken by Robinson and takes into account 
in the sales curve the seller's "full influence, direct and 
indirect, upon the situation. 11 (J) In the "large group" case, 
the difference in approach is obscured, since Chamberlin assumes 
that no sellers will react to the moves of an individual competitor. 
Diagrammatically the distinctions arise from the use of Chamberlin's 
DD 1 curve, which indicates clearly the influence of factors 
external to the firm on group equilibrium, while, as has already 
been indicated, Professor Robinson's curve is essentially one 
representing pure monopoly. 
In summarizing the nature of the distinctions, Triffin concludes 
that, had Chamberlin made an assumption similar to that of 
Robinson' s, i.e.. that all firms but one are in equilibrium, his 
diagram in the large group would have been similar to Professor 
Robinson's, with dd1 not shifting and DD' not appearing. (4) In 
this context it would seem as if the difference lies in the starting 
points of the respective analyses. In the small group case, the 
fact that Professor Robinson includes the interdependence charac-
teristics in her analysis already, means that her dd 1 curve does not 
shift, while, under any circumstances (even using Professor 
Robinson's initial assumption), Chamberlin's would have done so. 
In his 'Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition'ft,Professor 
Chamberlin has pointed out that Professor Robinson, in introducing 
her concept of "Imperfect Competition" is merely re-stating the 
well.:.known rather than providing a fruitful blend of "monopoly" 
and "competition". 
"Competition and honopoly go their ways 
without the least overlapping, and 
interference with one's categories of 
thought is held at a minimum."(5) 
(1) Ibid., p. 21. 
(2) Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, p. 45. 
(3) Ibid., p. 45 (Quoted from The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, 
p. 100). 
(4) Ibid., p. 46. 
(5) p. 572. 
16 
Chamberlin makes reference(l)to Professor Robinson's inability to 
arrange 
"actual cases .in a series of which pure 
monopoly would be the limit at one end and 
pure competition at the other."(2) 
and compares this with his own expressed belief(3) that this is a 
"cornerstone of the theory" (4). The conclusion he gives is that 
Professor Robinson does not in fact regard monopoly and competition 
as being anything but mutually exclusive, and that she appears to 
consider an individual seller to be a monopolist whether he is 
selling under conditions of perfect or imperfect competition. 
Professor Chamberlin produces a number of inferences from 
Professor Robinson's point of view. Firstly, since all profits are 
competitive in the Robinsonian system, the entire question of 
monopoly profits can be made redundant, since a broad definition 
· of an 11 industry11 will completely eliminate any possibility of 
making profits out of the control of a single product. (5) This 
is not so under conditions of monopolistic competition, where the 
fact of product differentiation permits a seller to derive 
"monopoly profits" from the sale of his product. 
Secondly, he indicates that "Free Enterprise" has consistently 
tended to become associated with the rather loose concept 11 competi-
tion11 either 11 pure11 or 11 perfect 11 • ( 6) Instead, however, it would 
' ' 
appear as if 11monopolistic competition11 is a category more suited 
to describing the outcome of 11 Free Enterprise11 , in the sense that 
under such conditions business-men will, in competing with one 
another, try to distinguish their products and indulge in the 
processes of advertising which characterize 11monopolistic competi-
tion11 as against 11 pure11 or "perfect" competition. In other 
words, "free enterprise" is merely a 11monopoly-building11 on the part 
of each seller. 
Thirdly, the question of numbers arises. We have already noted 
the distinction between the works of Professor Chamberlin and 
Professor Robinson in respect of "small" and "large" groups. 
In her tWhat is Perfect Competition'?'( 7), Professor Robinson writes: 
(1) Ibid., p. 574. 
(2) The Economics of Im:Qerfect Com:Qetition, p. 4. 
(3) The Theory of Mono:Qolistic Com12etition, pp. 63' 64. 
(4) 'Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition p. 574. 
(5) Ibid., p. 576. 
(6) Ibid., p. 576. 
( 7) Quarterl;y: Journal of Economics, November 1934. 
11 It is sometime:s supposed that for 
competition to be perfect, it is necessa~ 
that the number of buyers should be 
large. But this is the reverse of the 
truth. 11 (1) 
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However~ the suggestion that the supposition is untrue is based 
entirely on the belief that 11 perfectl1 competition can in some way 
be expanded as a concept to include the principle of product 
differentiation, and that it is possible for all buyers to be 
exactly alike in their preference~2 ) - a belief which does not 
seem to be very realistic, as Chamberlin has pointed out(J)~ and 
which Professor Robinson considers oossible only in one case; where 
there is only one buyer for each fi~m(4). Using the preceding 
argument, if there is to be perfect competition among sellers, it 
would seem that 11 monopoly11 is a necessary condition, so that this 
situation, coupled with the monopoly which has evidenced itself 
above, emerges in the new form of 11 bilateral monopoly11 ( 5). The 
reasoning then, is that for "perfect competition11 to exist, each 
seller must view his buyer as a monopsonist, and each buyer must 
view his seller as a monopolist~ 
Chamberlin and Robinson do not manage to establish any clarity 
on the exact n~~ber (if quantitative elements are in any way 
valid) of firms required to create conditions of perfect competition 
either. It is in fact not possible to determine just where the 
movement from "small" group competition to 11 large11 group competi-
tion takes place~ and for this reason the selection of a 11 number11 
of firms must perforce be arbitrary and merely illustrative.C 6) 
Professor Robinson writes: 
11vie have thus reached the conclusion that 
there is not one universal value for the 
'large number of firms' which ensures 
perfect competition. In each particular 
case, with given slopes of the marginal 
cost curves, there is a certain definite 
number of firms which will produce 
competition of an agreed degree of 
perfection, and this number, in some cases, 
may be quite small. 11 ( 7) 
(l) Ibid., p. 114. 
(2) See earlier discussion. 
(3) 'Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition'H, p. 270. 
(4) 1What is Perfect Competition?', p. 118. 
(5) 'Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition?J,p. 569, note. 
(6) Ibid., p. 569, note •. 
( 7) 1What is Perfect Competition?:', p., 118. 
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In this context Professor Robinson obviously bases her argument on 
the belief that the Marginal Cost curve is an important determinant 
of the nature of the competition prevailing within an industry. (l) 
Setting these basic issues aside for the moment, we may move on 
to an examination of the broad principles on which The Theory of 
Monopolistic Competition and The Economics of Imperfect Competition 
are based. As the study prmgresses a number of the issues 
discussed in the present chapter will be raised again and closer 
inspection of their implications for the overall Theory will be 
undertaken.; 
(1) Ibid., p. llB. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE QUESTION OF PRODUCT DIFFERE~~IATION 
In Chapter IV of The Theory of I'ionopolistic Competition, 
Professor Chamberlin provides a discussion on the nature of Product 
Differentiation. He suggests that 
11A General Class of product is 
differentiated if any significant basis 
exists for distinguishing the goods 
(or services) of one seller from those 
of another. Such a basis ~~y be real 
or fancied, so long as it is of any 
importance whatever to buyers, and leads 
to a preference for one variety of the 
product over another. Where such 
differentiation exists, even though it 
be slight, buyers will be paired with 
sellers, not by chance and at random 
(as under pure competition), but 
according to their preferences. 11 (l) 
The significance of this view must be carefully examined. 
Where the distinctions between products are real, the basis for 
differentiation might range from purely technical characteristics 
to the varieties of package in which the item is sold. The fact 
that consumers differentiate on this basis does not imply that the 
competing products perform their functions any differently, but 
may merely reflect the fact that the decision to buy one good as 
opposed to another. is a subjective one and very frequently defies 
qualitative or quantitative analysis. At the same time, differen-
tiation by consumers on the basis of intangible factors such as 
service, reputation or efficiency iL the field of retailing, is common 
and also serves to establish the limited monopolies which characterize 
conditions of monopolistic competition. 
Professor Robinson has written 
11 ••• the notion of a perfect market is 
. based on the assumption that the customers 
who make up the m.:trket all react in the 
same way to differences in the prices charged 
by different sellers. 11 (2) 
At this point the element of price enters the picture. One of the 
interesting features of the analysis is the fact that where consumers 
have established preferences for one good over the other, it is 
possible for individual sellers to charge higher prices than their 
(l) The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, p. 56. 
(2) The Economics of Imperfect Competition, p. 89. 
\ 
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competitors and still retain customers. However this principle of 
11 loyalty11 (or whatever else it may be) will be discussed at a later 
stage and a number of criticisms of the orthodox approach will 
emerge. 
The views taken by Professor Chamberlin and Professor Robinson 
on this issue display certain similarities, although they raise 
questions as to their analytical depth. No longer was the homo-
geneous grouping of exactly alike commodities possible as under 
conditions of perfect competition. A new form of product grouping 
had to replace the old~ and the result was a system disclosing 
tta number of recognizable commodities 
and 'industries' generally one for each 
seller. 11 (l) 
Professor Chamberlin, in his article 'The Product as an 
Economic Variable,( 2) has come to consider that the new approach to 
Competition theory has opened up new fields for investigation, 
particularly in so far as the 11 product" itself and 11 advertising11 
are concerned. An interesting point to emerge from his discussion 
of these two aspects of monopolistic competition is his view that 
there is no such thing as a given product selling at a given price. (3) 
The 11 Product11 itself is subject to constant modification, improve-
ment or even deterioration and the demand for it will be partially 
a function of these variables, to the extent that 
"elasticity of demand in its general sense 
of the degree of responsiveness of demand 
to a change in price, is evidently applicable 
to the product as a variable~ where the 
question becomes that of the responsiveness 
of demand to a change in product. 11 (4) 
The argument put forward is that demand for a 
11 product11 will be a function of both price and quality when compared 
with other, but essentially similar, products. At the same time, 
since 11 quality11 is not necessarily judged objectively, one product 
might very well be regarded as being 11 superior11 or "inferior" to 
another purely because the service (or some other intangible 
feature) which surrounds its sale are different. 
Before continuing with this discussion, it would be '\-Tell to 
consolidate the issues raised at the beginning of the chapter. 
We have seen what the term "product differentiation" implies 
and it is possible to turn now to its implications for 11monopoly11 
(l) Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, p. 81. 
(2) Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1953. 
(3) Ibid., p. 3. 
(4) Ibid., p. 4. 
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and 11 competition11 • Since the possibility of distinctions of one 
sort or another arising amongst a range of essentially similar 
commodities is very strong, it would appear as if heterogeneity, 
rather than homogeneity, of product is the predominant market 
characteristic and that, in effect, all products are differentiated, 
no matter how slightly. Prior to the presentation of the new 
theories, economics had attempted to explain this phenomenon with 
the aid of either the theory of 11 monopoly11 or the theory of 
11 competition11 as they then were. 
This approach raised a number of problems. The determination 
of vvhether. a product or service was a 11 monopoly11 or in competition 
with others was necessarily vague. For example, a patent or a 
copyright was held to be capable of conferring monopoly powers on 
the holder, whereas a "trade mark'' was not regarded as constituting 
much of a barrier to the competitive encroachment of other sellers. (l) 
This way of thinking not only misunderstood the essence of both 
11 monopoly11 and 11 competition11 but was largely responsible for the 
belief that the two market forms opposed each other diagonally, vdth 
no chance of being combined in a single body of analysis. 
If one considers the case of the patent and trade marks 
mentioned above, the possibility of breaking down the old dichotomy, 
as it appeared to Chamberlin, will become fairly clear. There is 
no doubt that a patent does, to a fairly large extent, confer 
certain monopoly rights upon its holder. At the same time, 
however, the fact that one producer is deriving the benefit of such 
legal protection .• generally has the effect of inciting others to 
achieve the same conditions for themselves, and the very idea that 
each individual producer is concentrating on a search for a product 
which will fulfil this function, ~nplies that the element of 
competitive enterprise will be quite strong. Taken one step 
further, no patent is likely to be sufficiently · oampr@heneive to 
cover all aspects of a particular field, with the result that, in 
spite of the existence of such limited 11monopolies 11 as arise from 
the distribution of patent rights, no individual can be completely 
barred from entering the field at all. The result of this is 
that there will, under normal conditions, always be a pressure of 
competition, potential or otherwise, surrounding each patent 
holder in a field and product characteristics will, with an increasing 
11 density11 of competitors,tend to become increasingly similar, 
even if they never become exactly the same. Another possibility 
arises. Even if a producer is far-sighted enough to buy up a 
(1) The Theorv of Monopolistic Competition, p. 57. 
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number of patents relating to a field of production, and thereby 
to ensure a greater degree of isolation from his competitors~ 
there is no reason to believe that the products which he himself 
would be manufacturing under such right~ would not be in competition 
with one another and would not possibly be very close substitutes. 
The implication is that the ability of the individual to control his 
price/output policy for any one or a number of items over which he 
has control is very much a function of the nature and number of 
the substitutes available. 
Chamberlin also mentions the issues surrounding trade-marks. (l) 
He points out the distinction which has tended· to arise., between 
trade-marks and patents. In the case of the former, the use of a 
trade-mark does not give the same control over a process of produc-
tion as it does with a patent. It definitely does permit a 
producer to distinguish quite strongly between his product and tfr~t 
of his competitor, but it does not (or so it is sometimes held) 
give the individual the same power to control price and output as 
might be the case under the more monopolistic conditions of a 
patent. Chamberlin indicates that this dichotomy is not strictly 
valid since: . 
11 Both patents and trade marks may be 
conceived of as pure monopoly elements of 
the goods to which they are attached; the 
competitive elements in both cases are the 
similarities between these goods and others. 11 (2) 
He bases this argument on the fact that, as we have already seen, 
patents, particularly single ones, do not give complete control 
over a field of business and therefore cannot be regarded as 
conferring "monopoly" powers in the strict sense of the word. 
Secondly, control is in any case a matter of degree and depends 
on the elasticity of demand for the product of any one producer. 
For this reason: 
11To neglect either the monopoly element 
in trade marks or the competitive element 
in patents by calling the first c~mpetitive 
and the second monopolistic is to push 
to opposite extremes and to represent as 
wholly different two things which are, 
in fact, essentially alike. 11 (3) 
If we examine the reasoning behind Chamberlin's analysis, we 
may conclude, with him, that monopoly in the strict sense of the 
(l) Ibid., p., 59 ff. 
(2) Ibid., p. 61. 
(3) Ibid., p. 61. 
word, implies 
11 control over the supply of all economic 
goods. 11 (l) 
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This would provide the only cond!ition under which there can, by 
definition, be no competition from substitutes. Pure Competition~ 
on the other hand, implies that all· goods constitute perfect 
substitutes for one another and that the demand curve for the 
product of each seller is perfectly elastic as a result of such 
standardization. 
11 Between the two extremes there are all 
gradations, but both elements are always 
present and must always be recognized. 11 (2) 
An aspect of the question of 11 gradations 11 was discu~sed in 
1929 by H. Hotelling(3), in an article dealing with the work of 
Sraffa.(4) The point which provided the basis for Hotellingts 
analysis was 
11 the feature of actual business ••• which 
does not seem to have been generally taken 
account of in economic theory ••• (is) the 
existence with reference to each seller 
of groups of buyers who will deal with him 
instead of with his competitors in spite of 
a difference in price. 11 (5) 
Professor Chamberlin refers to Hotelling as the single exception to 
the view that, prior to the publication of The Theory of l11onopolistic 
Competition, no writer had appreciated the need for a notion of 
11 produc.t equilibrium11 as well as 11 price equilibrium11 , or the idea of 
11 product adjustment for a given price. 11 (6) 
Hotelling's argument was that consumers are confronted by a 
selection of basically similar, but superficially differentiated 
products. The reason for this, he suggests, lies in the belief 
held by seller& that there is an inherent risk in moving too far 
out of line with the general trend, while, at the same time, 
differentiation of some sort would be desirable to avoid the 
possibility of a price war. · The matl:ematical processes employed in 
arriving at this conclusion need not be analysed here, but a rough 
indication of major points may be provided. 
Hotelling believed that the sales made by a seller are a 
(1) Ibid., p. 63. 
(2) Ibid., p. 63. 
(3) !Stability in Competition', Economic Journal, March 1929. 
(4) Economic Journal, 1926. 
(5) 'Stability in Competition', p* 44. 
(6) The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, p. 73, note. 
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function of the sellerts location along a straight 1!Linett, while the 
aggregate of sales on such a line are constant. Prices for all 
sellers along this line are uniform and products, except for 
location, are uniform; competition is based on trading convenience. 
Under such circumstances, a seller would position himself at any 
point. Where only two sellers are involved, each seller would 
position himself as closely as he could to the other, although 
Hotelling fails to indicate where this 11 cluster11 would materialize.(l) 
Under these circumstances, customer convenience would not be maxi-
mized since no seller caters specifically for buyers located at 
the quartile points. Working on the principle that 
11the market of each extends halfway to 
his nearest rival in any direction. 11 ( 2) 
each seller could increase h~s sales by moving_closer to his com-
petitor. Assuming that the point at which they are closest lies 
at the centre of the line, both sellers' markets would be equal in 
size and no one could gain from a further movement. In the case 
of larger numbers, the analysis becomes slightly more involved. 
If we assume that two sellers, such as discussed above, are located 
in the centre of the line, successive sellers would also tend to 
cluster around the same point, to the extent that, as Hotelling 
indicates in his conclusion, there will tend to be excessive 
concentration. The llline11 analogy may obviously be applied in 
the form of 11 varying density11 , or spread of ubuyers on a plane11 • ( 3 ) 
Professor Chamberlin, in the Appendix C of his The Theory of 
Monopolistic Competition, as well as in the article 'The Product as 
an Economic Variable', has pointed out that Hotelling1 s analysis 
loses some of its validity as soon as more than two sellers are 
considered, since a 11 group11 of three or more sellers is not 
possible. This is so because, were there three sellers, with one 
lying between the other two, the former would move out of the 
centre and take up a position at the edge of the group. Since 
this movement would always have the effect of leaving another 
seller in between two others, the continuous movement outward 
would tend to disperse the competitors and the excessive concen-
tration would be unlikely to arise. 
A.P. Lerner and H.W. Singer, in !Some Notes on Duopoly and 
Spatial Competitiont(4), take up the discussion of Hotellingts 
(1) Chamberlin, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1953, p. 18(5 n). 
He suggests that this cluster would be in the centre of the 
line. 
(2) Ibid., p. 18. 
(3) rstability in Competition', p. 55. 
(4) Journal of Political Economy, April 1937. 
analysis and conclude that 
11 Hotelling1 s assertion that sellers will 
cluster together is only true ••• where 
the cost of transporting a unit of 
commodity across the whole length of the 
market is less than the price each con-
sumer is willing to'pay for it. 11 (1) 
However, there is also criticism of Chamberlin's contention that 
one seller will always be attempting to move towards the outer 
edge of a 11 group11 of three. According to Lerner and Singer a 
11 third arrival will ••• go as near as 
possible to the center, where the previous 
two are located.. One of these will now 
find himself cut off from the market 
entirely, having a competitor on either 
side. He will be squeezed out of his 
middle position, but if he too considers 
the location of his competitors as given, 
he will move just past one of his 
competitors, imprisoning h~n in turn. 
If the movements are infinitesimal, the 
three producers st·ay at the center. 11 (2) 
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Another conclusion reached by the two authors is the fact that there 
is no tendency for dispersion when sellers are in pairs, particularly 
when each producer realizes that the location of his competitors is 
a function of his own position and that, for this reason, he should 
att.s.in 11 equilibrium11 as soon as he can. Since each seller will 
attempt to get as close - by virtue of the fact that this will 
increase his gains to his competitor as possible (when there are 
two), there will be a tendency to locate at the end of the line 
only when there are two sellers - not v.rhen there is only one at 
each end. The net result is, as Chrunberlin points out, that 
11 although 1 groups 1 of sellers may in 
general consist of either one or two, 
the end groups must necessarily consist of 
two sellers. 11 (3) 
In his 'Monopolistic Competition Revisited 1 ( 4), Chamberlin 
deve~qps the study of space and indicates its importance for 
Monopolistic Competetion theory. He takes up the argument from the 
point of view of an 11 abstract 11 model in which buyers are fairly 
uniformly spread over a spatial area, sellers are homogeneous 
except for spatial considerations, all charge the same price initially 
and attempt to attract customers on the basis of shopping convenience. 
The result would be an even spread of sellers over the given area 
and the fact that each seller would possess a market built of buyers 
(1) Ibid., p. 162 
(2) Ibid., p. 178. 
(3) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1953, p .. 19. 
(4) . Economica, 1951. 
( 5) Ibid., p. 346. 
(5) 
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who find his location the most convenient. By lowering price, 
any ind~vidual seller could attract more of the available custom 
prepared to travel further in order to save on the purchase. By 
raising price, the seller would lose custom but would retain 
those not prepared to travel further in order to save. The result 
is a de~~nd curve of finite elasticity for each seller, in contrast 
to the infinitely elastic demand curve found under the conditions 
of 11 pure11 and 11 perfectt1 competition. l'1.A. Copeland(i) produces a 
similar conclusion that: 
11~vhen sellers are selling unbranded goods 
of identical specifications on identical 
terms, transportation costs alone are 
sufficient to give rise to monopolistic 
competition provided buyers and sellers are 
distributed somewhat evenly over the map, 
and buyers outnumber sellers. 11 
The same sort of analysis can be applied to a situation in 
which two shops are next door to each other, but each selling a 
different type .of branded product. (2) These shops will then be 
differentiated by the conditions within·them, e.g. by 11 spatial 
separation. 11 The effect of such a situation is to create 
11 co~centrations11 of population (3) around those products, shops etc. 
which appeal most to public tastes. Producers therefore will 
endeavour to manufacture products most similar to those which are 
already popular, and the situation similar to that envisaged by 
Hotelling arises. 
The important issue which arises here, is the question of the 
nature of the distribution of sellers. In much of the above 
discussion, it hcs 'been assumed that buyers are distributed evenly 
along the line. The fact that this does not appear to be the case 
in the real world~ would seem to confuse the issue. Where it is 
held that sellers adjust to the location of buyers, and that 
these buyers are distributed, not evenly, but in correspondence 
to the principle of popu~ation concentrations, sellers will attempt 
to cater for those buyers who constitute the biggest concentrations, 
to the detriment of those who lie on the periphery. 
11 Evidently, maximum profits do not lie in 
these areas where the 'population' is 
thinly distributed. 11 (4) 
(l) 'Competing Products and Monopolistic Competition', Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, November 1940, p. 8. 
(2) Ibid., p. 347. He cites restaurants as examples. 
(3) Economica, 1951, p. 347. 
(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1953, p. 22. 
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We may n~r proceed to a more intensive analysis of the position 
of the 11 product 11 in the process of equilibrium. We have briefly 
touched on the question of product differentiation, and outlined 
a number of views on the question of space, merely to indicate the 
nature of the discussion. 
In the article 1 The Product as an Economic Variable1 , Professor 
Chamberlin points out one of the significant differences between · 
11 monopolistic 11 and 11 pure competition" in so far as their inclusion 
of important variables is concerned. V'Jhere "pure competition" 
need only be examined in the light of price/quantity relationships, 
"monopolistic" competition theory must encompass price/quantity and 
quality relationships. ln this matter we have already observed 
the significance which must be attached to the question of product 
variation and differentiation. In order to render monopolistic 
competition theory more valuable for purposes of analysis, Professor 
Chamberlin proY.des a number of possible paired relationships in 
addition to the standard price/quantity variables:(l)(i) Price-
quantity (ii) Product-quantity (iii) Advertising-quantity 
(Advertising here, covering all forms of selling costs)(
2
) 
(iv) Price-product (v) Price-advertising (vi) Advertis~ng­
Product. 
At this point, we may briefly examine a few in turn, with the 
exception of the familiar price-quantity relationship, and those 
relating to advertising without consideration of the product proper. 
Product-guantity: If we take price-quantity relationships as 
the starting point, and consider the question of elasticity of 
demand, it becomes clear that under monopolistically competitive 
conditions demand 1nust be a function not only of price, but also of 
quality. A product, for example, which lends itself to not easily 
detectable deterioration by the manufacturer might experience a 
highly inelastic demand in this respect, since the public is 
unaware of the fact that such a decline in quality is in fact taking 
place. On the other hand, if a change in the quality of an article 
makes itself obvious immediately,· the demand for it will bear a 
close relation to a variable which turns out to be one other than 
mere price. This issue becomes more important when one considers 
that it is far easier for a consumer to become aware of a change in 
price than of a change in quality, and the assumption of perfect 
knowledge, used so effectively in 11 pure 11 and "perfect11 competition 
(1) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1953, p. 3. 
(2) Ibid., p. 3, note 4. 
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theory requires.modification under the conditions of "monopolistic" 
competition. 
Another question which merits attention, is that of 11 cut 
throat11 price competition(l~ Professor Chamberlin considers the 
possibility that this type of behaviour may take on a form different 
from that experienced where prices are cut by competitors to the 
extent that they lie belcH costs. Where the product is the major 
variable, he envisages a situation where competitors struggle to 
improve their products until the point is reached where costs lie 
above prices. He also points out that under such conditions, the 
"product!' as a variable may be as eminently quantifiable as any of 
the other accepted factors in analysis such as price and quantity. 
Price- Product: This relationship of price to product is based 
on the principle that price is likely to be a function of quality and 
vice-versa. Conventional theory has held that the product is 
11 given11 so that price changes can only be considered for such 
1"given11 products. As Chamberlin has indicated, however_, it may 
well be that a competitive lowering of prices by different producers 
will result in a deterioration of product in an effort to push 
costs down. The knovJledge, on the part of customers, that a low 
price may mean an inferior product (quality-wise) will produce a 
market situation different from one in which quality considerations 
are absent and only price is held to be the important variable. 
For these reasons, price-competition is not readily resorted to 
by the competing manufacturers who appreciate the possibility that 
elasticity of demand may incr.ease with a fall in price - simply 
because consumers become wary. 
Advertising-product: Thus far we have paid no attention to 
the question of "Advertising" or selling costs as such. Reference 
will be made to it at some length later in this paper, but at this 
point it is possible to include a brief mention of one aspect of the 
problem without seriously deviating from the line of discussion. 
If, for the sake of brevity, we assume that, where prices and 
products are given, demand Hill be a function of expenditure on 
selling, it is easy to understand how another variable '(not found 
under the theoretical conditions of 11 pure11 competition) must be 
incorporated into the general body of analysis if the theory is in 
any way to explain the experiences of the real world. This 
"other variable", advertising, becomes more important if we assume 
(l) Ibid., p. 4. 
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that the product is not 11 given11 and that a relationship exists 
between such advertising and the product in question. Chamberlin 
has pointed out that 
11 ••• there is literally no such thing as a 
given product. Products are actually the 
most volatile things in the economic 
system - much more so than prices. To 
begin with, almost every product has at 
least a variable element in the circum-
stances surrounding its sale: convenience 
of location, peculiarities of shop and 
environment, personality, service ••• 
etc. 11 (l) 
Equilibrium of the firm or industry must be based on an 11 optimum 
relationship11 ( 2) between the product and advertising in addition 
to that between other variables. If it is assumed, for example, 
that price may be held constant, while both the quality and the 
expenditure on selling are varied, it is likely that quantity sold 
will be a function of both of these variables to the extent that 
they may be often regarded as 11 positi vely correlated11 (3). The 
exact nature of the relationship borne by 11 product 11 to advertising 
has not been fully analysed, but there can be no doubt as to its 
importance. 
1. Abbot(4) provides an interesting analysis of the question 
of quality and attempts to develop a theory around it. 
Chamberlin's observation that 
11 ••• no two individuals are either identical 
in tastes or identically situated relative 
to their environment ••• (and) ••• we might 
Taking 
by analogy regard buyers as distributed along 
symbolical lines in multi-dimensional space with 
respect to other aspects of the product. 11 (5) , 
he suggests that people possess 11 basic 11 and 11 derived11 wants. ( 6) 
11 Basic 11 wants may be regarded as the fundamental want for an 
experience, while 11 derived11 wants are those for a product which 
the individual believes can satisfy the 11 basic 11 vmnt. The theory 
is based on the belief that basic wants are a function of the 
individual's tastes, values and circumstances, and that there must 
be an 11 optimum attainable variety of product!' ( 7) which, if it 
(l) Ibid., pp. 8.-9 •. 
(2) Ibid., p. 7. 
(3) Ibid., p. 7. He also points out, however, that 11 advertising 
is often used to maintain sales volume in the face of quality 
deterioration". (p. 7). 
(4) L. Abbot, Quality and Competition, Columbia University Press, 
N.Y., 1955. 
(5) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1953, pp. 11-12. 
(6) Abbot, loc. cit., p. 40. 
(7) Ibid., p. 75. 
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were produced, would be able to satisfy wants exactly. Demand for 
' 
products can be e.:reated either through increasing selling expenditure, 
or altering the product itse1f, while producers will not endeavour 
to copy the products of competitors, but will rather adopt what 
they believe to be superior aspects for incorporation into their 
own products. 
In addition to these characteristics, Abbot suggests that his 
theory introduces certain distinctions between itself and the 
"current theory of competitive markets 11 (l), since the latter has 
provided a 11 valueless~ 2 ) concept of an 11 industry11 (J). However, 
as he points out, if one accepts the notion of basic wants, a group 
of products may be considered capable of achieving specific ends, 
and may legitimately be considered constituents of the same 
industry(4). There is no need at this stage to elaborate on 
Abbott s 11 distinctions 11• Suffice it to mention a few of his 
conclusions: 
(a) 11 Socially useful entrepren~1Jrjnlxtivity11 ( 5) must include 
attempts to inform buyers about the nature of available 
products, as well as to adapt products to wants. 
(b) ''Product heterogeneity, variation and advertising11 (b). 
are indispensible in the attainment of competitive 
equilibrium. · 
(c) Advertising is no alternative to changes in price, i.e. a 
reduction in the latter affects those already familiar 
with the product, while an increase in expenditure on 
the former attracts new customers. 
We have already mentioned the concept of the 11 group11 or 
11 industry11 , and the significance of the question of 11 substitutability11 • 
Where the principle of 11 product differentiation11 occupies so 
important a part of the analysis, and where a number of producers 
are held to be in competition with one another, the exact nature 
of the 11 product11 in question must be specified. For example, a 
motor car of make A may be regarded as being in 11 competition11 
with a motor car of make B, but it is also possible that, in so 
'(l) Ibid., .P• 80 
(2) Ibid., p. 81. 
(3) The question of the "industry" is discussed below. 
(4) Abbot, loc. cit., p. 82. 
( 5) Ibid., p. 205. 
(6) Ibid., p. 205. 
- ' .... ...._ 
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far as the consumer's money is concerned, both makes might be in 
competition with a bicycle. It is the problem of defining the 
outer limits of the 11 group11 which has confronted theorists since 
the introduction of the works on monopolistic competition, and the 
problem of adequately c L:1.ssifying a wide range of produc,ts into 
the 11 pigeonholes11 of competing or non-competing goods is not easily 
solved. 
Professor Robinson defines an 11 industry11 as 
11 ••• any group of firms producing a 
single commodity ••• bounded on all 
sides by a marked gap between itself 
and its closest substitutes. 11 (1) 
This definition provides a vie1r.J of her attitudes towards both 
11 industries 11 and 11 commodities11 and indicates the important relation-
ship between the two. 
Professor Chamberlin appears to have been more appreciative of 
the problems which beset the definition of a 11 group11 (which, at 
this stage, may be regarded as a classification of similar purpose 
to Professor Robinson's ,"industry"). (2 ) His definition is naturally 
based on the view that there may exist a number of producers, each 
selling a simih'lr, but slightly differentiated product, and therefore 
constituting monopolies unto themselves, in spite of the fact that 
they are not entirely isolated from their competitors as would be 
the case under conditions of pure monopoly. The very fact, however, 
that no products are exactly alike - whether the distinctions drawn 
by the customers are based on sound objective judgement (rationality) 
or merely on a vague, subjective impulse (irrationality) - means 
that it is highly unlikely that any two producers will experience 
the same conditions of cost and ee~1.nd. For this reason, the term 
11 group11 of competing producers may be. used to cover those producers 
who manufacture products lying within sets of "price classes", even 
if technical similarities are non-existant. (3 ) 
11 ••• A group may be large or small, depending 
upon the degree of generality given to the 
classification ••• 11 (4) 
Triffin( 5) has pointed out that neither Chamberlin nor Robinson 
(1) The Economics of Imperfect Competition, p. 17. 
(2) The Theory of l'ilonopolistic Competition, p. 81 ff. 
(3) Ibid., p. 103. 
(4) Ibid., p. 103. 
(5) Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, p. 67. 
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discuss the relationships which exist between groups, and confine 
their analysis to the equilibrium of the firm and industry without 
considering thB possibility of establishing general equilibrium. 
We have already discussed Triffin's views of Professor Robinson's 
sales curve. He points out(l) the inherent diffi~ulty of determining 
the extent of the 11 gap11 lying between a product and its substitutes, 
and suggests that Mr Kaldor's( 2) view on the subject constitutes 
appropriate criticism. Kaldor has pointed out that the 11 gap11 
will be different for different producers as well as for different 
substitutes. Some substitutes, for example, will be close to or 
11 further away" from a particular good, and the degree of com-
petitiveness or substitutability will naturally be a function of 
this "distance". 
Chamberlints attitude would appear to elicit more approval 
from Triffin, although he suggests that Professor Robinson's view 
possesses a measure of analytical_ value. (3 ) The main point which 




this form of competition can no longer be analysed 
lines of homogeneous infinitely elastic substitutes. 
time, Triffin points out that 
11Nonopolistic competition robs the old concept 
of industry (and also the Chamberlinian group) 
of any theoretical significance. As soon 
as the elasticity of substitution between 
two products is recognized as imperfect, 
their sellers can pursue independent price 
policies. 11 (4) 
This argument is based on the belief (fashioned on a "mixture" of 
At 
Chamberlinian and Robinsonian reasoning, but producing an entirely 
different conclusion) that all 11 products 11 compete in one way or 
another, to eithera greater or a lesser extent, for the income of 
the consumer, and there is little to be derived from the fact that 
it is easier to group certain products on the basis of technical 
similarity than it is others. 
" ••• when competition is discussed in general 
abstract terms, we may just as well make the 
group (or industry) co-extensive vdth the 
whole economic collectivity. The problems 
are the same and the collectivity is no 
greater. 11 (5) 
(l) Triffin, lac. cit., p. 83. 
(2) 1Mrs Robinson's Economics of Imperfect Competition', Economica 
August 1934, pp. 339-340. 
(3) Triffin, lac. cit., p. 84 ff. 
(4) Ibid., p. 88. 
(5) Ibid., p. 88. 
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In order to provide a more adequate explanation of the question 
of the interrelationships between firms, Triffin begins with 
Chamberlin's distinction between "large" and "small" groups. (l) 
The group may be regarded as being large if 
11 
••• any adjustment of price or of tproductt 
by a single producer spreads its influence 
over so many of his competitors that the 
impact felt by any one is negligible and 
does not lead him to any readjustment of his 
own situation."(2) 
He then proceeds to determine the degree of competition prevailing 
by examining the effect on Total Revenue and price of the competing 
firms if any of their number should change his. He also considers 
the possibility that one firm may be more affected by a change in 
the price/ output policy of one of h.s competitors than that 
competitor would be were the same firm to change ~ price/output 
policy. Whilst it is not necessary to analyse in detail Triffin's 
technique, suffice it to say that it led to a revision of Chamber-
lin's 11 large group11 case and produced a 
11 single coefficient ••• to distinguish 
systematically between the various types 
of market interdependence. 11 (3) 
The coefficient, the value of wh~ch is:;::~ is a partial derivative, 
in elasticity form, in which p refers to price and q to 
demand or sales quantities. Subscripts l and 2 refer to the firms~ 
which are regarded as separate. If the coefficient equals zero, 
there is no relationship (in the form of interdependence) between 
the firms. If this is the case, it may be accepted that, should 
firm l alter its price/output policy, firm 2 will not react since 
its own sales will remain unaffected. , In such a case, firm l may 
be regarded as an isolated seller as far as firm 2 is concerned. 
As soon as the coefficient becomes finite, firms 1 and 2 are 
heterogeneous competitors, and when it tends towards infinity, the 
competitors may be called homogeneous. Where the coefficient 
is negative, the goods wpich the firms are selling are heterogeneous 
complements. 
11 To find the value of the coefficient, the 
effects of a fall in pi, on q2, q3 and q4 
••• are observed. Finally, it is made 
explicit that, while pi varies, p2, p3, p4 
••• remain constant. 11 (4) 
(l) Ibid., p. 100 
(2) The TheorY of Monopolistic.Competition, p. 83. 
(3) Triffin, lac. cit.', p. 141. 
(4) · s. l'leintraub: t The Classifica-tion of Market Positions: 
Comment', Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1942, p. 666. 
'-
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We must accept the proposition(l) that Triffin's 'hetero-
geneous competition" conveys the same meaning as Professor Chamber-
lin's "Monopolistic Competition11 and Professor Robinson's 
"Imperfect Competition11 • "Homogeneous Competition'' can be equated 
with 11 Pure Competition11 • ( 2 ) 
In this matter Weintraub's article proposes that the classifi-
cation procedure might be simplified a good deal by merely examining 
the effects of a fall in pi on the ratio dq2 • This ratio•, which he 
refers to as the "quantity ratio11 (J ), q2 he proposes should 
replace the Triffin 11 coefficient 11 • He points out that, for 
example, in the case of Homogeneous Competition a value of minus l 
would appear, since the full demand for the output of firm 2 would 
have been transferred to firm 1~4) Similarly, for Heterogeneous 
Competition the yield would lie between zero and minus l, and for 
Heterogeneous Complementarity, the result would be positive and 
less than unity. If pi rises, the situation becomes slightly more 
complex, but detailed analysis is not required here. 
Weintraub also points out in his article that Triffin~s 
assumption of constant prices only applies to conditions of isolated 
selling( 5)and in a few other cases, but that, in the main, it is 
an 11unnecessary, restrictive anachronism11 (6). In his 1 Reply 1 ~ 
Triffin suggests that this question of interdependence of price only 
arises in the case of oligopoly, but that in most other cases, firm, l 
can safely consider p2, p3 ••• as "parameters, independent of its· 
own actions. 11 ( 7) Under conditions of oligopoly, the Marshallian 
demand curve can obviously not be used. 
Weintraub's final major criticism of Triffin is the suggestion 
that the latter's coefficient produces little more of value than 
the traditional technique of examining demand elasticity~ This 
however, is not so, since, as Triffin points out(S), the measurement 
of the simple elasticity of demand cannot distinguish effectively 











loc. cit., p. 666. 




(7) Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1942, p. 674 ff. 
(8) Ibid., p. 676. 
over a range of competitive relationships, such as oligopoly and 
Monopolistic Competition, but rather, is only able to discern the 
two market situations of traditional theory: Monopoly and Pure 
Competition. 
There has, however, since the publication of the articles of 
Triffin and Weintraub,.been a certain amount of discussion on the 
validity of Triffin's assumptions regarding the "industry" or 
"group". 
Andreas G. Papandreou, in his article entitled 1Market 
Structure and Monopoly Powert(l), points out that Triffin's 
coefficient is confusing, in that since 
11 ••• in a purely competitive situation, 
the cross-elasticity of demand for the 
product of the firm i in terms of price 
of the product of firm j becomes zero, 
in terms of actual or realizable changes 
in the volume of firm its sales. On 
these grounds, however, we should consider 
every pure competitor as being a pure 
monopolist! It seems impossible •.• 
to distinguish between pure competition 
and pure monopoly on the basis of Dr 
Triffin's criterion. 11 (2) 
In order to provide a basis for his analysis, Papandreou 
points out the necessity for having some definition of a 11 group11 
or 11 ,industry11 , if only to obtain a criterion for empirical 
investigation. To this end, he suggests that: 
"Our group-centred industry concept is 
defined to include all the firms which 
compete in selling with one another ••• 
The group must in fact fulfil two 
conditions: (a) any two firms in the 
group must compete and (b) no firm must 
be left out of the group if it competes 
with all the firms in it. 11 (3) 
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Theodore Morgan's article 'A Measure of Monopoly in Sellingr(4), 
provides a coefficient indicating the extent of a firm's isolation 
from the competitive process, and expresses this in terms of the 
relative size of the firm and the substitutability of the product 
of that firm and the products of its competitors. The ;i,nsulation 
is a function of an increase in the former and a decrease in the 
latter, and can be used to obtain an idea of the relevant 11 group11 
cohesion. 
(1) American Economic Review, September 1949. 
(2) Ibid., p. 889. 
(3) Ibid.~ p. 887. 
(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1946, p. 461. 
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Bain(l) has written that the .rate of excess profit found in a 
firm will determine the extent of its monopoly powers. This excess 
profit he conside-rs to arise from 11 a discrepancy between price and 
average costt1 ( 2), while he suggests that 
" ••• a monopoly is conventionally defined 
as a situation involving a discrepancy 
between price and marginal cost. 11 (3) 
The value of his analysis can be seen quite readily if one considers 
his "three sources of excess profits": (a) a lack of freedom of 
entry (b) monor~ly in the selling market, and (c) monopoly in the 
buying market.(4) In order to provide a suitable working definition 
of monopoly profits, Bain finds it necessary to bring in the 
principle of future rents thus: 
"The rate of profit is ••• that rate 
which, when used in discounting the 
future rents of the enterprise, equates 
their capital value to the cost of those 
assets which would be held by the firm 
if it produced its present output in 
competitive equilibrium. 11 
The value of this procedure of aLalysis is to indicate fairly 
accurately the extent of the competition prevailing in an "industry" 
or "group" on the basis of the nature of the profits being IIkJ.de by 
firms in it. This is obviously an entirely different method of 
estimating the degree of substitutability between products and does 
not require the use of the elasticity coefficient as is the case 
above. 
Two older approaches which merit consideration are those of 
P .H. Sweezy and A.P. Lerner. 
In an article entitled tOn the Definition of Monopolyt(.5) 
Paul Sweezy suggests that a seller could be called a monopolist if 
the demand curve for his product is not dependent upon either its 
price or the profit or loss he experiences.. The significance of 
the first criterion is obvious, in that an inelastic demand curve 
would be necessary, while in the second case profits, no matter how 
large, made by the seller must, of necessity, have no influence on 
the plans of potential competitors. This, according to Sweezy, 
will provide suitable conditions of isolation for the seller and he 
may then be termed a "monopolist". 
(1) Joe S. Bain, 1The Profit Rate as a Measure of Monopoly Power', 
Quarterll Journal of Economics, February 1941, p. 271. 
(2) Ibid., p. 273. 
(3) Ibid., p. 273. 
(4) Ibid., p. 273. 
(5) QuarterlJ!: Journal of Economics, February 1937, p. 362. 
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Sweezy proceeds on this basis. Should the price criterion be 
fulfilled_, while, at the same time, the profit criterion is not, i.e. 
where profits do provide some sort of incentive to potential 
competitors to offer or withdre"w substitutes, the situation would, 
according to the author, display characteristics s~nilar to 
Chamberlin's "Monopolistic Competition". On the other hand, where 
the position is reversed, i.e. where the profit criterion is ful-
filled, but the price is not, a situation similar to Chamberlin1 s 
"oligopoly" arises. From the above, it will be readily observed 
that, should, at any one moment in time, either one or both of the 
criteria not be fulfilied, the question of monopoly must be set 
aside and the issue of group 11 equilibrium11 brought to the fore. 
Should the demand curve prove to be independent of neither of the 
two variables simultaneously, Sweezy has suggested that the situation 
would correspond to Chamberlin's "monopolistic competition with 
oligopoly". (l) 
A.P. Lerner, in his article 1 The Concept of Monopoly and the 
Measurement of Monopoly Power'( 2) suggests that monopoly power can 
be detected by examining the divergence between marginal costs and 
P-C where P = average revenue, through the use of the formula: p 
price and C = marginal cost. The use of this formula >dll 
provide an index of monopoly power. It is essentially a formulation 
of Mrs Robinson's proposals (see above). 
In an article by J.S. Bain(3 ) the writer indicates that the 
prevailing system of market classification i.e.' that developed by 
Chamberlin, Robinson and Picks is unsatisfactory, in that it is 
11 
••• based upon a rather sketchy and 
incomplete group• of genuine empirical 
generalizations. 11 (4) · 
The result of this has been an over-simplification of real 
conditions and severe limitation of the capacity of the generali-
zations to be empirically verified. One of his primary criticisms 
is the fact that, in the work of Professor Robinson, a given demand 
curve is assumed and estimates as to price and output are made 
from it. This he suggests is fallacious reasoning, since in fact, 
(l) Ibid., p. 363 .. 
(2) Review of Economic Studies, _Ll933-34. 
(3) 1Market Classifications in Modern Price Theo~t, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, August 1942. 
(4) Ibid., p. 561. 
I· 
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Demand curves cannot be ascertained ex, ante_, and therefore have no 
empirical validity. Naturally, the usefulness of the curve is 
reduc~d even more by the treatment (which we have already examined) 
which Professor Robinson accords the question of interdependence. 
The high level of subjeftive estimation embodied in the Robinsonian 
Demand curve leaves, according to Bain, the entire analysis devoid 
of any empirical content. (l) 
Chamberlin's contribution, however, 1rrould seem to be of greater 
empirical value.(2 ) Bain indicates that Chamberlin does not 
commence his analysis with a 11 given11 Demand curve, but selects 
rather 
11 certain direct empirical generalizations, 
all elements of which are susceptible 
to easy practical ascertainment. 11 (3) 
The generalizations here are those relating to the 
"effect of associated price behaviour 
of the number of sellers in a 1market 1 
and of the degree of differentiation of 
the product within a 1markett 11 .(4) 
At the same time, Bain points out that Chamberlin's empirical 
observations regarding the fact that various markets display 
differing characteristics both in products and prices, are not very 
advanced. An important omission from the work of Chamberlin, it 
would appear, is the fact that the latter has failed to consider 
m~rket characteristics other than numbers and differentiation, 
and his market classification, therefore, lacks the detail 
necessary 11 for further theorizing11 ( 5). On the basis of 
11 such significant market characte.ris-
tics as nun1ber of sellers, differentiation 
of product, durability of good, importance 
of product-variation, nwnber of buyers, 
and consumers' or producers 1 goodU(6), 
Bain constructs a more complex classification of market positions:(?) 
(1) Ibid., p. 564. 
(2) Ibid., p. 565. 
(3) Ibid., p. 565. 
(4) Ibid., p. 565. 
(5) Ibid., p. 568. 
( 6) Ibid., p. 569. 
(?) Ibid., p. 573. 
I Few Sellers 
A) Producer's goods; product variation unimportant. 
1. Durable 
a) Differentiated in important degree. 
i) Many buyers. 
ii) Few buyers. 
b) Undifferentiated or only slightly differentiated. 
' 
i) 1'-iany buyers. 
ii) Few buyers. 
2. Non durable; only slightly differentiated. 
a) Hariy buyers. 
b) Few buyers. 
B) Consamerts g~ods; many buyers. 
~. Differentiated. 
a) Durable. 
i) Product variation important. 
ii) Product variation unimportant. 
b) Non-durable; product variation unimportant. 
2. Non-differentiated; non-durable; product 
variation unimportant. 
II Many Sellers 
A) Producer's goods; slightly differentiated; 
product variation unimportant; non durable. 
l. l1any buyers. 
2. Few buyers. 
B) Consumer's goods; many buyers; differentiated in 
important degree. 
1. Durable; product variation important. 
2. Non durable; product variation unimportant. 
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CHAPTER III 
We may now turn to an examination of the question of "equili-
brium". Since much of the theory of Monopolistic Competition 
rotates around this point, the discussion should, for purposes of 
clarity, be divided into two parts: the equilibrium of the 
individual firm and the equilibrium of the group or industry as 
orthodox Chamberlinian and Robinsonian analysis came to view it. 
The Firm: In the initial pages of The Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition(l), Chamberlin takes care to point out that 11 equilibrium11 
must be distinguished from the equation of Supply and Demand, for 
the simple reason that the latter indicates only the point at which 
demand and supply are equal and not why that point in particular should 
be chosen. The curves are drawn on the assumption that they would 
represent the quantities bought and sold if certain prices prevailed, 
but fail to indicate why these prices should prevail. 
Chamberlin pro'fides the example of a monopolist, faced with 
Supply and Demand curves which intersect (and therefore, obviously, 
achieve a point of 11 equation11 ), who chooses, in v-iew of his market 
position (characterized by a lack of rivals who might possibly 
undercut him), to charge a price higher than this point would seem 
to warrant, since this would maximize his total profit. (2) Whilst 
the curves do not intersect at this higher price point, the seller 
might still be regarded as being in 11 equilibriwn11 (since he is 
maximizing his total profit) and the D :lmand an.d Supply curves may 
still be regarded as being equated but at a lower price. Since it 
is likely that any slight deviation from the monopoly price will be 
countered by a tendency to return, the argument of 11 equilibrium11 
is reinforced. Since the Demand curve in this case is also the 
Average Revenue curve, the illustration might be refined by the use 
of an additional example. If we imagine the curve of I\1arginal 
Revenue under the Demand curve, the total revenue from the sale of a 
given quantity of goods will be indicated by the relevant area under 
the Marginal Revenue curve. This total revenue will be 1'maximized11 
at the point of equilibrium mentioned above, since any increment in 
output after this production position will add more to costs than 
to revenue. 
Since the brief analysis above may also be applied to cunditions 
of perfect competition~ it will be readily appreciated that only 
(l) p. 12 ff. 
(2) p. 13. 
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under such conditions can the point of 11 equilibrium11 correspond 
to the price at which demand and supply are equated. 
Chamberlin proceeds to consider the possibility that individual 
equilibrium may be achieved through the adjustment of either 11 price11 
or 11 product 11 or both simult:l.neously(l) In the case of a set price, 
unalterable on the part of the seller for any number of reasons 
such as convention, trade practice, resale price maintenance 
(in the case of a retailer), the individual equilibrium >dll have 
to be attained through adjustment of the product e.g. superficial. 
quality changes or changes in the fundamental nature of the article 
itself. Conversely, if the 11product 11 itself is not easily varied, 
adjustment will have to be in the form of price changes. 
Let us first consider the case in which the 11 product11 is 
given and prices are variable. 
An assumption which must be made is that conditions regarding 
all substitute goods are giveo.. In the following diagram (2) 
y 
DDt and ppt respectively represent the Demand and Cost curves for 
a single seller. In this context the Cost curve indicates the 
economies of large scale production by falling to a minimum point and 
then rising.. The principle is that, where output is small, unit 
costs of production will be high. As output increases such costs 
will fall to a point, subsequent to which they will rise as certain 
diseconomies such as, for example, overcomplexity, arise. ppt 
must either be intersected by the Demand curve at two points, or be 
at a tangent to it. If it lay above it at all points, Average 
Costs would exceed Average Revenue for any output; consequently, 
(1) p •. 74. 
(2) Ibid .. ,, p. 75 •. 
\ 
\. 
production of the good would be uneconomic. It is assumed that 
the relative positions of the curves are as indicated in the 
diagram. The Average Revenue curve itself slopes downward from 
left to right, since it is assumed under conditions of monopolistic 
competition that the-presence of fairly close substitutes will induce 
a shift of customers away -from a .seller shoul.d he rais.e his pric.e, 
and towards him should he lower it. He will, .however, not lose. 
all his customers with a moderate price. change,. nor will he gain 
all those of his competitors, since buyers establish extra-economic 
preferences for dealing with specific sellers. The nature of these. 
will.be discussed at a later stage, but attention has already been 
briefly given to the shape of the demand curve. 
The curveDD' lies.below PPT to the left because the existence 
of substitutes as v.fell as. other factors means that demand will 
decrease to zero at a certain price, and the fact that costs of 
one sort or another (fixed, variable or risk) have.always to be 
covered, no m...q,tter what the scale of production, means that the 
curve ppr will meet the y axis at infinity. It will lie below it 
to the right because eventually demand must fall to zero,.while 
costs will inevitably be rising, after the nadir of the curve PP 1 
has been. reached. 
Using Chamberlin's notatiors and assuming that the curve ppt 
includes, at every point, llminimum profit necessary to secure-the 
entrepreneurs services"(.l); the ultimate price charged by the sel1er 
will be AR, .sinc.e at this point, the area of profit EHRF is· a 
maximum. Consequently,the.output sold will.beOA. If DD 1 and 
PP 1 were at a tangent to one another, the only price which would not 
result in a loss for the seller is AR, in which case, the output 
would be OA. The matter may be put in another way, in that, 
11 the point of maximum profit iik'lY also 
be defined ~Qth reference to curves of 
marginal costs and marginal revenue. 11 (2) 
In the diagram above, these are represented by ppt and dd' res-
pectively. Production will be carried up to the point OA where 
these two curves intersect, since after this, increments of output 
will add more to costs than to revenue. The relevant price will 
be dictated by the point where the extended perpendicular AQ cuts 
the Average Revenue curve 
AR. 
(l) Ibid., p. 77. 
(2) Ibid., p. 77 
in this case at R, so that the price is 
According to Triffin 
11 
••• the whole behaviour of the producer is 
assumed to be directed towards the 
maximization of his monetary profit i.e. 
of the positive difference between his 
revenue and his costs ••• Corresponding to 
each level of output (x), _there exists n 
minimum total cost C (x) and a maximum 
total revenue R(x), the difference 
between which constitutes the firm's 
profit1T(x) 11.(l) 
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Let us now examine a situation in which price is given and the 
11 product11 is the variable element. The value of such nnalysis will 
becJme evident when the discussion of retailing arises, since the 
variation of the product under such circumstances is a common 
phenomenon. Where, as has already been observed, the variation 
of price by a seller has no impact on the cost of production curve, 
ppr may be assumed to be unchanged. However, variation of the 
product may be generally considered to cause a shift in the 
position of the cost curve, since changes :.:tre frequently of a 
qualitative nature requiring increased expenditure on design, raw 
materials, equipment, etc. The net result is that 
11 ••• the problem becomes that of selecting 
a 1 product 1 whose cost nnd whose market 
allow the largest total profit, price 
being given.u(2) 
Further, the fact that 11 product 11 changes are basically qualitative 
means that graphical representation is more difficult than is the 
case where price changes only are being considered, and it is 
necessary to provide a number of diagrams, each of which will 
refer to a variety of the 11 product 11 • 
Chamberlin has devised a system which will serve our 
(l) Honopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, p., 20. 
Further: "the firm chooses the level of output that 
maximizes: 
lT = R(x) - C(x) 
Putting the first derivative of'Ttwith relation to x = 0, we 
get the necessary condition: 
dTi = dR dC = 0 dR dC or = 
dx dx dx dx dx 
or marginal revenue =marginal cost." 
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If we take OE as the fixed price, and consider only two varieties 
of the product, called, in tbis case, A and B (and depicted 
simultaneously on the ·diagrern). with the Cost of Production curve of 
each represented by AA' and BB' respectively, the amount of A 
demanded (at price OE) will be OG, while the amount of B demanded 
(at the same fixed price) will be OH. For product variety A, 
total profits will be CRME and total costs OGRC. Similarly, 
for variety B,_ total profits will be DQNE and total costs will be 
OHQD. Chamberlin points out in this connection, that EN must not 
be considered a demand line "indicating indefinitely large demand 
at the price OE11 ( 2). Each variety of product will experience a 
limited demand dependent upon the nature and price of the product in 
question, as well as those of substitutes. There is then, no 
possibility of moving along a Cost curve in order to find the 
optimum output determined by 11 profitability11 ; movement is only 
possible from one curve, say AA', to another, BB', since this will 
imply a change in the nature of the product while output in each 
case remains strictly defined.. In the case above, variety B would 
appear to be a superior choice, since, although its Cost curve lies 
higher than that for variety A, profits are larger. Demand6 
it should also be pointed out, is not the sole criterion for judging 
the 11 superiority11 of one variety over the other, since it is only a 
valuable concept when relative costs of production have been taken 
into consideration. 
Both diagrams may now be combined in order to indicate the 
optimum combination of price and product which will produce the 
largest total profit •. 
(l) Ibid., p. _79 
(2) Ibid., p. 79. 
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There is no need to consider Professor Robinson's approach to 
the problem of determining the equilibrium of the individual firm, 
since it is essentially similar to Professor Chamberlin's in ~~ny 
parts, and of those areas where there is difference of approach, 
opinion or terminology, the distinctions have already been pointed 
out in some detail. (l) In this regard, Professor Chamberlin's 
approach may be taken as being adequately representative of the 
trend of analysis followed by the two authors. 
The Group: We have already examined the nature of the 
11 group11 or 11 industry11 (.::). If, for purposes of analysis, we accept 
the view that such a 11 group11 or 11 industry11 is made up of a number 
of competing producers, each selling a product for which there are 
a number of substitutes, we can proceed to study the nature and 
causes of 11 competitive equilibrium11 (J) or, as Professor Chamberlin 
calls it, group equilibrium.<4). As is the case with the 
attainment of individual equilibrium, the requirement is essentially 
an adjustment of prices and products. As Chamberlin has suggested, 
11 ••• exposition of the group theory is 
facilitated by ignoring (the lack of 
uniformity in the imperfection of 
competition in the sense that 
!differentiation ••• is not distributed 
homogeneously among all of the products 
which are grouped together1 (5)) ••• for 
the present. 11 (6) 
For this reason, it will be necessary to assume, initially at any 
rate, tnat there is a uniformity of cost and demand curves for all 
firms in the group(?), and also, that, consumers! preferences are 
distributed evenly amongst the competing products. (8 ) At the 
same time the question of 11 numbers 11 arises. If the group is small, 
oligopoly or duopoly problems arise, which are not entirtily related 









See Chapter I, above. 
See above. 
Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition, Book III, 
Chapter 6. 
The Theory of Honopolistic Competition, p. 81 
Ibid., p. 82. 
Ibid., p. 82. 
Ibid., p.. 82: 
assumption. 
Chamberlin refers to this as an heroic 
We shall return to the issue at a later stage. 
Ibid., p. 83. Chamberlin suggests that this condition might 
apply to the 11 fairly even geographical distribution of small 
retail establishments in the outlying districts of a city. 11 
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distinction lies largely in the fact that, under conditions of 
oligopoly~ it must be assumed that the decisions of any one seller 
are very likely to affect those of his competitors. Where large 
numbers of competitors are involved however~ the influence of any 
one seller on his rivals may be regarded as negligible, since the 
effects of his adjustment of price or product are spread over 
many competitors, so that his decisions will not induce a reaction 
on the part of his competitors. In the present case, therefore, 
we will examine first the large group problem. As was the procedure 
in the examination of individual equilibrium, we will observe the 
position when price is adjusted v·d.th 11 product 11 constant, and, 
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If we imagine that the above(l)diagram represents the Cost and 
Demand curves experienced by each competing monopolist in the group, 
PP1 and nnn will denote such curves respectively, and the price 
charged by each seller will be AR, since under such conditions the 
profits GHRE are at a maximum. Whilst each would be able to lower 
his price below AR ~~thout necessarily incurring a loss, no one 
is inclined to do so, since the loss of total revenue would not be 
compensated for by the increased volUme of sales. The fact that 
the individual sellers are enjoying excess profits is likely to 
induce more competitors to enter the industry, with the result that 
the D.emand curves will definitely, and the Cost curves will possibly, 
shift. Since the Demand curve is also the Average Revenue curve, 
the phenomenon is easily explicable. As new firms enter the 
industry, the volume of trade will now be spread over an increasing 
number of competitors, with the result that the demand per seller 
will decrease, along, implicitly therefore, with his Average Revenue. 
(1) Ibid., p. 84 
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The Demand curve will shift dmm.wards to the left, while, at the same 
time, continuous adjustments of price will be made in such a way as 
to ensure that the profit area (formerly GHRE) is always a maximum. 
This excess profit will ultimately disappear entirely, once the 
pressures created by the increasing number of competitors has 
forced the Demand curve down to a position of tangency with the 
.Average Cost curve. The price will be BQ and the demand curve 
ddt at this latter point. Had the Demand curve lain below and to the 
left of dd', there would have been an eflux of firms from the 
industry, since none would have been covering costs with revenue, 
and the result would have also been a tangency 11 solution11 at BQ. 
At this point of equilibrium then,the cost of production will 
be. equal to price and, since any seller will lose by raising or 
lowering his price, the position is stable. Since also, there are 
no excess profits being made, no further competitors will enter the 
industry, while, because normal profits are being experienced, no 
sellers will be inclined to leave. 
Chamberlin introduces a brief discussion on costp(l), in 
which he suggests that, with an influx of competitors,it is 
possible that costs of production (owing perhaps to an increase in 
the prices of certain productive factors) will rise, or alternatively -
with an improv~ent in external economics- might fall •. A third 
alternative is that such costs could renmin constant owing to a 
cancellation of the advantages with disadvantages above, or as a 
result of an absence of any of these tendencies. · The existence of 
any one of these trends would result in either increasing, decreasing 
or cons.·~ant costs respectively, and it is the latter case which has 
been implicit in the above diagrams. Chamberlin has indicated 
that there is a certain validity in assuming conditions of constant 
costs, since 
11 1) the theory in this form is widely 
applicable to the facts and 2) where it 
is not applicable, its extension to cbver 
cases of increasing and decreasing cost 
for the group is easily made. 11 (2) 
The first argument is based on the belief that, where competitors 
in an industry are so numerous as to render' the influence of each on 
the total output negligible, it is highly probable that the 
influence of each on total costs will also be negligible. This 
assumption is reinforced by the possibility that the proportion of 
specific resources used by a particular industry might be small 
(l) Ibid., Po 85. 
(2) Ibid., p. 85. 
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compared with the total of such resources, so that changes in the 
quantity employed by the former are unlikely to affect the general 
price level of the latter.(l) Where diminishing costs- resulting 
from economies - are concerned, Chamberlin points out that a 
similar difficulty of relative size arises. (2 ) If the industry is 
small compared to the larger field, it is unlikely that an improve-
ment in the organization of resources as output increases will 
appreciably affect the nature of the Sost curve facing the group~ 
At the same time, it is also extremely likely that, as has been 
suggested above, the economies and diseconomies resulting from a 
larger scale of production vdll indeed cancel out and the result 
will be a situation of constant costs.(J) 
Should the necessity to consider cases of increasing or 
decreasing costs arise, however, Chamberlin suggests that the 
procedure would merely entail raising or lowering the entire Cost 
curve for the industry ~nd establishing equilibrium at the higher or 
lower point - wherever appropriate. 
An issue of major ~nportance which arises from the outline of 
monopolistically competitive behaviour providedabove, is the fact 
that, owing to the slope of the Deme~d curve, it will never be 
possible for it to attain a position of tangency with the lowest 
point on the Average Cost curve. The implication is that, under 
conditions of monopolistic competition, price will always be 
higher, and output always smaller, than under perfect competition. 
The reason is that a position of maximum profits will, where the 
Average Revenue curve is relatively inelastic, be reached where 
output lies to the left of the point of minimum average costs. 
(l) Ibid., p. 85. He writes: "An increase in the manufacture of 
of scissors will not appreciably affect the price of steel. 11 
(2) Ibid., p. 86. 
(3) Ibid., p. 87. He provides the example of the automobile 
industry, where costs increase with increased output and fall 
with organizational improvements. 
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In the diagram below(l), a reduction in price from AR to MK, 
by one seller, would result in an increase in sales from OA to OM, 
and it may be thought likely that such an action will eventually 
be undertaken by all. Such a move however, would prove undesirable,. 
since, although the output OM would provide the most efficient 
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Triffin has pointed out that the entire problem of group 
equilibrium may effectively be set aside if one assumes that the 
group be closed- that is to say, where it is not possible for a 
firm either to enter or leave the industry(2). This would 
obviously be a position contrary to the one we have been assuming 
above i.e. one in which freedom of entry and exit exists to the 
extent that all competitors, potential or otherwise, are able to 
compete on the same basis of costs and revenue. Turning briefly to 
an examination of the case in which entry (as opposed to the group) 
is closed, Professor ChEunberlin would conclude that the analysis must 
assume that entry is closed, while exit is possible. (J) The result 
would be that the AR curve would generally tend to lie above the 
Average Cost curve and equilibrium would be 11 compatible with any 
amount of positive profits 11 (4), and also, that profits will always 
be such as to cover costs. 
Certain aspects of Chamberlin's analysis have been treated 
at length by Triffin. ( 5) He indicates that the particularizing 
(1) Ibid., p. 89. 
(2) Monopolistic Competition nnd General Equilibrium Theory, p. 21. 
(3) The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, p. lll. 
(4) Monopolistic Competition and General Equilibrium Theory, p .• 22. 
(5) Ibid., p. 24 ff. 
assumptions (as distinguished from the general definition of 
equilibrium conditions) must be dealt with as two groups: 
(a) those v-rhich assume that the Cost curve is constant and (b) 
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those which assume that all competing firms within the group are 
similar and that each one may act as representative of group 
behaviour. The first set of assumptions are, according to Triffin, 
less drastic than the second. (l) 
The assumption of syn~etry, under which all firms are held to 
possess the scJme Demand and Cost curves and to be faced with markets 
of the same size, together with the implicit assumption that a 
price change by one of the competitors in a large group will spread 
its impact over all the competitors and so render the influence 
of the individual negligible, is modified somewhat in the later 
stages of Chamberlin's analysis.C 2 ) He points out that each 
11 general class of product divides itself into subclasses 11 (3), with 
the result that certain products overlap more significantly into some 
groups than others and for this reason it cannot necessarily 
be expected that the gains made by one seller from a price cut 
will be taken evenly from his competitors. Certain varieties of 
the same product - depending upon the actual definition of such an 
entity -will be in closer competition than others, and for this 
reason, different competitors will be influenced to greater or 
lesser extents by the actions of their rivals. 
Before proceeding with this discussion however, Chamberlin's 
argument must be placed in proper perspective. If we assume, with 
Chamberlin(4), that there are sufficient firms in the group to 
achieve an equilibrium adjustment but that the prevailing price is, 
for the moment, above a level which would correspond to that 
position, we are able to indicate, with the aid of a modified set 
of Demand curves, the processes involved in providing a solution. 
(1) Ibid., p. 24. 
(2) The Theory of Honopolistic Competition, p. 102 ff. 
(3) Ibid., p. 102. 
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In the above diagram(l), the Demand curve ddt represents the 
demand for the product of the individual seller, assuming the prices 
and 11 products 11 of his competitors to be given. Since it charac-
terises the conditions of monopolistic competition, it indicates the 
increase or decrease in sales the seller would experience were he 
(alone in this case) to lower or raise his prices. The curve DDt 
represents the demand facing any one seller provided that there is 
no difference between his prices and those of his competitors. 
It is obviously more inelastic than ddt since no competitor can, 
by lowering his price, affect his rivals' customers. It may also 
be taken as representative of the De~2nd curve facing the group of 
competing monopolists as a whole. If we assume that, for the 
present, all are charging price BQ, selling OB and making 
11 excass 11 profits FHQE, curve ddt, drawn through Q, would show the 
additional sales which any one seller could obtain by lowering his 
price, if others held theirs at BQ. Since each competitor is so 
insignificant none need fear competitive or retaliatory price 
cuts, it is likely that all sellers will eventually be induced 
by the vision of increased profits - to cut prices under the 
circumstances described above. 
11 The curve dd', then, explains why each 
seller is led to reduce his price; the 
curve DD 1 shows his actual sales as the 
general downward movement takes place."(2) 
The downward movement of dd 1 along DD' with a successive lowering 
of prices will come to a halt at AR, since after this point, 
production costs will not be covered by receipts. 
(1) Ibid., p. 91. 
(2) Ibid., p. 91- 92. 
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Another Chamberlinian diagram may now be used to indicate an 
interesting observation.(l) 
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Chamberlin points out that, the 
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since the share of each in the total will be smaller in the former 
case and larger in the latter. If we assume that, with a price of 
BQ prevailing, new competitors will be attracted to the industry, 
the curve DD 1 will be pushed towards the left until the position 
of tangency with curve PP' is attained at price BQ and consequently, 
output per firm OB. Cost, in this case (owing to the diseconomies 
of the existing scale of production) equals price. Each producer 
however, will consider the possibility of increasing his profits by 
moving down the curve dd', with the result that all (by our earlier 
criterion) will do precisely that. Since DD 1 indicates the sales 
of each producer as the lowering of price by all takes place, it 
is obvious thRt losses for all will increase steadily. (Chamberlin 
points out, for example, that at price CQt, sales of each seller will 
be OC, with losses of FQ'rlli)(2). If any seller, however, cuts to 
AR, he will cover his costs and avoid loss. Since it is extremely 
likely that all will do so, the total sales divided by the number of 
sellers (represented by curve DD') will be OM and losses will be 
great. The only real way of solving the problem would be the 
exodus of firms. At the same time, Chamberlin considers it pcssible 
to reduce losses, even if it is not possible to avoid them altogether, 
by lowering price slightly further than the first dd' curve would 
seem to indicate i.e. if ddt lies only slightly lower than the 
line passing through R. However this solution is only of limited 
value and will cease to be a proposition below the position of the 
lowest dd' curve in the diagram. 
(l) Ibid., p. 92. 
(2) Ibid., p. 93. 
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Bearing in mind the principle that an exodus of firms will cause 
the DD 1 curve to shift upwards and to the right, Chamberlin defines 
equilibri~~ of the group in terms of two characteristics: 
11 a) dd' must be tangent to PP', and b) 
DDt must intersect both dd' and ppt at 
the point of tangency11 .(1) 
At the same time, we should bear in mind the Chamberlinian notion of 
subclasses, discussed earlier. 
Since the phenomenon described above is only characteristic of 
monopolistic, and not pure or perfect, competition, the 
11 ••• elasticity of dd 1 (may be regarded) 
as a rough index of buyers' preferences 
for the 'product' of one seller over that 
of the other.u(2) 
We now turn to an examination of the conditions under which group 
equilibrium will be attained with price constant and the 11 product" 
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the price is fixed at OE with the horizontal EZ, indicating the 
adjustments of any seller, drawn at this height. If we draw 
Cost of Production curves simiL~r to those presented in the earlier 
diagram, ppt may be taken to represent "an optimum variation of 
the tproduct' 11 ( 5), while OA will indicate the demand for it. Total 
costs and total ''excess" profits are OAHF and FHRE respectively. 
Since the prevailing level of profits will be sufficiently high to 
attract new competitors, the sales of each producer will be reduced 
to OB where cost will be equated with price and there will be no 
tendency for sellers to move into or out of the industry. Should 
(1) Ibid., p. 93. 
(2) Ibid., p. 93. 
(3) Ibid., p. 94 ff. 
(4) Ibid., p. 95. 
(5) Ibid., p. 95. 
output fall to less than OB, an eflux of producers would be 
sufficient to restore equilibrium. 
54 
If we accept the notion that individual sellers can increase 
their profits by improving their "products", "While those of their 
competitors remain the same, demand for such an individual seller 
will increase (reflected by a. movement along EZ) as will his costs 
(reflected by a shift in ppr upwards to the right). As was the 
case with the price movement discussed in the preceding analysis, 
all producers will attempt to improve their products in view of the 
higher profits to be derived. The result is that the overal 
gain to all producers within the group is less tLan would have 
accrued to the individual who acted while his rivals did not. The 
fact that costs are now generally higher means that profits of 
each are now probably generally lower, but so long as any seller 
considers it possible to increase his profits, the process of 
11 productl1 improvement will be continued up to the point where any 
further improvement will result in a level of costs higher than 
revenue. The limit cannot lie higher than pp' since if it did, 
the product would not be produced. It can, however, lie below 
it, since by definition of the curve EZ, a price reduction cannot 
result in an increased output, and the fllct that it might indeed 
occupy this position does not necessarily imply that demand will 
have increased to OA'. In vim'l of the difficulties involved in 
quantifying "product 11 changes, Chamberlin has pointed out that 
11 ••• any attempt to define with precision 
the exact point of equilibrium" is 
11 rendered hazardous •••• It would seem that 
the most that can be said is that it will 
be characterized by l) the equation of 
cost and price, and 2) the impossibility 
of a 'product' adjustment by anyone which 
would increase his profits. It will 
involve either the intersection of the 
price lin.e with the curve of cost _of ·pro-
duction or its tangency to it."(l) 
(1) Ibid., p. 97. 
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Finally, we may turn briefly to the case in which price and 
''product" are variable. If we imagine a Demand curve sloping 
downwa~ds and passing through R', its negative slope would 
immediately imply that it lies above ppr to the left of Rt , since pp1 
has zero slope. By raising price and reducing sales a seller could 
increase his profits. Since this would affect new competitors, 
the effect would be to shift the Demand curve of each seller to the 
left until it was tangent to pp'. 
"Under given conditions with regard to the 
'products' and prices of his competitors, 
each seller will choose that combiTh~tion of 
price and 'product' for himself which will 
maximize his profit. For each variety of 
'product' possible to him there will be a 
price which will render his profit a maximum 
relative to that 'product'. From these 
relative maxima he will choose the l~rgest 
of all." (1) 
' 
After that, the competitive forces described above determine the ' 
equilibrium position. 
At this stage in his The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 
Chamberlin proceeds to an examination of the processes by which 
equilibrium is established in the usmall group" case i.e. under such 
conditions where the number of competitors is so small as to make 
each one a significant force in the market. (2) The result is that 
each seller must be aware of the influence which his presence has on 
the price and output policies of his competitors, who, in their 
turn, will be a major factor in his calculations. Effectively, 
the situation we are about to consider is a combination of the element 
of numbers - fewness in this case - and the principle of product 
differentiation. If we assume in the third diagram (above), that the 
curves refer to a small number of firms, a rather different result 
from the one described above presents itself. In the previous 
discussion we considered the possibility that any one seller might 
maximize his profit by lowering his price from BQ, provided -
and this was possible - that others did not feel themselves adversely 
affected and therefore follow suit. The only reason why ~ 
sellers would eventually do this would be because each felt that no 
others would be sufficiently affected by his actions to resort to 
retaliatory price reductions. In the case of the 11 small group" 
however, this is not so. Each seller could, of course, improve 
his position by lowering his price, provided that others did not 
follow suit, but since each seller is extremely sensitive to the 
(1) Ibid., p. 98. 
(2) Ibid., p. 100. 
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actions of his rivals, a price cut by any one would induce an 
overall downwards shift with the result that all would be worse off 
than before. Similarly, since each seller is fully aware of the 
ultimate consequences of cutting his price he will therefore 
refrain from doing so. 
Assuming, for the moment, that the actions of an individual 
seller are analytically separable from the reactions of his 
competitors, and each seller feels that his rivals will not, in 
fact, be influenced by his decisions, and will keep their prices 
fixed, it is possible to say that his price will be lower than.BQ 
and will probably be AR if bidding is competitive. S:imi~1rly, if 
sellers anticipate that the outputs of their respective rivals 
will remain fixed, prices 
11 ••• will settle at a determinate point 
between BQ and AR, which point is lower 
as their numbers are greater, coinciding 
v.rith AR if their numbers are very large 
••• and always defined by the condition that 
no seller can increase or decrease his supply 
with profit, the supplies of the others 
remaining constant. It must be noticed that 
the extreme limit AR below which price can 
never descend is higher than that for a 
standardized product, the latter coinciding 
with the lowest point of the cost curve ppr • 11 (1) 
The exact nature of the "indirect influence" implicitly 
referred to in the above discussion is not easy to analyse. A 
seller may regard his influence, or that of his rival, as being of 
negligible significance for any nmnber of reasons of which, 
according to Chamberlin(2), the following are the most notable: 
(a) the nature and direction of a seller's interest in the market 
(b) uncertainty as to whether competition from a rival will take 
the form of price or output variation (c) the skill and vision of 
a rival and (d) the difficulty of deriving the exact, or quanti-
tatively ascertainable, influence of one seller's policies on 
another's and (e) uncertainty as to the direction of the time lag 
between the policy change of a seller and the reactions of his 
rivals. 
We have already touched on the question of Chamberlin's 
11 subclasses 11 • We may now mention, in the light of our immediately 
previous discussion the nature of a 11 chain relationship11 (3), since 
it may be regarded as having a fair amount of relevance for the 
issues which follow. The principle of the "subclass" would 
(l) Ibid., p. 101. 
(2) Ibid., p. 101. 
(3) See above. 
seem to indicate that certain "products" within a given 11 group11 
approximate more closely to one another than do others, with the 
result that individual competitors making up the so-called small 
group fear action on the part of certain close rivals more than 
"distant" ones. What this implies is merely that a price cut by 
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one seller A, will not necessarily oblige another competitor B to 
match it immediately, but this situation might ultimately transpire 
on the basis of the fact that a whole range of intermediate 
competitors ranging in increasing "distance from 11 A to 11 decreasing 
distance from" B will slowly be affected and will therefore be 
obliged to react to varying degrees. 
so-called chain relationship. 
This is the principle of the 
Another issue which Chamberlin deals with is that of 
"Equilibrium with Excess Capacity11 (l). He points out that there may 
be a large number of reasons - other than those pertaining to the 
small group - why price cutting is not undertaken by competing 
monopolists. Of these, a very important one (which will be dealt 
with in greater detail later( 2)) is the fact that individual sellers 
may aim at less than maximum profits purely because they do not 
wish to encounter the strain of aggressive business and are prepared 
to 11 li ve and let li ve11 (3) • In such· a case - assuming that all 
businessmen display the same preferences - prices will tend to 
move together and the curve dd! will no longer be useful. 
Businessmen might 11 set their prices with reference to costs rather 
than to demandu(4), and the price could settle anywhere between 
BQ and AR in the diagrams. If, at a price of BQ, new competitors 
arrived, the DD 1 curve would be pushed to the left and to a 
position of tangency 1'-l'ith BQ, with the result that at AR costs 
could not be covered. To regain "equilibrium" a new profit margin 
would have to be selected and added on to current prices. 
Chamberlin suggests that another reason why price cutting is 
not arbitrarily undertaken is that, where prices are low, consumers 
are apt to get the impression that quality is inferior. (S) For 
obvious reasons, this observation is rendered invalid by the 
assumption of 11 perfect knowledge", but should be noted. At the 
same time, a low priced establishment (particularly of a retail 
variety) is likely to attract a lower-class customer and in such a. 
(1) Ibid., p. 104. 
(2) See reference to Hall and Hitch below. 
(3) The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, p. 105. 
(4) Ibid., p. 105. 
(5) Ibid., p. 107. 
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case, price cutting may have the undesirable effect of lowering the 
11 tone 11 of the shop. Since the 11 tone 11 of an establishment is an 
important part of the 11 product 11 in retailing, the argument has 
some relevance. 
A fairly cornn1on technique employed by sellers unwilling to 
cut prices is to provide toys, coupons, household goods, insurance 
and a number of other items together with the actual good purchased. 
In this way, while prices themselves are not cut - and retaliation 
for that reason is less likely, the consumer is, in effect, given 
11 more for his money". In such a case, the seller who cuts prices 
obtains some of the advantages which the ddt curve offers to the 
compet~tors in the small group, without the disadvantage of 
incurring the competition which would normally arise, since 
"price cuts" are disguised. · 
For these and other reasons, there is a tendency towards the 
creation of "surplus capacity11 under conditions of monopolistic 
competition, with the result that prices tend to be higher, and 
output smaller than in cases where price competition is permitted 
to function normally. (l) We have already examined the signifi-
cance of the sloping Demand curve for price and output, and have 
observed that the AR curve for the group in equilibrium lies 
tangentally to the AC curve at a point higher than that which would 
indicate minimum cost. 
Professor Robinson presents a series of arguments similar to 
those of Professor Chamberlin, although greatly lacking in the 
detail which characterizes the latter's analysis(
2
). Since 
little further will be gained from a study of Robinson's work in 
respect of equilibrium, we shall not dwell on it here. There are, 
however, a number of other issues which have been raised. 
In an article entitled 1 Elements of 
Theory of Non-Perfect Competition1 (3)_ 
that the 
Indaterminacy in the 
Benjamin Higgins suggests 
\ 
" ••• close relationship of relative 
indivisibilities of factors of 
production to non-perfect competition 
results is a highly discontinuous cost 
curve with possible multiple equilibd a 11 
(1) Ibid., p. 109. 
(4) 
(2) The Economics of Imperfect Competition, Chapter 7. 
(3) American Economic Review, September 1939. 
(4) Ibid., p. 468. 
' 
This argument is based on the belief that 
11 ••• where the magnitude of the 
investment (by the producer) in 
the fixed factor is large relative 
to the market for the product, the 
number of firms is limited, and 
imperfect competition exists. 11 (l) 
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The result is that where factors of production may be regarded as 
being 11 indivisible11 , imperfection of competition is likely to 
appear. 
Since it is possible that certain indivisibilities may exist 
even under conditions of perfect competition, another aspect must 
be employed to indicate the significance of the special case of 
monopolistic competition. If we accept the notion that indivisi-
bilities in the factors of production result in discontinuities 
in the Cost curve - since the addition of increasing quantities of 
a relatively indivisible factor, say blast furnaces, will not 
result in a smooth U-shaped ppr curve, but will probably create 
possibilities for establishing a number of short run curves and 
equilibrium points at which MC can be equated with MR, in the long 
run - it is quite conceivable that there will be a strong element 
of indeterminacy as far as a final equilibrium adjustment is 
concerned. This is due to the fact that the point of equilibrium 
will depend upon the output at which the firm starts production.(
2
) 
Because, it is assumed that, under conditions of perfect competition, 
the Demand curve is a horizontal line, ~ll that is required to 
establish equilibrium in the face of such similar discontinuities 
is to produce up to the point where the Average curve lies at a 
tangent to the PP 1 curve at its lowest point. 
Higgins also suggests that the indeterminacy which might 
prevail with respect to costs can arise 
11 ••• out of the relationship between 
non-perfect competition in the commodity 
market and non-perfect competition in the 
factor market. 11 (3) 
The form which this phenomenon takes is generally that in which 
product differentiation creates the conditions for imperfection 
and severely limits the market for any one type, or variety, of 
commodity. If the uniqueness of the final product itself lies 
specifically in one of the factors constituting it, the market for 
that factor may also be considered limited and therefore conducive 
(l) Ibid., p. 471. 
(2) Ibid., p. 473. 
(3) Ibid., p. 474. 
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to monopoly on the part of the maker of the final product. 
Since however the factor itself may be minor and perhaps relatively 
inexpensive, the problem is not always a real one~ The question 
should hov1ever be considered in greater detail., for the reason 
that, where there is a monopsonist (who is also, say, an oli-
gopolist), his actual Cost curve will be determined by the relative 
bargaining strengths of himself and seller of the factor of 
production in question. For this reason, the curve ppt cannot, 
under all circumstances, be regarded as strictly determinate, and 
the net result is that a tlt,angency11 equilibrium of AC and AR 
cannot be established. 
Higgins ra .. ises a number of other issues concerning the 
question of indeterminacy of equilibrium. 
He finds that such indeterminacy may arise from various 
factors on the demand side. vJhere the impact of rivals 1 
actions are taken into consideration in the construction of the 
Demand curve for the firm in monopolistic competition, Higgins clain1s 
that there is no reason for assuming that the latter will in fact 
take on the configuration accepted by orthodox theory. In fact, 
a reduction in price by one seller might cause a competitor to 
reduce his by so much more that the former will lose sales. 
Alternatively, a reduction in price by one seller might induce 
another to raise his prices radically and concentrate his attention 
on a different market prepared to pay the higher price. A 
related factor in respect of the Demand curve is that the reactions 
of a competitor to a firm 1 s change in price are only estimated, 
and that, if a firm were able to ignore such reactions, it would 
probably find that its 
11 ••• estimated average revenue curve would 
have at least the same general configuration 
as the demand curve itself."(l) 
The fact that it must consider its rivals means that the estimated 
Demand curve provides an inferior tool for equilibrium analysis, 
since it possesses no statistical value whatsoever. 
Harrod, in his 1The Theory of Imperfect Competition Revisedt( 2) 
develops the argument that there is no reason why imperfect 
competition should result in excess capacity, as Chamberlin 
suggests. Assuming free entry, Harrod points out that a producer 
will select a price which will yield him no more than that profit 
which is comp~tible with the equilibrium of the industry (allowing 
for minor variations on the basis of that which the producer feels 
(l) Ibid., p. 475. 





is of special advantage to himself) ,and __ will purchnse the equij,)r.lent 
necessary to produce an output at the lowest cost possible in 
respect of the selected price and will maintain that price 
11 ••• even although the short period 
marginal revenue yielded by such a 
policy is less than the marginal 
cost. 11 (1) 
The implication of this is tlli~t, the producer will produce at the 
point where the AR curve cuts the Long Run AC curve at its lowest 
point, rather than at the point where in Chamberlin's diagram, 
the Demand curve lies at a tangent to the curve PP 1 • In the diagram 
below( 2) LAC is the long run A.verage Cost curve of the individual 
firm, 1 and 2 are short-run Average Cost curves for plants of 
differEnt sizes. P is the lowest point on both 1 and the long-
run jwerage r;ost curve, while Q, 
11 ••• the point of tangency of 2 to LAC, 
is also the point of tangency of the 
demand curve d'd' which will face the 
entrepreneur when abnormal profits due 
to initial production at R by all members 
of the group have been eliminated by new-
comers. Q thus corresponds to Professor 
Chamberlin's large group equilibrium point. 11 (3) 
u~c 
\ 
Harrod's reasons for selecting P instead of Q in the long run 
are as follows: (i) There is no certainty about the future. For 
this reason a firm will be careful not to expand its capacity 
merely to take advantage of a chance to snatch quick short-run 
profits; (ii) If a producer is genred to equating short-run 
marginal costs with short-run marginal revenue, using this to 
determine his price and thereby making excess or supernormal 
profits, he will attract competitors, which will immediately mean 
(1) Ibid., p. 151. 
(2) Taken from lVl.E. Paul 'Notes on Excess Capacity', Oxford 
Economic Papers, February 1954, p. 34. 
(3) Ibid., p. 33. 
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that his output will be decreased and that he will now be faced with 
a problem of utilizing his excess capacity. He should be aware 
of this possibility from the beginning and design his capacity 
accordingly. 
These arguments have, however, been severely criticized by 
M.E. Paul in her article. As far as Mr Harrod's first point is 
concerned, Mrs Paul points out that the profits which may be 
available to a firm in the short run may be sufficiently large to 
outweigh even the significance and desirability of profits in the 
long run. Also, perhaps it might be that the sacrifices which a 
firm may make when opting for short-run profits need not be very 
great and would therefore not be a very important consideration 
in business calculations. Harrod has suggested that a firm might 
be weakened by the long-run implications of snatching quick profits, 
but ~~s Paul has suggested that 
11 ••• a firm in large-group equilibrium 
need ••• be no weaker than a firm producing 
at minimum average cost. 11 (1) 
If, therefore, the fact that a firm, by deciding to take advantage 
of certain short-term profit advantages puts itself at a long-
term disadvantage no more serious than a reduction to a level 
at which it is just able to cover its long-term minimum average 
costs, enters into the argument, there is no reason to believe 
that such a firm will necessarily choose to produce at point P 
rather than at Q. 
The second criticism which Mrs Paul makes is with reference 
to Mr Harrod's notion that, by equating short-period marginal 
revenue to short-period marginal costs, a producer cannot avoid 
the danger of being left with redundant capacity in the long run. 




(l) Ibid., p. 34. 
(2) Ibid.~ p. 36. 
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In the diagram, B indicates the point at which the output 
produced will result in the optimum profit, and is determined by 
the intersection of the long-run Narginal Revenue and }IJ.arginal eost 
curves. Using the same notation as in the previous diagram, 
it vall become evident that plant 1 is of the optimum size, 
while plant 2 is the most suitable for producing at Q. d1 d1 is 
the Demand curve which will result from production starting at 
B. With plant 2 and the demand curve dd, A will provide the 
maximum profit point, while E fulfils the same function as far as 
plant 3 is concerned. :tfli's Paul's observations regarding :Hr 
Harrod's assumptions crun as follows; Should the producer start 
production using plant 1 he will find that he is left with 
excess capacity. By producing with plant 2 and selling at price 
A (determined in the manner that it is), he will experience the 
same problem; while, by producing with plant 3 and setting his 
price this time at E, he will also not be able to avoid redundancy. 
The 11 argument 11 , Mrs Paul points out, "seems however to rest on 
ac confusion". (l) A producer will have to contract his plant 
progressively only if he refuses to reduce his prices in line with 
the shrinking rrLqrket possibilities with which he will become 
increasingly burdened. There is, however, no reason to believe 
that the old remedy, very 1nuch a part of the orthodox analysis, 
of lowering prices in order to expand the market and take advantage 
of available capacity, will not prove valuable under such circum-
stances. By doing so, a producer will not be likely to find his 
plant redQ~dant as demand contracts. 
Mrs Paul concludes that 
11 ••• although we have so far found no 
reason to abandon the doctrine that . 
imperfect competition leads to excess 
capacity, ••• the introduction of short-run 
cost curves clearly makes necessary some 
modification of the traditional path 
towards equilibrium. 11 (2) 
She points out that where large changes in output arise relative 
to the long-run cost curve of the firm, Chamberlin's argument 
ignores the fact that it is possible for the producer to be 
stuck with plant capacity of the vurong size. For this reason 
_,....--
she appears to be partially in agreement with the overal stand 
taken by Harrod i.e. that a consideration of both the shortr and 
long-run cost-implications of a specific size of plant is necessary 
before the final decision to commence production on a particular 
scale can be taken. Chamberlin's analysis, in that it provides 
no adequate reference to the question of short-run curves, 
fails in this respect. 
(l) Ibid., p. 36. 
(2) Ibid., Po 39o 
J •. R. Hicks, in his article t The Process of Imperfect Corn-
petitionl(l), distinguishes between two types of entrepreneur-
11 snatchers 11 , or those who are concerned only with making quick 
profits, and 11 stickers 11 : those who wish to establish and 
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maintain steady businesses. 
by such factors as the 
Beth of these types will be influenced 
11 ••• lengths of time for which the closed 
(short) and open (long) periods are 
expected to last, the rate of time 
preference, and the willingness to bear 
risks. 11 (2) 
Whilst it is not necessary to discuss his work at great length~ 
it should be pointed out that the study provides a fair amount 
of the detail which is absent from 11The Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition .. (3 ) 
Another author who merits attention in the current discussion 
is Wolfgang F. Stolper. In an article entitled tThe Possibility 
of Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competitionr(4), he indicates 
that 
" ••• stable group, industrial and general 
equilibrium are all impossible under 
conditions of monopolistic or imperfect 
competition. 11 (5) 
Stolper suggests that there is some confusion as to the nature of 
11 freedom of entry11 , since under conditions of pure competition, 
for example., a producer need only take the decision to produce, 
and he automatically becomes a competitor to another producer. 
Under monopolistic competition1 however, the potential producer 
has to decide what to produce. This difficulty arises from the 
fact that under pure competition, all goods are held to be 
homogeneous, while under monopolistic competition the element of 
product differentiation creates the problem of deciding what 
product (or variety of product) ~~11 be most competitive. 
llit follows that while the presence of 
profits may be an incentive to look for 
substitutes and rival products, it is 
not sufficient to insure a flow of 
factors of production into the neigh-
bourhood of the profitable product. 11 (6) 
If a new competitor believes that his differentiated product 
(1) Oxford Economic Papers, February 1954. 
(2) Ibid., p. 45. 
(3) Another article which is of interest is by Arthur Smithies, 
entitled IEquilibrium in Monopolistic Competition'. He 
discusses the necessary conditions for stable equilibrium. 
See Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1940 and 
'Addendum', Februa~ 1942. 
(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1940. 
(5) Ibid., p. 519. 
(6) Ibid., p. 520. 
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is far superior to those of his competitors, he might very well 
enter an industry which is making only normal profits, or alterna-
tively, which is made up of roughly the same number of successes 
as failures. 
"His own profits are, therefore, largely 
independent of the profits and losses of 
his rivals, and the same is likely to apply 
to his anticipations. 11 (l) 
Stolper takes the argument a step further, by suggesting that, 
since people's tastes and preferences change rapidly, either of 
their own accord, or as a result of persuasive advertising, 
products themselves must keep changing, with the result that the 
concept of a stable group of commodities must fall away. 
11 •.•• there is no freedom of entry because 
there is no well defined industry or group 
which could be entered. Hence neither 
group nor industrial equilibrium can 
exist. 11 (2) 
Cassels(3 )defines excess capacity as 
" ••• the difference between the output that 
the productive agent in question is 
capable of producing and the output it is 
actually called upon to produce. 11 (4) 
At the same time he points out that the exact determination of 
such quantities is fraught with problems and, at best, the 
estimation of the extent of such excesses is vague. One of the 
major difficulties is to establish whether the term "excess 
capacity11 is being applied to the fixed factors in a given 
production unit such as a firm or industry, or whether it is 
being applied to all the factors in such a unit. 
"If because a pig-iron producer is using 
only half his blast furnaces we say that 
there is one hundred per cent excess 
capacity in his business it is evident 
that we can be referring only to the 
fixed factors in the business. The 
output of pig-iron could be doubled 
without increasing the number of furnaces, 
but it could not be doubled without 
increasing the amounts of coal and iron 
ore and labor that are used. 11 (5) 
Since this distinction frequently arises, Cassels concludes that 
(1) Ibid., p. 521. 
(2) Ibid., p. 524. 
(3) 'Excess Capacity and Monopolistic Competition', Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, May 1937. 
(4) Ibid., p. 427. 
( 5) Ibid., p. 427. 
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Chamberlin must be referring to conditions under which there is 
an excess of all the factors in an industry. The excess capacity 
resulting from rigidities in the combination of fixed factors 
generally accounts for the shape of the short-run cost curves, 
and the basis for analysing such excess capacity should, according 
to Cassels, be taken 
11 ••• as that at which the average full 
costs of production are at a minimum. 11 (1) 
In order to do this, he suggests a number of ways in which fixed 
factors can be valued. He points out, however, that the primary 
source of confusion lies in the attempt to use Chamberlin's long-
run Cost curve analysis to investigate short-run phenomena. (2) 
This is simply because there are no fixed factors in the long run 
while in the short run they generally account for the rigidities 
in the production process. Therefore, in the Chamberlinian 
sense, the 11 least cost11 point (or any cost point for that matter) 
on the curve of production will be the result of a situation in 
which 
11 ••• all the factors are combined together 
in the most appropriate forms and pro-
portions. 11 (3) 
The Chamberlinian Cost curve falls initially as a result of the 
economies derived from an increasing scale of production, and 
rises later as a result of certain diseconomies of the nature 
already discussed.(4) Since the shape of the short-run cost 
curve is the result of tho inflexible nature of large fixed 
factors, it will be obvious that, although the two curves are 
similar in shape, the nature of their respective origins differs. 
In an article entitled 'Equilibrium of the Firm'( 5), Richard 
A. Lester introduces the concept of an equilibrium zone, rather 
than a point. He indicates that 
11 It is doubtful whether business executives 
generally think, plan or act in terms of 
a single equilibrium point determined 
separately for each item of production. 11 (6) 
(1) Ibid., p. 428. 
(2) This point has been discussed above. 
(3) Cassels, Ibid., p. 428. 
(4) See above. 
(5) American Economic Review, March 1949. 
(6) Ibid., p. 480. 
While this argument is less theoretical than those preceding it 
in our discussion, the notion is an interesting one. Lester 
suggests for example that manufacturers of branded items, e.g. 
clothes, electrical goods, cc>.rs etc.. generally regard prices as 
remaining fairly fixed over short periods - say 6 months to a 
year - and, should any price change occur within such a period, 
it is likely to remain fixed for some time. In other words, 
price changes do not take place continuously and a condition 
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of "point demand11 (l) prevails. Combined with the phenomenon of 
point demand, it is possible that a relatively small change in 
output is unlikely to affect the curve of Total Costs within a 
narrow range, and businessmen might feel justified in considering 
their 11 operations satisfactory or reasonably profitable11 ; they 
11 ••• would not feel pressed to move outside 
the zone or to attempt to influence sales 
so that the firm would arrive at any 
particular point within the zone. 11 (2) 
In his article 1Reserve Capacity and the Kinked Demand 
Curvet(3), P. Streeten has pointed out that, not only can 
excess capacity arise through the processes of monopolistic 
competition, but it is possible that businessmen may actually 
plan for it. He suggests that there are three "motives" for this 
hoarding of capacity(4): 1) Technical: A businessman may 
decide to keep plant in reserve to avoid loss of time owing to 
breakdowns. Also, the existence of flexible reserve capacity 
in multi-product manufacturing and at various stages of production 
can assist in preventing bottlenecks from occurring. 2) Pecuniar,y: 
Street~n regards this motive as analagous to the desire to hold 
money balances in excess of those required for transactions 
purposes. A manufacturer might wish to hold sufficient capacity 
to accommodate orders which might not be fulfilled were capacity 
to be fully employed. In this way he can maintain the goodwill 
which he might have lost if he found himself unable to accept 
customers' orders. In this connection, StreetEn points out that 
the fact that "goodwill is easier lost than gained" means that 
11 ••• price reductions do not always or 
often tie up a new clientele, but make 
it impossible or very difficult to raise 
prices again, if this should become 
necessary. 11 ( 5) 
(1) Ibid., p. 481, 
(2) Ibid., p. 482. 
(3) Review of Economic Studies, 1950-1951, p. 103. 
(4) Ibid., p. 103~ 
(5) Ibid., p. 104. 
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The third motive discussed by Streeten is speculation. If 
one equates the accumulation of stocks, with the hoarding of 
reserve capacity, it becomes fairly clear that it might benefit a 
manufacturer to refrain from current use in the hope of higher 
yields at a later date. Also it may be profitable to 11 lay in11 
capacity (equipment or buildings) to be used later, either as a 
substitute for higher price equipment which the manufacturer 
might have had to buy, or for resale. 
For the above reasons, Streeten would conclude that excess 
capacity possesses a certain value to the manufacturer. 
Marion J. Levy, Jnr. suggests that there is an element of 
confusion which arises from Chamberlin's analysis.(l) The belief 
that the equilibrium of the group can only be achieved under certain 
circumstances by the exodus of firms must, she points out, be 
qualified by the 
" ••• assumption of a difference in the 
hardihood of the firms involved (i.e. a 
difference in the ability of the firms to 
produce over a period of time at a loss). 11 (2) 
If no assumption of this nature is made, 
11 
••• there can be no equilibrium ••• because 
all firms would be driven out at once. 11 
Conversely, unless it were specifically assumed that there were 
no distinctions in the hardihood of the various competing firms 
in the small group, no price would be perfectly stable if any one 
producer felt that he could endure amore severe series of price 
cuts than his competitors, and that the 
11 ••• total losses ••• involved in driving out 
the extra firms will be less than the total 
profits •11 (3) 
A paper written by R.A. Gordon, entitled tShort-Period Price 
Determination in Theory and Pract~cet( 4), focusses attention on 
the question of the divisibility of factors of production in the 
short- and long-period. He points out that the indivisibilities 
which may arise in the short-period will tend to create dis-
continuities in the curve of Total Costs and induce it to 
11 
••• rise in large steps, instead of 
continqously, as theory usually assumes. 11 (5) 
(1) ~ote on Some Chamberlinian Solutions', American Economic Review, 
June 1940:. 
(?) Ibid., p. 345. 
I 
(3) Ibid., p. 345. 
(4) American Economic Review, June 1948. 
(5) Ibid., p. 275. 
The net result is that, because investment in physical capital 
must frequently be made in "large chunks", business-men often 
tend to be unwilling to increase output even if profits could be 
increased. 
Thus far, our examination of the conditions for individual 
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and group equilibrium has run in terms only of the single-product 
firm. Since, however, the greater part of this section of the 
thesis is intended to provide a background to the analysis which 
follows, and since the analysis itself will be primarily concerned 
with retail theory, it is desirable that we examine, albeit briefly, 
since little work has been undertaken in this field to date, the 
question of multi-product equilibrium i.e. the nature of the 
problems surrounding producers manufacturing a nwnber of products. 
This question naturally has relevance for situations in which 
sellers sell more than a single type of product. 
In Eli W. Clems's article 'Price Discrimination and the 
Multipie-Product Firmt(l), the author points out that 
11 ••• it is probably impossible to find in 
the whole of our economy a single firm that 
sells a single product at a single price. 11 (2) 
Since it is possible for a firm to produce a number of products, 
it is also possible that it will attempt to equate the ~furginal 
Costs and ~~rginal Revenues for only one item, and content itself 
with a different policy for its others in the hope that the profits 
on the former will cover the losses on the latter. Whatever the 
individual procedure may be, the principle is that price discrimi-
nation is not a very different phenomenon from multiple-product 
production. The argument in support of this view is based on 
the belief that the individual firm must continuously find new 
ways of utilizing idle capacity. In order to do this, it will 
search for markets (suited to the nature of its t1product 11 and 
production capacity) in which there are opportunities for profits, 
and ~dll carry on its production until Marginal Costs and Price 
are equated in the least profitable market. Clemens points out 
that, for example, the manufacture of steel is characterized by 
many different types and qualities of final product, so that in 
this case it may justifiably be classified as a 11multiple-product 11 
industry. The list of examples would appear to be quite 
extensive. The purpose of utilizing available capacity to the 
fullest is obvious - only a.t this point is output such as to 
(1) Review of Econonuc Studies, 1951-1952, p. 1. For a.n 
initial analysis, see The Economics of Imperfect Competition, 
Chapters 1~ and 16. 
(2) Clemens, ibid., p. 1. 
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make the greatest contribution to fixed overheads. Clemens 
envisages a situation in which a firm is operating at about 70% 
of capacity and succeeding in equating MC and MR. Since it still 
possesses excess capacity it might be able to increase output 
without a proportionate increase in costs at the margin. At 
this stage it has the alternative of either reducing prices in 
the market in which it is currently operating, or seeking new 
markets in which Marginal Revenue exceeds Marginal Costs. Should 
it choose to do the latter it will probably enter the markets in 
ord.er of their individual profitability. Only when MC and MR have 
been equated in the least profitable market (as already indicated 
above) will it pay the individual firm to halt its expansion. 
In an article entitled lThe Equilibrium of the Firm in Multi-
Process Industries' (l) vl.J. Eiteman suggests that 
11 ••• it is absurd to claim that entrepreneurs 
strive, consciously or unconsciously, to 
expand their scale of operations until 
marginal costs equal marginal returns. 11 (2) 
He bases his argument on certain empirical data which would seem 
to indicate that the concept of a margin is too poorly constituted 
to describe the complexities of production in multiple-process 
industries. The orthodox notion that homogeneous products 
can be increased by one unit at a time, falls away where there is 
in fact no product homogeneity and where additions to both output 
and input are made in terms of units of varying types. Where, 
further, a single product is being considered, it is possible to 
examine the marginal input unit by withdrawing it from the process 
and noting the effect. Where a number of different types of 
input unit are being employed simultaneously in different parts 
of the plant, exact measurement of the significance of each is 
rendered far more complicated. In many cases, the manipulation 
of marginal units in an attempt to equate ~lrginal costs and 
marginal revenue creates probelms which dwarf the advantages to 
be derived from such an exercise. 
On this issue, however, M.A. Adeln~n 1 s 'Equilibrium in 
Multi-Process Industries- Further Commentst(J), makes the point 
that in multiple-process firms it is quite commonly found that 
(l) Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1945. 
(2) Ibid., p. 284. 
(3) Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1946. 
(4) Ibid., p. 467. 
one department is able, with only a small addition to its 
factors of production, to move ahead far more quickly than, 
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say, another operating under more favourable conditions. Since 
this type of situation frequently arises in vertically integrated 
firms, it is likely to result in excesses which cannot be absorbed 
by other departments, and the effect will be to stimulate such 
lagging departments in the attempt to improve overall productivity 
and perhaps also productivity per unit of input employed. Adelman 
suggests that 
n ••• because a changing demand situation 
gives rise to constant changes in the 
level of output yielding the maximum 
gross revenue, and because changing 
techniques put one department ahead at 
one time, and subsequently another, the 
constant comparison of marginal costs is 
not less but more important for a multi-
process firm than for an isolated 
producer. 11 (1) 
The question of multi-product manufacturing and selling will 
be dealt with again at a later stage in this thesis. 
(l)Ibid., p. 467. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Before concluding the introductory notes on the nature and 
implications of The Theory of Monopolistic Competition and The 
Economics of Imperfect Competition, there remains to be discussed 
the question of Selling Costs, and its relevance for the overall 
analysis. 
In his The TheO£V of Monopolistic Competition, Professor 
Chamberlin provided the first detailed analysis of selling costs 
and an indication of their importance in distinguishing monopolistic 
from pure or perfect competition. (l) Thus far vve have followed 
Chamberlin's technique of assuming given wants and perfect lmowledge 
on the part of buyers, and an appropriate analytical framework has 
been provided. At this point, however, the issue of selling 
costs will be introduced and the following definition employed: 
11 Selling costs are ••• costs incurred in 
order to alter the position or shape 
of the demand curve for a product. 11 (2) 
Initially it is necessary to distinguish between Production 
Costs and Selling Costs.(J) Selling Costs may be considered as 
advertising of any kind, the salaries of those persons employed 
in selling the product, various forms of encouragement (discounts, 
margins) granted to dealers as a stimulus to increase sales 
efforts, displays and demonstrations etc. It must ~qturally be 
assumed that consumers can in fact be persuaded to buy a product or 
otherwise it would not pay a seller to indulge in expenditures of 
the sort enumerated. Under conditions where all goods are 
exactly alike (in either the imaginations of the buyers, or in 
reality) and where each seller can sell as much as he wishes 
at a given price, it is not necessary to incur selling costs as 
a means of differentiating products or increasing sales. 
Siw~larly, where wants are given and there exists perfect knowledge 
in the minds of consumers, selling costs will also have no part 
to play since it will not be possible to change the opinions of 
the buyers through a form of advertising which is not always 
necessarily designed to point out real differences amongst products, 
but rather, is more frequently geared to making imaginary dis-
tinctions. 
(l) Chapter VI ff. 
(2) Ibid., p. 117. 
(3) Ibid., p. 117. 
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Assuming, then, that buyers can be influenced by sales tech-
niques and that the most common form taken by such techniques is 
Advertising, let us examine the way in which Demand can be affected. 
We have already pointed out that, for Advertising to have any 
impact on the market, it is necessary that both imperfect know-
ledge and 11 flexible 11 tastes, preferences and wants exist. 
In the case of imperfect knowledge, Advertising can be employed 
to perform the useful function of informing potential customers of 
the range of products from which they can choose. Since, in 
many fields, people are ignorant of the comparative prices ruling 
in the market, or of the qualities of various goods or even of the 
existence of the goods themselves, informative advertising enables 
the sellers to draw attention to their own products, as well as, 
under certain circumstances, to benefit the consuming public by 
increasing the breadth of choice. At the same time, advertising 
of this type can be employed to misinfonn buyers as well, in that 
it can attribute to goods qualities which in reality do not exist. 
Basically, however, the result of advertising expenditure is to 
make the Demand curve for all products more elastic, since in-
creasing awareness of the variety of products from which to choose 
will tend to reduce the 11 clustering'' of buyers around a r:a rticular 
product merely because they know of no proper substitutes. The 
inelastic Demand curve, conventionally associated with product 
differentiation under conditions of imperfect knowledge (as 
opposed to product preference) flattens out in the lower price 
ranges as sellers are able to expand their markets through 
advertising expenditure. At the same time, advertising 
outlays increase costs, with the result that prices have to be 
raised sufficiently from "pre-advertising" levels. 
Not only will the shape of the Demand curve be altered through 
the introduction of such selling expenditures, but the location 
will be affected as well. The fact that the market for products 
can be widened by the judicious application of advertising means 
that Demand curves may be shifted upwards a.nd to the right. 
Chamberlin also points out that advertising has the capacity 
to alter wants themselves(l). He distinguishes between this 
function and the fact that it can be used as a means of spreading 
information in the manner already described, andjustifies this by 
suggesting that: 
(l) Ibid., p. 119. 
"An advertisement which merely displays 
the name of a particular trade mark or · 
manufacturer may convey no information; 
yet if this name is made more familiar to 
buyers, they are led to ask for it in 
preference to unadvertised, unfamiliar 
brands. 11 (1) 
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The principle underlying all this, is that selling techniques of 
certain varieties may be, and are, used on the potential consumer 
in such a way that his entire psychological make-up is brought 
into the picture and his attitudes are made susceptible to the 
influences exerted by the advertisers. 
"They are not informative; they are 
manipulative. 11 (2) 
Another distinction which must be drawn, however, is that 
between the type of advertising undertaken by the manufacturer, and 
that undertaken by the wholesaler and retailer. For the manu-
facturer, advertising is somewhat more complex since he must bring 
his product to the attention of both the retailer and the final 
consumer, while the retailer is only concerned with the latter. 
The reasoning behind this is obvious. Since the manufacturer 
might be able to persuade consumers to buy his product, he must 
be able to persuade the middlemen to stock it, and vice versa. 
At the same time, it is likely that retailers, experiencing a 
heavy demand for a good which the,y do not stock, will attempt to 
obtain supplies from the manufacturer and in this way the latter 
will be saved the troubles of cont. acting distributors. This 
method, however, leaves much to chance. The advantage of 
establishing contacts with a wholesaler is that goods requiring a 
large number of retail outlets can be most adequately handled by 
those who know the maximum number of dealers. In addition to the 
costs incurred in encouraging vJholesalers to sell a particular 
good, certain costs must necessarily arise in the process of 
persuading them to carry sufficient stocks of such goods to cater 
for anticipated demands. Wholesalers constitute the only group 
with facilities adequate for holding large stocks, but the cost 
(in the form of space and risk) of doing so must be borne by the 
manufacturers in the form of margins. In addition, the whole-
saler will only be tempted to carry the product if assured of the 
demand for it. In order to encour~ge this, a strong advertising 
campaign with retailer and consumer is necessary. 
(1) Ibid., p. 119. 
(2) Ibid., p. 120 
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The manufacturer must also be aware of the strategic importance 
of the retailer. By refusing to sell a product for one reason 
or another, the retailer can effectively ruin the manufacturer's 
trade. For this reason, the manufacturer must provide the 
distributor with suitable incentives in the form of profit margins 
higher than, or as high as, those that the latter might be able 
to obtain from concentrating on other 11 substitute11 prod1.1cts. 
Part of this process is the granting, by manufacturers, of exclusive 
agencies to retailers. The fact that this system protects 
distributors from competition and gives them all the benefits 
accruing from the sale of the particular line is a great incentive 
to stimulate sales efforts on the part of retailers. 
An increasingly effective system is the operation of dis-
tributive outlets by manufacturers themselves. This technique 
of organization provides the producer with many of the opportunitie~ 
and advantages which generally go to the retailer or wholesaler 
and he is at the same time able to ensure the fullest promotion 
of his product. The process operates in reverse as well, in 
that retailing firms have succeeded in securing cost and other 
advantages by either setting up their own supply network or 
arranging for manufacturers to supply goods to them in bulk and 
under their own trade names.. At this point, the question of the 
integration of production with selling raises the issue of the 
difference between production costs and selling costs~ 
Using Chamberlin's definitions of selling costs- the 
costs of altering the demands of the consumer - and production 
costs - the 11 costs of satisfying them11 (l)_, we may proceed to 
an examination of the analytical distinctions between them. 
"Cost of production includes all 
expenses which must be met in order to 
provide the commodity or service, 
transport it to the buyer and put it 
into his hands ready to satisfy his 
wants. Cost of selling includes all 
outlays made in order to secure a demand, 
or a market, for the product. The 
former costs create utilities in order 
that dem~_ds may be satisfied; the latter 
create and shift the demands themselves. A 
simple criterion is this: of all the costs 
incurred in the manufacture and sale of a 
given product, those which alter the demand 
curve for it are selling costs, and those 
which do not, are costs of production." (2) 
(1). Ibid., p. 123. 
(2) Ibid., p. 123. 
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The distinction is not always clear. Chamberlin cites cost 
of Transportation as an example(l), in that it constitutes a cost 
of production, but it may also be regarded as a selling cost 
borne by the manufact,,rer as an inducement to the retailer to 
stock the good, or merely to bring his product into contact with 
the market. Rent is another example; a high rent, generally 
characterizing a well-populated shopping district, is the price 
which a distributor must pay in order to obtain the large volume of 
sales which such a location can bring. his attempt on the part of 
the seller to get as close to as many buyers as possible may be 
viewed as an adaption of product to market in the form of the 
provision of more convenient shopping facilities. Similarly, 
the seller who locates in a lower rent area and informs his clientele 
that for just that reason he is able to sell his waresmore cheaply 
is adapting demand to the product. 
11We arrive at another way of stating 
the distinction between the two kinds 
of costs: those made to adapt the 
product to the demand are costs of 
production; those made to adapt the 
demand to the product are costs of selling. 11 (2) 
Since economic theory as it stood prior to the preparation 
of the works on monopolistic competition had failed to take any 
cognizance whatsoever of the noti~n of selling costs, it provided 
no way of incorporating anything appr~ximating an interpretation 
of the expenditure responsible for changes in the Demand curves. 
There was no need to, since Perfect Competition theory assumes 
homogeneity of product and large numbers of competitors while 
the theory of Jlionopoly implies a control of the market upon which 
no-one (even qy advertising) could possibly encroach. The result 
was a body of thought which assured that demand merely existed 
and did not venture an explanation of the reasons why. 
We have already indicated that the effect of advertising is 
generally to enable the seller to sell more of his products than 
he would without it, with the result that the Demand curve tends to 
shift upv-rards and to the right. This obviously means that, with 
advertising, he is able to sell more at any price than would 
have been the case otherwise. This raises the question of outlays 
on advertising. Up to which point will the seller experience 
increasing returns from his expenditure, and what will determine 
(l) Ibid., p. 124. 
(2) Ibid., p. 125. 
this point? Since price is also an important variable in the 
sales analysis, the only way in which the value of advertising 
expenditure can be calculated is to keep price constant and var.y 
the selling outlays. The extent of changes in demand will provide 
an idea of the returns from advertising, even though there might 
be minor variations in the reactions of the Demand curve over the 
range of possible prices. 
The magnitude of advertising outlays and the combination of 
selling expenditures with the expenditures on factors of production 
such as land, labour and capital, will be a function of the size of 
the firm and its capacity to spend on such items, as well as of the 
nature of the product and the extent of its potential market. 
These factors, will, in turn, determine the medium to be used in 
the dissemination of information. A small corner shop will 
naturally find its advertising outlets more limited than will a 
large international organization. For the purposes of our present 
analysis, however, it must be assumed that expenditures are 
optimally combined and that, in each case, no greater returns could 
be obtained from the given outlays. 
Continued expenditure by a firm on Advertising may produce a 
number of effects. Chamberlin has pointed out that certain forms 
of selling expenditure must be repetitive in order to provide 
results, and, up to a certain point, outlays may in fact be 
subject to decreasing returns - a situation which may only be 
corrected by a maintenance of ~uch expenditure.(l) Alternatively 
the slow process of persuading consumers to turn towards a 
particular product may be accompanied by increasing returns, 
after which relatively fewer customers can be reached by advertising 
and the net result is probably decreasing returns. 
The nature of advertising is such that it is frequently 
subject to the same laws as govern the production process. The 
principle of economies of scale is applicable to certain selling 
techniques in that the larger the outlay the better it can be 
organized and utilized. For example, a small firm might find it 
both unnecessary and financially impossible to support a specialized 
advertising manager, while the establishment of an advertising 
department is becoming an increasingly common feature of large 
scale organizations - the advantage being the fact that a 
trained specialist is obviously superior to a man who is required 
to be a 11 jack of all trades 11 in his own business. In addition, 
(1) Ibid., p. 133. 
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the point has already been made, that the larger the outlay, the 
greater is the access to all media, with the result that coverage 
is probably greater and more effective in terms of numbers reached. 
There are, however, aspects of selling expenditures which 
are subject to decreasing returns. The effect, already mentioned 
above, of successive increments in outlays is frequently to reach 
fewer and fewer customers, or alternatively, to induce a given set 
of customers to resist the product in question and to weigh up 
more seriously the sacrifices which have to be made in order to 
purchase it. The result is that increased costs will have to be 
incurred in order to persuade the consumer to maintain his rate 
of consumption after a certain point has been reached. The 
rationale behind this process provides the reason for organizing 
selling expenditures in such a way that the most susceptible 
consumers are dealt with first, and only after they, as a market, 
have been saturated, is attention given to those potential 
customers with st~r sales resistance. 
Under the conditions outlined above, it may be legitimately 
held that increasing returns will eventually be transformed into 
decreasing returns, in the sense that the former state will soon 
come to an end while the latter condition will, with the passage 
of time and the increase in selling expenditure, only become more 
amplified. 
Let us now turn to an examination of Chamberlin's exposition 
of the matter.(l) He makes the point that the curve of Average 
Selling Cost per unit will indicate those factors discussed 
above i.e. whilst increasing return~ are being experienced the 
curve falls until a minimum poi~t is reached, after which 
diminishing returns cause a rise. 
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Chamberlin employs the curve SSt to illustrate this and makes the 
assumption that costs of production are, for the moment, being 
disregarded. Costs of product are measured along the vertical 
axis, while product (in units) is measured along the horizontal 
axis. (l) 
The area OAPC indicates the total cost of selling OA units 
of the product, while AP indicates the average cost of selling the 
same quantity. The position of the curve will depend upon the 
nature of the product and the conditions surrounding its sale, as 
well as the type of substitutes available. These factors will 
also determine the shape of SSt and the exact point at which the_ 
upward turn begins. In order to draw the curve properly, these 
determinants must be isolated from the selling costs themselves 
and only the latter should be exarained. The lower the price of the 
good, however, the lower the curve of Selling Costs will generally 
lie. (2). The greater the range of substitutes, the poorer the 
quality of the good itself, the lower the price of competing goods 
(or the better their quality) or the larger the expenditure on 
their advertisement, the earlier will diminishing returns be 
encountered for the good under consideration. The result will be 
a minimum point lying further tolthe left. 
Since it is not entirely practical to consider the viability 
of increasing or decreasing expenditure on selling without examining 
the costs of production of the product itself, the analysis is 
improved by combining the curve of Selling Costs (SS 1 ) with that of 
Production (PP')(3). 
(1) Ibid., p. 136. 
(2) Ibid., p. 137. 
(J) Ibid., p. 138. 
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We have already discussed the pp1 curve and it requires no 
elaborating at this point. The curve CC 1 may be used to represent 
the C0st of Selling plus the Cost of Production for each of a 
number of units, so that the .difference between the curves CCI and ppt 
constitutes the cost of selling alone. Taking the previous 
\ example, for output OA, cost of proauction per unit is given 
by AM; cost of selling per unit is HQ; and the combined cost of 
producing and selling per unit is AQ. Similarly the total cost 
of producing OA is OAME; of selling it is EMQF and the sum of 
both total production and selling costs is OAQF. It will be 
noted that the minimum point on CCI does not necessarily correspond 
to the minimum points on either PP' or SSt. 
Chamberlin also introduces a curve of Combined Marginal Costs. (l) 
This merely indicates the addition made to total costs by the 
production of each extra unit. At this stage, however, it will 
not be required in the analysis. 
We may now proceed to an examination of the equilibrium 
situations similar to those studied earlier. In the first case 
we will turn our attention to the conditions of individual 
equilibrium and subsequently. to those pertaining to group equilibrium. 
The distinction in this situation will be the fact that selling costs 
are now being considered.· 
We assume that the prices and adver1ising outlays for sub-
stitutes are given, an~ that the products themselves do not change. 
In order to maximize his profits, the individual seller may adjust 
price, product or selling outlays, or all three together. As 
was the procedure in the earlier analysis, each of these variables 
(1) Ibid., p. 138. 
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will be considered separately, on the assumption that the others 
remain constant. In the first example selling outlays will be 
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In the above diagram ppr is the curve of Cost of Production, and 
the combined curve of Average Cost of Production and. Selling 
(assuming naturally that price is given) is CCt .(l) The 
point on the CC' curve is AL, and price may lie either above, 
below, or on the same level as this point. Assuming for the 
moment that it does, in fact, lie above this point (at OF), 
the line FZ may be dravm parallel to OX. Where CC t lies below 
this line, the distance between the two will indicate the profits 
prevailing per unit of output, and total profit will be reflected 
by this distance multiplied by the relevant output. The point at 
which the total profit area is largest is OB (since ENRF is a 
maximum between CCI and FZ), and this will constitute the most 
profitable output under the circumstances. For ~his output to be 
sold, the total selling cost will be HGNE (total production cost 
is OBGH). Any expenditure on advertising of a sum either larger 
or smaller than HGNE would be less profitable. 
If we assume that the price lies lovwr than it did in the 
above example, and at a level exact~ equal to AL (the minimum 
point on the Combined Cost curve), the selling expenses would just 
be sufficient to sell OA. At this point, only normal or minimum 
profits will be made and there can be no surplus. On the other 
hand, if price lies below AL, the firm will be operating at a 
loss and production would, under normal circumstances, and providing 
that no other adjustments are possible, be discontinued. 
(1) Ibid., p. 142. 
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The second case is that in vmich price is adjustable and the 
other variables remain constant. Since the reasons for a stable 
selling outlay have not yet been discussed(l) 1 they may be explained 
by the fact that a finn might budget for a specific level of ex-
penditures well in advance, and find it impossible to vary it at 
a later stage. Alternatively, the level might be determined by 
11 .... habit or inertia on the part of the 
individual entrepreneur, or by g~erally 
accepted trade practice. 11 (2) 
In such a case, the elasticity of the curve SS' may be regarded as 
unity, since selling costs will be evenly distributed over the 
entire output. The CC' curve possesses the same shape as the PP1 
curve - falling to the minimum point and rising subsequently. 
At the same time the minimum point of CCt is located further to the 
right than the minimum point on PP 1 • 
In order to select the most suitable price to charge, the 
entrepreneurs Demand curve DDt must be inserted into the diagram.(3) 









0 ; ___________ _,_ __________ .. ""/. 
A 
The slope and position of such a curve will obviously be a function 
of the ll}nonopoly11 characteristics of the product as well as the 
nature of the product itself and the amount of the selling 
expenditure made for it. Chamberlin proceeds to a new curve 
the curve of 11 combined producing and selling costs 11 ( 4)armotated 
by FF' (instead of CC'). The distinction between this curve and 
the curve previously discussed is simply that, for the latter, it 
(1) The possibility of, and reasons for, a stability of either 
11 product11 or price have been discussed above. 
(2) The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, p. 143. 
(3) Ibid., p. 144. 
(4) Ibid., p. 145. 
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was assumed that the cost of producing and selling each amount of 
product, at a given price, could be indicated by cc•, while, for 
the former, it is assumed that, since selling costs are fixed, they 
must be distributed evenly over the entire output (hence the 
notation FF' ). In order to provide the maximum profits, price will 
be AQ, sales OA, total combined costs OAPH and total profits HGQE. 
Without going into unnecessary detail it may be assumed that the 
area of profits and the optimum price will change with a shift in 
the position of the DDt curve. At any point further to the left 
of a position of tangency between DD' and FF' production would, 
in terms of our preceding analysis, be discontinued. 
If we now consider "product" only; as a·vnriable it is necessary 
to assume price and selling outlay to be given. The producer in 
this case will be required to decide the nature of the product which 
will maximize his profits. Demand will be a function of all the 
variables already discussed (price, product and sellihg outlays for 
the good itself and its substitutes), and the optimum 11 product 11 will 
be selected on the basis of profit yields. This does not imply 
that the 11 product11 with the lowest combined cost or greatest demand 
is the one which is selected. (l) 
Group Equilibrium: Chamberlin employs the same assumptions in 
his discussion of group equilibrium with selling costs as he does 
when referring to equilibrium without them. (2) This implies that 
he does not, in his initial analysis, recognize the fact that the 
~ost and Demand curves may vary between products and that the 
acceptance of uniformity in this regard is a simplification. At 
the same time he is aware of the disadvantages of making the 
assumptions and attempts to clarify the conditions surrounding 
producers at a later stage. He also points out, however, that 
there is some justification in assuming relative consistency of 
characteristics: 
11Markets are often fairly uniform in 
composition, consumers' preferences 
fairly evenly distributed, differences 
between products such as to give rise to 
no marked differences in cost, and selling 
methods stable and unsensational. Where 
these things are true, our assumptions 
are sufficiently realistic to make the 
results of some direct applicability. 11 (3) 
If we were to consider first the small group i.e. that in 
which each producer is capable of making incursions into the 
(1) See discussion above. 
(2) The TheorY of Monopolistic Competition, p. 149. 
(3) Ibid., p. 150. 
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markets of his competitors and which is thus characterized by action 
and reaction patterns, we are faced with the problem of determining 
the impact on his competitors of the use of selling outlays by th~ 
individual producer. Since this is best left till later we will 
confihe our attention to the situation in which the group is 
sufficiently large to permit the individual to advertise without 
severely affecting his competitors and, therefore, without 
inducing them to retaliate either through price cutting or 
advertising. At the same time we run into another problem. In 
our previous discussion of the question of size in relation to the 
group, we distinguished only between "large" and "small" groups -
and did so on precisely the basis we have just mentioned. In 
this case, however, - when we are dealing with selling outlays -
0 
n I • 
it is poss1lbe that the "large" group need not be as large as it 
IV 
would have to be without selling outlays. Without indulging in 
quantitative comparisons we may explain the distinction according 
to Chamberlin's argument. (l) He points out that the best examples 
may be taken from situations in which the seller either cuts his 
price, or advertises. If he cuts his price (as would be the case 
where there is no allowance for selling outlays) he increases his 
business by reducing the number of customers patronizing his rivals. 
At the same time, he will attract other consumers who heretofore 
have had no loyalties as far as the partidular product is concerned 
and are, in fact, buying it for the first time only because the 
price has been reduced. Were this not the case "the demand curve 
ld al b d . 1a 1· '' ( 
2) Th . t t . wou ways e a perpen 1cu r 1ne • e same s1 ua 1on 
applies to advertising. If he advertises, the producer will 
attract both customers new to the product and new to himself 
(in the sense that they had previously bought elsewhere). 
Obviously the effect of the entire group either advertising or 
cutting prices will be to increase demand for the product far 
more than could an individual producer. 
We shall now turn to an examination of the processes by which 
sales may be increased for the group as a whole, through the use 
of advertising. Chamberlin's argument will become more clear. 
As already shown, Chamberlin initiates his discussion by 
pointing out that there is a distinction between the effects of 
advertising on the members of the group and the effects on those 
(1). Ibid., p. 151. 
(2) Ibid., p. 151. 
outside it. ( l) The reasoning behind this lies in the fact that 
for any one product there are a number of imperfect substitutes 
as well as general substitutes, and the 
" ••• increased market of any one producer 
is derived not alone from the markets of 
the closest substitutes for his products, 
but from the markets of all substitutes 
(i.e. from the markets of all other 
products). 11 (2) 
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At the same time it should be realised that the nature of the 
advertising and the sector of the market at which it is directed 
Will play an important part in determining the influence which it 
will have. If, for example, the advertising is aimed at 
persuading those who buy the product anyway to buy a specific 
brand of it, there is less liklihood that it will also succeed in 
attracting many entirely new buyers, although generally at least a 
small proportion of such new demand will be an inevitability as 
people are made aware of the existence of the type of product. 
Similarly, a good deal of advertising is currently directed at 
potential buyers rather than old established ones, since the former 
can frequently be more easily persuaded to buy a particular brand 
of the product while the latter possess preferences which cannot be 
altered sufficiently to warrant the outlay. 
As far as the effect of advertising on the group itself is 
concerned, Chamberlin points out that there will naturally be 
(for the seller who advertises) 11 a readjustment in his favour of 
the sales total of the group. 11 (3) The question arises, however, 
as to whether this will necessarily result in a loss of sales for 





11 ••• it is, in general, impossible for the 
advertiser to direct all of this new demand 
to himself: he attracts it in his direction 
but a part of it is dropped to his 
competitors on the way. When the auto-
mobile manufacturer describes the 
satisfactions to be had from motoring 
and suggests the purchase of his car in 
order to realize them, most of those 
influenced may investigate his product 
first but few will buy without looking 
at others, and many will end by purchasing 
elsewhere."(4) 
Ibid., p. 151. 
Ibid., p. 151. 
Ibid., p. 152. 
Ibid., p. 152. 
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In this way, the advertising instituted by an individual member of 
the group serves to attract buyers to the entire group, and it is 
extremely difficult to analyse the complex relationships which 
arise. It is, for example, difficult to ascertain in advance 
whether advertising would be more or less valuable to the individual 
producer within a group producing a relatively undifferentiated 
product, since any new demand created would be srn.red out amongst 
all the producers to a greater extent, and there would also be 
less well established preferences which the individual advertiser 
would have to counter in his attempt to gain customers from his 
competitors. At the same time, were the product to be relatively 
homogeneous advertisers would be not so much concerned with 
attracting potential customers for the product as a whole, as 
they would be with trying to gain those already attracted to 
their rivals. Naturally the probability that this will in fact 
be done will depend upon the size of the group, since the larger 
the number of competitors, the greater the advantage (in terms of 
potential markets) will be. 
Returning to our original proposition that the size of the 
11 large group11 need only, in fact, be quite small relative to that 
required to fulfil the conditions of competitive non-interdependence 
in the case of pure price or product competition, it will become 
clear that this is indeed the position. If all competitors 
advertise, each will be protected to a large extent from the 
incursions of his rivals by the facts that (a) he will be able 
to keep customers he might have lost if he did not make such 
selling outlays although (b) he will lose some to his competitors 
as a result of the natural processes of persuasion and {c) he 
will gain some from his rivals as well as from outside the original 
group (i.e. those attracted by general intra-group advertising). 
At this point in the analysis, Chamberlin introduces the 
question of advertising by sellers in other groups but points out 
that his arguments have only been developed to include the 
adjustments within the group itself. (l) The advantage of this 
technique is that the analysis can be applied to systems of 
interdependent groups as well as to the question of general 
equilibrium. 
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In the above diagram(l) ppt is the Cost of Production curve for 
the individual producer, OA is his output and OM his price. Since 
all sellers are producing the same output, total sales by the group 
as a whole will be OA multiplied by the number of competitors. 
Under these circumstances, profits prevailing within the group 
are at the minimum necessary to maintain production and to prevent 
both an influx and eflux of sellers. The combined Cost curve 
CC 1 represents the costs of producing and selling at price AR for 
each producer. 
drawn on the 
Chamberlin indicates that the CCt curve is 
11 ••• assumption that the selling outlays 
of all others except the single one who 
advertises are held constant. 11 (2) 
In this case he assumes that they are held constant at zero -
implying that no-one else advertises. The most suitable 
position for the producer represented in the diagram above would 
be one in which he would make total selling outlays of FHDE, 
thereby increasing his sales to OB, making additional profits of 
EDQM and lowering his unit production costs from AR to BH. The 
effects on his competitors might be either to increase, decrease 
or leave their markets the same - depending upon the nature of 
his advertising. Since each seller can increase his market by 
advertising, in the same way as, in our earlier analysis, each 
seller could ncrease his market by cutting his price while 
others kept theirs constant, the incentive to do so will be 
strong and there is no justification for believing that all 
competitors but one will hold their selling outlays constant at 
(l) Ibid., p. 155. 
(2) Ibid., p. 154. 
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zero. In the above diagram the CC' curve was drawn on the 
assumption that profits of EDQM were possible only for one seller, 
and also, that he was the only advertiser. Since, however, when 
all members of the group advertise, each expands his sales by 
taking customers from his rivals, it is quite possible that for 
each, sales will remain steady at OA, and there is a tendency for 
the selling efforts of all within the 
In the following diagram (l) 
group to cancel out. 
y p F 
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the total expenditure of each seller is MREK. PP 1 possesses 
its customary characteristics and FFt indicates that selling outlay 
is fixed and therefore independent of volume. NDQM = YillEK as 
well as any rectangle drawn between PP 1 and FFt. 
Chamberlin indicates that the distinction between FF 1 (in 
this diagram) and CCt (in the previous diagram) must be noted. 
11The latter shows by its distance from 
the base line the cost to one firm of 
producing and selling different volumes 
on the assumption that the selling 
outlays of the others remain constant 
(as originally drawn, since no-one was 
advertising as yet, they remained 
constant at zero); the former shows by 
its distance from the base line the 
combined cost of producing and selling 
different voltunes of product on the 
assumption that all producers in the 
group carry their selling outlays to a 
given total amount. 11 (2) 
(~) Ibid., p. 157. 
(2) Ibid., p. 156. 
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MREK indicates both the total expenditure on advertising of each 
of the sellers, and the amount of his losses whilst there are too 
many sellers in the field. (Total Revenue for each is shown 
by the area OARM and Total Cost is OAEK). Assuming that, in 
fact, there is no exit from the group by any of the sellers, 
Chamberlin employs a device to show that, by increasing their 
expenditure on advertising, the sellers are able to escape their 
losses. 
He originally drew the curve CG' for a single seller on the 
assumption that all his rivals maintained theirs at a constant. 
He now drops this assumption and selects conditions under which all 
producers but the individual in question are keeping their selling 
outlays at MREK on FFt. Since such advertising is sufficient ·· 
to achieve the sale of OA units of output, the curve CCI how 
passes through E on the curve FF', lying below it to the left of 
E and above it to the right. The implication is that the in-
dividual seller will now have to spend more on advertising than 
his rivals, if he wishes to sell more than they, and need spend 
less if he does not wish to sell as much as OA. ccr may dip 
below the price line MZ. If it does not, losses may still be 
reduced if further selling outlays are made, but there is no 
possibility of increasing profits. If, on the other hand, 
CC' does move below MZ, an outlay on selling of JLGH will produce a 
profit of HC.TH. Output would increase to as, costs of production 
would be reduced to SL, selling costs per unit to LG, and profits 
per unit to GT. 
The advantages of increasing advertising expenditure in 
situations like this, will become evident to all sellers, and the 
net result will be that both FF 1 and CC' are moved upwards and to 
the right. When it is obvious that the individual cannot improve 
his position any further by moving along CCI to the right, the 
selling outlays will cease. According to Chamberlin this will 
be the case where 
11 CC' had moved upwards and curled back-
wards so that the optimum point on it 
coincided with the point of intersection 
of CC' and FF' • 11 (1) 
At this point, however, owing to the fact that FF 1 is now 
lying higher than it did originally, the individual producer is 
incurring losses of the kind indicated by the area MREK. In 
order to eliminate this difficulty, the only alternative is an 
eflux from the group of some of the producers, and a subsequent 
(l) Ibid., p. 158 note. 
, 
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distribution over the remainder, of the markets which they had 
held. As this movement out of the group takes place, there is 
an increase in the size of the markets belonging to those left 
behind, with the result t~~t there is a fall along the curve FF'. 
After a while costs will be equated with price and there will no 
longer be any losses as soon as the output of the group as a 
whole has increased to OB. Chamberlin points out, however, that 
here the equality of cost and price will not be stable.(l) 
He provides the following diagram( 2) 
F 
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to show that, if CC' is drawn through Q (since there are now 
fewer sellers) it is possible to show how much an increase in 
profits each seller could expect from further expenditure on 
selling. As soon as each and every seller initiates such 
expenditure though, profits'turn into losses as a result of the 
movement to the right of FF'. Once again firms leave the 
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group and the entire process is repeated. There will be a 
corresponding movement of ccr as well when advertising is increased 
and both CCt and FF 1 will always intersect on MZ. The process 
will reach equilibrium when CC 1 lies at a tangent to the price 
line (MZ) and this will naturally correspond to the point where 
the former intersects FFt. 
(1) Ibid., p. 159. 
(2) Ibid., p. 158. 
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and cost is equal to price. The group will be in equilibrium 
since no-one will be inclined to enter or leave the industry and 
no-one will advertise because this would, under any circumstances, 
raise costs and therefore increase losses. 
The principle behind this is not difficult to follow. As 
competition for markets becomes characterized by increasing 
advertising expenditure on the part of all sellers, each individual 
finds it more difficult to expand his markets. At the same 
time as output increases the unit costs of production tend to 
move downward more slowly. The combined effect of all this, is 
to increase selling expenditure per unit as the movement to 
the right of Q takes place, and to increase unit costs of pro-
duction over the same range. As Q moves to the right, therefore, 
CC' rotates about it and ultimately provides the tangency 
characterizing equilibrium. 
Up to this point in the following of Chamberlin's argument, 
no cognisance has been taken of the fact that the 
" ••• total sales of the general class 
of product are increased by the 
advertising. 11 (2) 
Our previous discussion has been based on the argument that the 
equilibrium adjustment is achieved as a result of an ef1ux of 
sellers from the industry and a consequent improvement in the 
market of each remaining producer. In that case, the effect of 
(1) Ibid., p. 160. 
{2) Ibid., p. 161 
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the selling outlays was only considered on the basis of its .... 
influence within the group itself, and, as has already been 
pointed out, no attention was paid to its impact on the sales of 
the general class of product. Returning to our diagram, we remember 
y t' ~ 
K. } \ \E 
,( 
.. / 
----~-'-~~~:::;::------....,.--.;4./-·· ------"- -z__ 
7 --·-------+---+--- p' 
! 
0 '------'-----J.....----±--------
p.. ~ s 
that it was shown that the net effect of a general increase 
in selling expenditure was to cause losses of 11REK. As firms 
left the industry, MREK was reduced and sales were increased for 
each from OA to OB. If we now assume that such selling expenditure 
increases the group's total sales, and that, as a result, each 
seller is provided with a market sufficiently large to absorb a 
quantity slightly greater than OA, but not as much as OB, the 
equilibrium adjustment can be brought about with a smaller 
exodus of sellers. If, on the other hand, output of each is 
as high as OB, there will be no need for any sellers to leave the 
field because at this point selling costs will be covered. It 
is even possible that the output of each may exceed OB, so that 
new competitors will actually enter the industry as a result of 
the attraction of the 11 excess11 profits being experienced. 
From this it should be obvious that, wkere selling outlays 
increase the sales of the general class of product, the equilibrium 
adjustment will requi~e special analysis. Another observation 
which is significant in this regard, is the fact that an expansion 
in the size of the market, resulting from an increase in ad-
vertising expenditure, will take place at a faster and faster 
rate up to a certain point, and the selling cost per unit will 
correspondingly fall more quickly than previously. This 
will cause the lowest point on the curve CC' to lie further to 
the right than under those conditions where increased selling 
outlays had no effect on the total sales of the product itself. 
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Chamberlin proceeds to an examination of the nsecond phase 
of the group problem11 (l), in which the advertising expenditure 
and the 11 product 11 are regarded as fixed, and competition is now 
carried out on the basis of price. In order to do this he 
utilizes the ppt and FFt curves for the individual producer, 
bear~ng in mind the fact that the latter shows only the 
11 ••• unit cost of producing the 
corresponding (to any ordinate on 
the curve) volume of goods, plus its 
proportionate sh~re of the fixed 
selling costs.11(2) 
The positions of the two curves do not alter. (3 ) 
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The nature of the analysis is very similar to that undertaken 
earlier, since the only distinction lies in the fact that selling 
costs have now been introduced.C4 ) However, in our previous 
analysis, it may merely be assumed that selling costs are kept at 
zero while in the present case the divergence between ppt and FF' 
characterizes a situation in which these outlays are constant at 
a value greater than zero. Equilibrium is now achieved when the 
curve ddt is a tangent to FFt and where output and price are OA 
and AR respectively. Unit costs of selling and production are 
HR and AH respectively and together give a combined unit cost 
equal to the price. Total production, selling and combined 
costs for all units are OAHN, NHRM and OARM respectively and the 
latter is exactly equal to total receipts, so that normal profits 
prevail. Equilibrium would be achieved by the conventional 
(l) Ibid., p. 162. 
(2) Ibid., p. 164. 
(3) Ibid., p. 163. 
(4) See above. 
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adjustment of producers within the industry. If, for exampl;;, 
the market and price enjoyed by each were greater, so that the ddt 
curve lay above the point of tangency with FF' and to the right 
of the position of ultimate equilibrium, there would be an influx 
of competitors and the curve dd' would be forced downwards and to 
the left so that the adjustment would take place. Similarly, 
if the situation were characterized by the opposite set of conditions, 
there would be an eflux of producers until equilibriurr1 was achieved. 
Chrunberlin's final analysis of each separate variable in 
turn deals with variations of the 11 product11 • (l) In this case 
selling expenditure and price are held constant. 






In the diagram( 2)0M is the fixed price while ppr and FF 1 represent 
the same factors as vms the case e.:trlier. It has already been 
observed that a change in the 11 product11 itself generally results 
in a change in the costs of production as depicted by ppt • (3) 
Equilibrium can obviously also be achieved in the type of analysis 
we are dealing with, when excess profits have been eliminated and 
there is no tendency for producers to enter or leave the industry. 
In this case, therefore, it will be attained where output is OA, 
since here the curve of Combined Cost, FF', will intersect NZ, 
the price line. Any output either greater or less than OA 
would have the effect of increasing or decreasing profits, with 
the result that competitors would be drawn into, or 11 pushed11 
out of, the industry. 
Chamberlin also discusses the nature of the equilibrium 
adjustment when the operation of all three variables - price, 
11 product 11 and selling outlays - are considered together. (4) 
(1) The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, p. 167. 
(2) Ibid., p. 16S 
(3) Above. 
(4) The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, p. 169. 
95 
This process merely entails the addition of the optimum adjust-
ments for each of the variables and the assumption that any 
excess profits will be competed away by the entry of new sellers 
and that any losses will be eliminated by the eflux of existing 
competitors. 
Thus far we have been concerned with the analysis of the 
behaviour of the "large group". Turning briefly to a study of 









we observe a number of differences. If the output of each seller 
is OA and the number of competing producers is smaller than in 
the exam~les we had been considering earlier, the situation will 
be one in which each competitor will be aware of the fact that 
his actions will have repercussions in the market and cause his 
rivals to react in order.to protect themselves. Since all 
competitors are aware of the implications of their actions, it 
is quite possible that none will advertise if they are not doing 
so already, for fear of encouraging their rivals to do the same 
and causing all to lose ultimately. Chamberlin concludes that 
11 ••• the argument is analogous. to that 
presented ••• relative to price competition, 
and leads to a similar conclusion - that, 
where numbers are small, competition by 
means of advertising may be cut short 
even though the possibility exists for 
any one producer to increase his profits 
on condition that the selling outlays of 
the others do not change. 11 (l) 
It is possible, on the other hand, that advertising outlays will 
be undertaken in spite of the competiiton prevailing, simply 
because sellers are interested in making short-term profits 
rather than establishing safe long-term business. The possible 
reasons for this sort of behaviour have already been discussed 
in the context of price-cutting. (2) · 
(1) Ibido, P• 170. 
(2) See above. 
Much that has already been discussed in the section on price 
competition without selling outlays, may be applied to the present 
analysis. (l) The question of excess capacity, for example, 












. ~~ R 
~~I -------- ;~~ , 
----~~···F t 
i ----- 9.~·. p ' I .,,"'-- I 








and examining them in turn, it will have been observed that in 
the first case ddt 
11 ••• represents the demand at various 
prices for the product of any one 
seller on the assumption that the 
prices of his rivals ••• remain constant 
while the price adjustments are made. 11(2) 
(1) See above. 
(2) The Theory of Monopolistic Compeition 1 p. 171. 
A 
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In the second case, the assumption is the same~ but the assumption 
of constant values is widened to refer to his selling outlays and 
those of his rivals. If the DD' curve of A were drawn 
into B , so that it would be possible to represent the 
demand facing any single competitor on the assumption that the 
reaction of his rivals' price changes to his own are instantaneous. 
This curve would be more inelastic than the curve ddt and it will 
be a tangent to FFt at a point further to the left of, and higher 
than, R. Further, a scale of production smaller than that 
reflected by OA will prevail and there will be more producers 
than under the conditions depicted in B If the elasticity 
of DD' in both figures is the same - implying that advertising 
has had no effect on it, the scale of production will obviously 
be larger with than without advertising. 
"Whenever price competition functions 
imperfectly then, it seems likely that 
advertising diminishes the discrepancy 
between the actual and the most efficient 
scale of production. But total costs and 
prices are higher. Selling costs per unit 
are greater than the decrease in production 
costs. The resources expended to achieve 
this result are therefore greater than those 
saved by achieving it. And, of course, 
the balance of excess capacity remains."(l) 
In an article entitled tThe Influence of Marginal Buyers on 
Monopolistic Competition,(2), A.J. Nichol criticizes Chamberlin's 
use of continuous Demand curves and his neglect of marginal buyers. 
He uses Hotelling1 s basic model in which two sellers are initially 
located equidistant on either side from tne centre of a street, 
while buyers will purchase from either one on the basis of price 
and transport cost. All buyers located along a line bisecting 
(1) Ibid., p. 172. 
(2) Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1934. 
98 
the street in the centre such as NS will be marginal in respect 
of the two sellers when prices are equal and a few will be 
marginal where NS lies nearer to either A or B if this results in 
~nice differences equal·to differences in transport costs. 
' 
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The knowledge that buyers are impartial between either of the two 
sellers may have the result of (a) inducing competitive price-
cutting which must eventually ruin trade~ or (b) causing the sellers 
to refrain from such harmful activity by creating conditions under 
which both might live in long-term harmony. 
This failure, according to Nichol, on Chamberlin's part~ to 
consider the importance of marginal buyers in determining the 
policies.of sellers, also leads him to a view of the Demand curve 
which is not quite valid. Where products are differentiated, 
Chamberlin assumes that the Demand curve is 
downwards from left to right. This 
continuous, running 
11 ••• implies at all times an absence of 
any appreciable n~)er of marginal 
buyers."(l) 
It therefore implies that, where price is raised dlightly above 
the general price level, sales will fall off by a small amount 
only - which would seem to indicate that marginal buyers play no 
significant role. 
Nichol suggests that 
11 ••• in spite of the ballyhoo of sales-
manship and advertising, in spite of 
superficial differences in packaging, 
trade-marks, service, location, some 
buyers may recognize a fundamental 
uniformity in two or more competitive 
offerings. Other buyers may be 
marginal simply through dullness or 
(l) Ibid., p. 123. 
carelessness. All products to these 
buyers may not have identical utility, 
but some at least may possess equivalent 
utility • 11 (1) 
He points out further that 
11 ••• still other buyers may be marginal 
in another sigificant sense. They may 
really prefer one particular product~ 
but not have money enough to buy it when 
its price rises above the prices of 
others. 11 (2) 
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Whatever the reasons for their behaviour, marginal buyers will 
be characterized by a tendency to change from one product to another 
when price differences arise, and whilst such changes may be 
undertaken more rapidly in certain cases than in others, the net 
effect will be to alter the ultimate shape of the Demand curve. 
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(l) Ibid., p. 123. 
(2) Ibid., p. 123 note 5. 
(3) Ibid., p. 124 ff. 
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in order to indicate the significance of marginal buyers. If we 
assume that all products within the range of competing substitutes 
are for the moment being sold at the price RA, and that the so-
called marginal buyers are purchasing one-tenth of the total 
sold output of a particular product (i.e. one-tenth of the quantity 
CA.), any rise in price of that product, no matter how small, 
over the prices prevailing for other products, will cause estab-
lished customers (i.e. non-marginal) to reduce their purchases 
slightly. This is implicit in Chamberlin's analysis. Marginal 
custamers, however, will cease buying the product altogether 
and will transfer their custom elsewhere. The result is that, 
at price EF (above RA) total purchases will be 11 somewhat less than 
nine-tenths of the original quantity.u(l) Nichol further suggests 
that, at still higher prices, additional groups of marginal buyers 
will be affected and demand might decrease even more sigfrificantly. 
From the method of presentation it should be fairly obvious 
what is meant by the discontinuity which materializes. This 
11 gap11 in the curve will become evident where there are price 
reductions as well, since although under such circumstances 
established customers will increase their purchases slightly, 
marginal buyers will be attracted away in large numbers from their 
alternative sources and the gain in sales will be from oa to of' 
(i.e. larger than conventional Chamberlinian theory might have 
led one to suppose). 







conditions of monopolistic competition, price is always 
In order to provide evidence that Chamberlin is not 
correct, Nichol provides the following diagram. (2 ) 
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(l) Ibid., p. 126. 
(2) Ibid., p. 127. 
101 
Assuming that the market is characterized by an "unlimited number 
of competing products 11 (l), and that the demand and cost conditions 
are the same for all, competition will 
11 ••• force their price dovm to the level 
of cost (including normal profits) at the 
most efficient scale of production. 11 (2) 
Equilibrium price in the above diagram, for example,would be ra, 
and the corresponding output would be oa. If we now assume that 
·the element of differentiation may be introduced, leaving other 
aspects of the situation constant, it is possible that each in-
dividual product will manage to establish an equally large market 
for itself while the one-tenth of all the buyers will continue 
to be "marginal" in their attitudes. If the discontinuous Demand 
curve for the product of each individual producer lies below ppl 
(the curve of Average Costs) under these circumstances, it would be 
unwise for any one to charge a price different from ra. If, for 
e.Kample, a higher price were selected by the single seller, he 
would lose those marginal customers 1-.rhose attachment is so important 
in helping him maintain a scale of production large enough to 
ensure that unit costs are below or equal to price. If a lower 
price were selected, the "increased cost of increased production 
entails a loss. u (3) 
From these observations, Nichol concludes that 
11 ••• in this case of unlimited competition 
among differentiated products there is no new 
equilibrium price level above that of perfect 
competition. On the contrary, the price 
tends towards the same level ordinarily 
shown by competitive demand and cost curves. 
In this process marginal buyers, though 
greatly out-numbered, exert a decisive 
influence. 11 (4) 
Nichol preposes a further case under conditions of which 
"differentiated" products are held to be selling at the same 
price ra, and, as a result, the upper branch of the Demand curve 
may be assumed to lie above the curve of Average Costs. 
(1) Ibid., p. 127. 
(2) Ibid., p. 127. 
(3) Ibid., p. 128. 
(4) Ifid., p. 128 
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If we further assume that not all sellers are aware of this, and 
that, in fact, the information is available only to a particular 
producer, by raising his price to tl, he will succeed in making 
temporary super-normal profits, and will be able to ignore marginal 
buyers while in that position. It will obviously pay him to raise 
his price to this level, since at tl, he need concentrate only on 
old established customers. Should his competitors also raise · 
their prices so that all are equal, the seller in question will 
find it even easier to retain his established clientele and will 
once again be able to sell to marginal buyers. It is hovmver 
possible that, where all are selling to the marginal buyers, 
competition will ultimately force prices down again (i.e competition 
either within the group of ttoldu sellers, or new competition from 
without the group). This will cause a shift in the Demand curve 
to the left, with the general price level moving to vw. At this 
stage no seller can rely solely on the trade of his old established 
customers and must attempt to attract marginal customers in order 





If competitors were so numerous as to force de for each 
individual producerto lie further to the left, so that at gb the 
sales of each producer to all classes of customer just equated 
average cost to price, no super-normal profits could be made and the 
group itself could be in equilibrium. The realization however is 
possible on the part of each rival that, by quoting prices lower than 
vw,'he would be able to increase his profits through attracting 
those marginal buyers at present purchasing elsewhere. This will 
result in an elimination of those competitors unable to sustain 
their sales at OV at least and equilibrium will be achieved when 
11 ••• the number of producers left is just 
sufficient to meet the total demand at 
this price. 11 (l) 
The significance of Nichol's observations and their relevance 
to the question of advertising were issues raised by Henry Smith, 
in an article entitled 1 Discontinuous Demand Curves and Monopolistic 
Competition: A Special Case.,(2) Smith bases his argument on 
the view that 
11 ••• prolonged advertisment of a product 
at one price has the effect of rendering 
the product unsalable in any comparable 
quantity at any other price, higher or 
lower. 11 (3) 











Ibid., p. 133 ., 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1935. Another article 
by Smith in the Review of Economic Studies, 1934/1935, p. 62, 
deals with the question of Advertising Costs and Equilibrium 
and employs similar graphical representation. See also 
tThe Imputation of Advertising Costs', Economic Journal, 
December 1935, an attempt at empirical investigation. 
Smith, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1935, p. 542. 
Ibid., p. 544., 
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in which AR represents the Dew~nd curve for the product in the 
absence of advertising, P the price at which sales may be increased 
by selling outlays (subject to decreasing returns) and PQ the Net 
Revenue curve resulting from advertising expenditure at price P. 
(P1 Q1 may be taken to be representative of other curves which may 
be drawn at different prices). Smith adds: 
"From any point on PQ a perpendicular to 
a line parallel to OX tlrrough P measures 
the cost per unit of selling the quantity 
indicated, while the distance along the line 
between P and the point of intersection 
measures the quantity sold in excess of 
1 normal 1 demand."(l) 
The curve ANR is the Average Net Revenue curve which indicates 
the maximum revenue which can be obtained by the firm through the 
combination ofoptimum expenditure on advertising with each of all 
possible prices. The curve does not indicate the price prevailing 
for any output, but reflects the firm's total revenue, which may 
be used to derive the former by drawing a horizontal parallel to the 
base line OX through the origin of PQ on AR. The point on the 
horizontal immediately above that on which PQ is a tangent to NAR 
will indicate the price at which the relevant quantity will be 
sold when expenditure upon advertising is at an optimum. Smith 
points out that the diagram reflects the notion that the "produc-
tivity of advertisment is the same at all prices" (2), since PQ 
and P'Q' occupy a position which suggests that at prices P and pt 
the return to selling expenditures will be the same. It is far 
more likely that the productivity of selling expenditure will be 
greater where prices are relatively lower and, for this reason, 
A'R' v.rill tend to be more elastic than AR. Further, the PQ 
curves may be drawn to indicate the fact that they constitute a 
11 ••• range of mutually exclusive possibi-
lities of increasing sales at ~ price. 11 (3) 
If the seller adopts a price under such circumstances he must be 
aware of the fact that advertising at such a price will render itself 
less productive at any other. At the same time, one of the PQ 
curves will have to be selected (since they represent the 
possibilities of increasing sales and are ••mutually exclusive") 
and the result will be that the'lothers will become flattened. 11 ( 4) 
(l) Ibid., p. 543. 
(2) Ibid., p. 545. 
(3) Ibid., p. 545. 
(4) Ibid., p. 546. 
This situation is reflected in the following diagram, 
Y, 
() ! ___________________________________________ __ 
X 
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in which PQ represents the Net R~venue curve relevant to the adopted 
price. The other curves have become flattened and there now 
exists a discontinuity in the DenBnd curve and, over a certain 
distance, a condition of perfect elasticity. The Demand curve is 
perfectly elastic over the same distance as the curve of Average 
Net Revenue follows the contour of PQ. 
Using the above analysis, it is possible to dravl certain 
conclusions regarding the question, introduced earlier, of the 
unsalability of a good at all but one price. Smith suggests that 
the clue to the argument lies in the fact that people generally 
do not wish to be bothered with the making of calculations or 
estimates. (l) He points out, therefore, that 
11 ••• if ••• one of a. continuous series of 
money prices is differentL~ted from its 
immediate neighbours by circumstances 
which make it difficult for any other 
price to be substituted for this one 
without 'calculating things or making 
close comparisons' then one may expect 
the result of any upward price change 
to be a greater diminution of demand than 
would be the case if only a greater money 
expenditure and not an increased 
expenditure of both 'trouble' and money 
was involved. Similarly, one may expect 
the increase in demand resulting from a 
fall in price to be very slight in 
circumstances in which a diminished 
money price was accompanied, and perhaps 
even outweighed, by an increased t trouble t· 
price.,'1 (2} 
(l) Ibid., P•. 54E~ •. 
(2) Ibid., p. 548~ 
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This sort of situation is most likely to arise where customers have 
become used to paying a particular price for a product for a long 
period of time. A change in price might induce these customers 
to review their expenditures and perhaps change their buying 
patterns to the disadvantage of the product in question. It is 
also likely to arise, for example, where goods are identified 
on the basis of price (utility) rather than 11 narne or tradernark11 (l), 
and where, under such circumstances, the market is characterized 
by a large number of 
11 ••• fairly similar commodities sold under 
different brand names and extensively 
aevertised. 11 (2) 
On the latter basis, Smith concludes that the Demand curve for any 
commodity distinguished from others by brand advertisement will 
resemble the curve A•R 1 in the second diagram - provided that the 
prices of all other goods do not change. Where price is accepted 
as a 11 specification of the comrnodity11 (J), the producer, if he 
wishes to sell, must advertise. 
Smith suggests that where a seller, after maintaining a 
particular price for a considerable period of time, decides · 
either to raise it or lower it relative to the level on which his 
rivals are keeping theirs constant, it is likely that the change 
will induce the consumer to question the quality of the article and 
perhaps to refrain from purchasing it in favour of those articles 
the prices of which are more familiar to him. 
11 Thus, against the background of intensive 
publicity, a fair number of consumers will 
feel that they are •playing for safety1 
if they transfer their custom to a 
competitive brand of which, ex hypothesi, 
the price has not been changed.u(4) 
In this context, George J. Stigler has made the observation 
that it is virtually impossible for a consumer to be aware of all 
the changes in either products or prices which are being advertised. ( 5) 
(1) Ibid., p. 549. 
(2) Ibid., p. 549. 
(3) Ibid., p. 549. 
(4) Ibid., p. 550. 
(5) r The Economics of Information•, Journal of Political Econogy, 
Juhe 1961. 
11 The cost of keeping currently informed 
about all articles which an individual 
purchases would be prohibitiYe. 
A typical household probably buys several 
hundred different items a month, and, if, 
on average, their prices change (in some 
outlets) only once a month, the number 
of advertisements (by at least several 
sellers) which must be read is forbiddingly 
large. 11 (l) 
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For the retail or wholesale seller, a simiL~r problem exists, in 
that, were he to advertise the crBnges in prices of his possibly 
large variety of products eve~ time such a change became necessary, 
his expenses would be unjustifiably great. As far as the manu-
facturer is concerned, k~ck of knowledge concerning the price or 
nature of his product is a disadvantage. 
11 The cost of search is a cost of purchase, 
and consumption will therefore be smaller, 
the greater the dispersion of prices and 
the greater the optimum amount of search. 11 (2) 
T.H. Silcock in his article !Advertising Costs in Nonopolistic 
Competitionr(3 ) writes: 
11 From the point of view of the seller, it 
makes little difference whether sales are 
attracted by advertising or by a cut in 
price. The buyer may accept one article 
rather than another because the price 
difference overcomes his objective 
preference or the cost of transport, or 
alternatively because his subjective 
preference is removed and he is convinced 
that the walk to another seller1 s 
premises is good for his health."(4) 
This point of view will be examined at a later stage in the analysis 
since it is of relevance to the question of location in retailing. 
(1) Ibid., p. 223. 
(2) Ibid., p. 223. 
(3) in Dundee Economic Essays, ed. J.K. Eastham, Dundee, 1955. 
(4) Ibid., p. 103. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The preceding chapters have been concerned mainly with an 
outline of the nature of the theories of 11 lcfonopolistic 11 and 
11 Imperfect 11 competition. A detailed understanding of the pro-
cedure of analysis is essential in providing a base from which 
other theories may be developed and, as this study proceeds, 
reference will be made to those aspects of the orthodox analysis 
which have been discussed earlier. It has not been possible to 
provide a background to the main section of this work - a 
discussion and a development of retailing theory - without 
incLuding a certain amount of detail which is of no direct 
relevance to what follows. At the same time, it has also been 
necessary to examine the writings of theorists other than Professors 
Chamberlin and Robinson, in order to place the works of the latter 
in proper perspective. For this reason reference has been made 
in the preceding pages to a wide number of books and articles 
published over the past 30 odd years. At this point, therefore, 
brief consideration will be given to an aspect of the theory which 
was developed as a result of a series of investigations into the 
behaviour of businessmen in their capacity as price setters and 
policy makers in a world of competition. 
The findings of the study were published ln an article by 
R.L. Hall and C."J. Hitch, entitled 'Price Theory and Business 
Behaviourt(l). The purpose of the paper was to 
11 ••• examine, in the light of interviews, 
the way in which businessmen decide what 
price to charge for their products and 
what output to produce. 11 (2) 
It has already been shown that orthodox Monopolistic Competition 
theory had come to view the process of price fixing and output 
determination as a matter of expanding production to the point 
where marginal cost and marginal revenue were equated. Where 
average cost and average revenue could be equated, the doctrine 
suggested that a group of competing monopolists were in equilibrium 
and any deviation from this equality would be interpreted as a 
movement away from such equilibrium. The value of the theory of 
Monopolistic Competition did not, ace ording to the study, extend to 
its analysis of either oligopoly or monopolistic competition with 
oligopoly since the Demand and Marginal Revenue.curves are 
indeterminate where there is strong interdependence between the 
(1) Oxford Economic Papers, May 1939. 
(2) Ibid., p. 12. 
price and output policies of different firms. (l) In spite of 
this, it would appear as if there is frequently a tendency to 
examine such situations in terms of orthodox analysis and the 
results are thereby rendered invalid. 
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The researches of the Oxford group produced the conclusion that 
11 ••• the most striking feature of the answer 
was the number of firms which apparently 
do not aim, in their pricing policy, at 
vlhat appeared to us to be the maximization 
of profits by the equation of ma.rginal 
revenue and marginal cost.u(2) 
Instead, a questionnaire sent to 38 businessmen revealed to the 
investigators that prices were set on the basis of the full-cost 
principle, by which is meant a system under the conditions of which 
11 ••• prime (or 'direct t) cost per unit is 
taken as the base, a percentage addition 
is made to cover overheads (or 'oncost', 
or 'indirect' cost), and a further 
conventional addition (frequently 10 
per cent.) is made for profit."(3) 
The reasons submitted for this behaviour were various but included 
the belief that price would be maintained at the full cost level 
in order not to evoke competitive reaction from close competitors, 
the notion that such was a 11 fair11 or 11 just11 price, and the fact 
that many sellers are prepared to accept less than the maximum 
profits because they believe that the 11 quiet life11 is preferable 
to the hectic chasing after profits. Whatever the reasons for 
the acceptance of this point of view, analysis of the replies 
revealed that the following conclusions might be drawn: (a) Firms 
frequently do not establish their prices in the manner which 
orthodox theory would suppose, in that they do not attempt to equate 
marginal revenue with marginal cost; (b) Oligopolistic inter-
dependence amongst firms is common in markets for manufacturers 
and competitors will therefore generally take the effects of their 
policies on those of their actual or potential rivals into 
consideration; (c) Under many conditions where oligopoly is either 
absent or present businessmen will attempt to price their goods 
on the 11 full cost 11 principle; (d) Prices fixed in this manner will 
tend to be stable and will only be changed in response to fairly 
significant changes in costs but not in response to minor changes 
in demand; (e) Prices are frequently not explicable on purely 
(1) Ibid., seep. 17. 
(2) Ibid., p. 18. 
(3) Ibid., p. 19. 
economic grounds, and may be n function of the historical develop-
ment of a particular industry or of the subjective attitudes of 
the individual entrepreneurs towards their markets and competitors. 
A similar result was achieved in a study undertaken by I.F. 
Pearce and L.R. Arney (l), although the principle of 11 cost plus 11 
pricing seems to have been replaced by the notion of charging 
11what the nnrket will bear11 ( 2 ). In this context a single firm 
was examined and the attitudes of three senior executives were 
assessed, particularly in so far as price and output fixing 
techniques were concerned. 
The inadequacy of the orthodox analysis of Chamberlin and 
Robinson in describing the phenomenon of competition amongst a 
small number of large firms, the price and output policies of which 
are interdependent rather than independent, has been clearly shown 
by K.W. Rothschild, in an article entitled 'Price Theory and 
Oligopoly'(J). Adherence to the view that price theory must yield 
determinate solutions if it is to have any analytical value, has, 
according to Rothschild, meant a relative neglect of duopoly and 
oligopoly problems in the writings of Chamberlin and Robinson. 
Where, on the other hand, the duopoly problem had been given some 
attention by the earlier li'Lonopolistic Competition theorists, most 
of it was directed towards a determinate solution and the result 
was a 
11 ••• removing from the analysis (of) its 
most essential differentiating aspect: 
the oligopolists 1 consciousness of their 
interdependence. 11 (4) 
Where such interdependence was recognized however, the notion that 
oligopolists would accept the fact of their capacity to influence 
rivals without actively doing anything about it predominated and 
the value of the analysis was severely limited. 
Recognition of the interdependence of firms in certain market 
situations also meant that new variables - other than those 
developed specifically for the analysis of monopolistically com-
petitive firms - would have to be introduced. In this 
regard, Rothschild has pointed out that 
"Economists have on the whole shied away 
fro~ this problem of drawing up a wider 
and different framework which could deal 
with the oligopolistic cases, because the 
concepts and methods used for the other 
market situations would be of little use. 11 (5) 
(l) 1 Price Policy with a Branded Product', Review of Economic 
Studies, 1956-1957, p. 49. 
(2) Ibid., p. 60. 
(3) Economic Journal, September 194?. 
(4) Ivid., p. 303.. 
(5) Ibid., p. 305 .• 
The present section provides no discussion of literature 
directed specifically at the theory of Monopolistic Competition 
in retailing. The decision to omit such works is based on the 
view that there are few sources suited to the line of discussion 
being adopted in this thesis, and that the discussion in the 
previous section is sufficient. It is the intention in this 
thesis that the ideas presented in the following chapters be 
examined in the light of the literature on the subject of Mono-
polistic Competition in its role as a theory of the firm; as 




When we enter the realm of retailing theory it becomes clear 
that the concept of a Demand curve as being primarily a reflection 
of the demand (at any possible price) for a single 11 product11 must 
give way before the more sophisticated notion of a Demand 11 curve" 
for an interacting group of commodities and services. The demand 
for each commodity or service, then, is dependent upon the demand 
for, and price of, the others. The single commodity approach to 
the theory of the firm is not without its value within the confines 
of the orthodox analysis.but fails to provide a clear picture of 
issues specific to retailing. 
Retail outlets do not generally sell only one commodity. 
Where one type of commodity constitutes the main source of revenue 
for the shop there remains scope for stocking a wide range of 
varieties some of which will sell better than others. Examined 
from this point of view it becomes obvious that the expressed 
desire for a particular product - even if that 11 product 11 is merely 
a representation of the agglomerate demand for individual "commo-
dities11 and 11 services 11-gives no idea as to the proportions of the 
different items making up the sale. The question of joint demand, 
where the demand for one commodity depends on the decision to buy 
another - as in the case where commodities are generally bougnt in 
combination - becomes extremely relevant. For example, a reduced 
price on commodity 11A11 might induce consumers to buy more of its 
complement, 11 B11 , with the result that the Demand curve applicable 
to 11 B11 would reflect greater sales at a given price. The Demand 
curves for 11A11 and 11 B11 are interdependent. Although Marshall 
gave great attention to the problems associated with joint demand 
and with 11 composite 11 demand for the same commodity derived from a 
variety of uses, and although these concepts formed the corner-
stone of neo-classical price theory, the more simplified versions 
of single commodity Demand curves, which were generally current in 
orthodox analysis, neglected these subtleties. In abstracting 
from reality to explain, in a simplified way, the processes by 
which a demand schedule is built up, these complicating considera-
tions tended to be neglected. Yet any description of re~lity which 
neglects them loses much of its explanatory force. 
When the doctrine of Monopolistic Competition was adumbrated, 
it also made no explicit recognition of the question of joint, or 
otherwise interdependent demand for the commodities sold by a 
single seller. The expositions of Professors Chamberlin, Robinson 
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and most others were not concerned with this aspect of the problem. 
The aspect of demand which was stressed, in order to give a richer 
picture of reality, was rather the existence not of complete 
substitutes but only of close substitutes amongst products. 
Under the conditions of "monopolistic" and "imperfect" 
competition defined by earlier theorists, the "product" which was 
produced by any single firm could not be regarded as analytically 
separable from the firm itself. Consequently, an increase or 
decrease in the demand for the 11 commodity11 sold by a firm meant that 
the firm itself would experience a corresponding gain in, or ~oss 
of, customers. This postulate would only be valid if each seller 
sold only a single physical commodity. 
Where the retail firm is concerned the matter is more compli-
cated. As there may, and generally does, exist a wide variety of 
goods and services for sale under the roof of the single shop, a 
new relationship between the seller and the goods he sells must be 
postulated. If the unit of analysis is to remain the firm (gua 
sum of all the goods and services it sells) it is legitimate to 
view the fir.m and the product as analytically inseparable~ Under 
such conditions the "reality content" Jf the theory is largely 
lost. It is only where the seller and the individual goods and 
services which he sells are regarded as possessing different, and 
hence separate, "Demand curves" that the experience of the real 
world is approximated. 
The following schedule will provide a clear picture. If 
we assume a situation in which two multi-product outlets are selling 
the same combination of four commodities at prices requiring the 
same total amount of consumersr expenditure in both cases, the 




















From the schedule it becomes obvious that, although the total 
expenditure demanded of consumers at both outlets remains the same, 
commodities 11 A11 and 11 D11 are priced differently. Since in each 
case one of the shops is selling the commodity more cheaply, if we 
assume-a ceteris 12aribus situation, the elasticity of demand for 
11.3 
the higher priced commodity will, once again in each case, be 
greater than it is for the same, but lower priced, one, e.g. the 
elasticity of demand for commodity 11 A11 in outlet 11 A" will be 
greater than it is for commodity "A" in outlet 11 B11 • On the other 
; 
hand, since each shop is selling a higher priced commodity, a 
balance of elasticities is achieved, and the demand for the com-
bination of commodities (and, therefore, ceteris paribus, for the 
goods and services of each seller) possesses the same elasticity in 
the case of each shop. Whilst therefore, individual prices induce 
consumers to change shops, the equality of the total expenditure 
required is sufficient encouragement to "stay put11 • A composite 
demand schedule for all the goods stocked by the firm need not vary 
in the same degree as the demand schedules for the various items_. 
(This does not imply that there is necessarily any valuable 
affililiation of customers with suppliers in the Chamberlinian 
sense. Where there is no suitable alternative combination or 
commodity within the shop itself, customers are quite likely to 
search elsewhere.) The conclusion is that the elasticity of 
demand for the relevant commodities is ll£1 the same as the elas-
ticity of demand for the total output (goods and services) of the 
shops selling them. A decrease in the demand for certain goods 
as a result of a change in their prices need have no effect on the 
total outlay on the commodities sold in the shop if there is 
compensating expenditure on other items. 
Orthodox Monopolistic Competition analysis is not equipped to 
deal with such a situation, since it postulates a "single commodity" 
or "product" - neither of which classifications is suited to 
explaining even the simple phenomenon of 11 loss-leaders 11 • One result 
of such an inadequacy is the fact that it is not possible to my 
exactly what the effect of individual commodity price changes is on 
the overall Demand ''curve" for the entire shop. The problem is 
compounded if it is observed that a change in the price of one 
part of a combination or standard 11 basketfull11 of commodities may 
result in a change in the composition of the entire combination. 
This would effectively preclude an analysis of the effect of price 
changes on the position of a single seller vis-a-vis his competitors 
and the concept of "interdependence" within the "group" loses some of 
its value. Price changes would mean that the "products" sold by 
the same seller over time could never be compared with one another. 
This has severe implications for individual and group AR and AC 
curves. 
In a section of his analysis discussed earlier, Chamberlin 
introduced his representation of the Demand curve for an individual 
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firm. In the particular instance the Demand curve was represented 
as lying below that representing the Demand curve for the industry 
as a whole. The object was to indicate that the individual finn 
may increase its profits by moving down the curve ddt and so that 
all sellers will do so in an effort to avail themselves of the 
prospects for gain. The elasticity of the curve ddt is, according 
to Cha1~erlin, an indication of buyers' preferences amongst sellers. 
An extension of this principle produces the downward sloping 
(finite elasticity) curves of Monopolistic Competition theory. 
A higher or lower price maintained qy one seller in relation to his 
competitors will, according to orthodox analysis, enable him to 
retain some of his customers or increase them (whichever the case 
may be) and so permit him a greater degree of latitude in pricing 
than would be the case under conditions of "perfect competition". 
This assumption is valid only within the strict limits of early 
theory. 
If we admit the significance of commodity combinations in 
retailing, modifications are require~Since it has been suggested 
that where a change in the price of a 11 basketfull11 of commodities 
takes place the combination of purchases may change as well~ 
it becomes immediately apparent that a change in the price, and 
therefore, the combination of commodities (the "product 11 ) being 
sold by the individual seller, prevents any valuable diagrammatic 
representation of the interaction of the seller with the industry. 
The Demand curves, since they represent a different "product" at 
every price, become meaningless. 
The break with the orthodox analysis which the above discussion 
implies is significant. It has been suggested here that, for 
purposes of exposition, seller and 11 comm.odities 11 should be clearly 
separable analytically. In deciding to reduce prices, the re-
tailer will have the alternative of lowering them on all the goods he 
has to offer or only on a small number of individual goods or 
combinations. If he reduces the prices of all his goods, the 
retailer must be making the assumption that the elasticity of demand 
for most (ff not all) individual goods throughout the entire range 
is sufficiently great for the increased sales at the lower price 
to offset - or more than offset - the decrease in revenue from 
each unit sold. An analysis which is incapable of explaining how 
a firm may gain total custom through reducing the price of only a 
few commodities (a relatively small proportion of the total) is 
inadequate to the realities of the retail trading situation. 
Chamberlin! s Demand curve, which relates to the whole range, 
provides no guide to its detailed composition. In order to make a 
satisfactory study of the retail trade it is necessary to be aware 
I 
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of the need for disaggregating the firm 1 s demand schedule into a 
compositite one comprising numerous commodities, with varying 
elasticities of demand, and not forming an invariable combination. 
At this point we proceed to a discussion of the validity of 
the orthodox view that Demand curves under conditions of monopo-
listic competition in retailing display the same characteristics 
as the finite elasticity curves envisaged by theorists studying 
manufacturing. Even if we accept the view that the retail firm 
and its wares are analytically inseparable and assume, on that 
basis, that, ceteris paribus, the greater the aggregate expenditure 
called for from consumers, the fewer customers will remain and, 
vice versa, we may legitimately contest the view that the f1nite 
Demand curve is an adequate representation of the relationship 
of demand to 11 price 11 in retailing. 
Whilst the customers who normally purchase from ordinary 
retail outlets may not have the same expert skills and infonnation 
as professional 11 buyers 11 , there can be no doubt that a large per-
centage of shoppers exercise careful judgement most of the time 
before making purchases, especially of goods which are in general 
use and are regularly purchased. Both these conditions are 
important, first because they are necessary to the establishment of 
adequate knowledge and second, in so far as any custoiiL r who finds 
that the goods he has to purchase form a significant part of his 
total expenditure - such as the food and .other household goods 
which must be purchased almost daily - will establish the cheapest 
and most convenient source of supply before committing himself to 
"regular patronage11• Such a view implies consumer rationality. 
At the same time, goods such as clothes, books, etc., which are 
bought less frequently are sometimes bought 11 impulsively11 and 
with less informed judgement, so that the role of careful price 
comparisons seems to have less significance. Even here, however, 
an element of rationality may be quite strong and the typical 
consumer might,_ after planning a specific purchase, 11 shop around11 
in an effort to locate the most suitable source of supply even of 
merely occasionally purchased goods, in terms of price and 
qualities. In the case of large occasional items of expenditure, 
expected to provide satisfactions over a considerable period, the 
exercise of rational choice might be very prominent. 
In any discussion of the processes by which consumers reach 
their purchasing decisions, the nature of the retailing complex with 
which they are faced must be detailed. In a rural village, for 
example, where the population is not sufficiently large to support 
more than one o~ any kind of shop, the pc-ttern of shopping will 
be very different from that found in larg::J urban areas. In the 
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first case, the structure 6f retailing will be such as to dissuade 
the consumer from "shopping around" in order to obtain the benefit 
of lower prices unless he is prepared to travel to the nearest 
town in ord.er to do so. In such a case, his decision tot ravel 
further afield will depend among others upon such variables as the .. 
comparative prices prevailing in the townand village respectively, 
the cost and inconvenience of the journey, and the enjoyment to be 
derived from the expedition and process of selection as such~(l) 
In the second case, the consumer will enjoy the advantages of large 
numbers of shops of the same type (either large or small( 2)), all of 
which are competing with one another in a limited geographical 
area for the custom of the buyer For many reasons one would expect 
the urban store to be able profitably to offer goods at lower 
prices than might prevail in the rural village, and competition to 
be sufficiently strong to compel it to do so. 
Whatever the circumstances surrounding the sale of the product 
i.e. whether the retail outlet be in strong competition or in a 
virtual "monopoly11 position in the market, the attachment of a 
customer to the firm after the fashion indicated by Chamberlin in 
his conclusions regarding the finite characteristic of the demand 
must be explained in terms of the distinctions drawn - either 
·rationally or irrationally - by buyers amongst sellers. 
If one assumes that the customer has not the choice amongst a 
nurrber of competing sellers (as would be the case in a rural 
village), the value of Monopolistic Competition analysis is largely 
lost unless one is to consider the peripheral cases where the 
alternative of shopping in town exists. Broadly speaking, 
generalization in such circumstances is not really possible since 
the obstacles to mobility of persons and goods between the village 
and the nearest town may be such as to grant a strong monopoly to 
any single firm. However, mention has already been made of the 
article•s by Hotelling, Chamberlin, Lerner and Singer(J) and others 
dealing with the issues of location, transport costs and the 
differentiation of product, and the basis for such differentiation 
has been the cost of transport or "convenience". 
(1) These questions will be discussed later. 
(2) In the context of this paper, the 11 size11 of retail outlets will 
be 11small11 or 11 large11 , depending upon their average costs. 
For a "large" shop, the cost per unit of goods and services 
mndled will be lQifer than for a 11 small11 shop, Diagrammatically 
presented, the AC curve of the former will ~e lower than 
that of the latter. The simplification is purely for pur-
poses of exposition. 
(3) See abovG, Chapters I, II. 
An interesting feature of these analyses therefore, is the 
notion that the consumers are in fact rational in their choices 
amongst sellers. 
"It is therefore assumed that prices ~ 
point of consumption must be identical in 
equilibrium conditions. In the type-
models consumers are, however, rigidly 
located along a road and are therefore 
variously sep:1.rated from producers. 
Attention may therefore be concentrated 
on delivery costs. 11 (l) 
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Assuming then, that the justification for price differentials 
between different geographical locations may be found in transport 
costs, and not in the comparative irrationality of the consumer, 
one must also assume - as the theorists above have done - that 
in the ordinary course of events it is more costly for buyers 
(of whom there are comparatively many) to move amongst sellers 
(of whom there are comparatively few) rather than the other way 
round. This assumption may indeed carry weight in the marginal 
cases to which we have already alluded i.e. where the village is 
situated far from the town. Under such circumstances it is highly 
probable that, for the purprnes of purchasing articles of regular 
consumption which have to be bought at frequent (perhaps even 
daily) intervals, the village consumer will find it to his advan-
tage to pay the higher price prevailing in the village rather than 
have to travel to town at an expense to himself, in time and 
inconvenience, as well as in money, equal to, or greater than the 
value of the price differential on the goods purchased. In the 
case where the savings in the cost of the purchases and the losses 
on travel balP-nced each other, there would be.no advantage either 
way, ceteris paribus. 
Such situations are however no longer predominant characteris-
tics of the market. Generally speaking, particularly in the vast 
urban complexes in which large proportions of the populations of 
most Western economies live today, the consumer is mobile. The 
belief that he is situated somewhere along a line, moving only in 
response to changes in the prices and transport costs of competing 
commodities tends to confuse the issue. In the ordinary course of 
events, the buyer moves into and out of the large shopping areas . 
which have come to characterize the cities and suburbs of today. 
Within the close confines of urban and suburban shopping centres, 
(l) Andrews,P: On Competition in Economic Theory, London, 1964. 
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delivery costs and other costs associated with the movement between 
residential and sucp shopping areas have lost much of their signifi-
cance. Theory which does not, therefore, recognize a movement of 
buyers not closely linked with particular transport costs is in-
adequate as a general explanation of retailing phenomena. 
If we take the point further, an interesting observation may 
be made. Assuming, for example, that the finite elasticity Demand 
curves of the Chamberlin type derive their shape largely frum such 
location factors as have just been described, and that the contention 
that consumers are indeed mobile in the manner suggested is a valid 
one, it becomes obvious that the orthodox notion loses some of its 
value. 
EJ··1mining Chamberlin! s thesis first, one considers that it 
is possible for a single seller to distinguish himself to sume 
buyers purely on the basis of his distance from his nearest rival. 
This could, in terms of the orthodox postulate, be the case where 
the retailer is situated in a suburb, with the nearest competitor 
being located in the adjoining suburb or in the Central Business 
District itself. However, this view would seem to assume that 
each shopping journey is an undertaking discrete in.itself and the 
prices which the suburban store could charge could exceed those of 
more distant competitors by the full cost of the journeys its 
customers would have to undertake in order to supply themselves 
elsewhere. But, in the "ordinary business of life11 , many 
of its customers might, in any case, have to travel to regions 
where the other suppliers are dominant. Under such circu~­
stances, the consumer might well be indifferent as between 
sources of supply in any regions in which he happens to find 
himself for reasons other than shopping. In an urban area, for 
example, it might be contended that the location of retail outlets 
in different zones tends to generate consumer 11 loyalty11 and 
therefore, relatively inelastic Demand curves for the goods and 
services of the individual seller. This point of view is naturallY 
invalidated if in fact consumers can just as conveniently conduct 
their shopping at other shops which they pass in the course of 
the day's work- some indeed presenting less of a detour than a 
visit to the neighbourhood shop and presenting no greater difficul-
ties in fetching their purchases home. This does assume, of 
course, that they find an equally satisfactory assortment of goods 
in the shops they encounter in their travels; if they do not, 
the element of differentiation does not depend merely upon location. 
This wBakens the argument th~t mere distance can provide of 
itself an effective means whereby individual sellers can expect 
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to distinguish themselves from their rivals. Indeed the clustering. 
of shops of a similar nature in close proximity to one another 
which is a feature especially of central business districts, 
suggests that it is of limited significance, except uhere widely-
separated markets are concerned. This casts doubt upon the 
validity, as a g:oneralization, of deriving Demand curves of finite 
elasticity as a simple function of transport and delivery cost 
differentials~. 
Such doubts could be important. If buyers' preferences amongst 
sellers were on average rationally determined by differences of 
transport costs, then much post-Marshallian discussion would seem 
to have been unnecessary. For l:"::l.rshall's competitive market was 
nqt one where uniform prices prevailed throughout. On the contrary, 
11 ' ••• of course if the market is large_, 
allowance must be made for the expense of 
delivering the goods to different purchasers; 
each of whom must be supposed to pay in 
addition to the market price a special 
charge on account of delivery. 11{1) 
The principle which simply derives discrepant.prices from this 
, form of restricted competition, implies, of course_, that individual 
sellers would be able to raise or lower their prices in such a way 
as to lose some (but not all) or gain some (but not all) of the 
available customers, since the accretion or depletion of customers 
would depend upon how near they viere situated to the source of 
supply, and therefore, to what extent their transport or delivery 
costs would be affected by changes in the supply price. It is 
as well to make these points clear before embarking on our sub-
sequent discussion of the elasticity of demand for the goods and 
services of an individual retailer in close competition with others 
in a limited geographical area. 
While we have shown that some caution should be exercised in 
accepting transport costs as a reason for assuming the finite 
elasticity constructions of the Chamberlinian analysis, there 
seem to be other and still more cogent reasons for believing that 
the strength of consumer preferences amongst retailers (the major 
consideration from which the shape of the firm's Demand curve is 
derived) is commonly overstated. 
Turning first to the question of consumer rationality_, W.A. 
Lewis has pointed out that: 
(1) Principles V, 1, 3, 8th edition, p. 325) 
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11There has been scme attempt to explain 
retailing~ using as a large element in the 
analysis the irrativnality, ignorance and 
inertia of customers. While it is impossible 
to deny that these factors have some 
importance, it is impossible to agree to a~y 
significant importance in view of the rapid 
changes constantly taking place in the 
structure of retailing ••• Any shopkeeper who 
uses the irrationality, ignorance or inertia 
of his customers as major elements in his 
policy would soon find himself in Carey 
Street. 11 (l) 
In the large metropolitan shopping centres which have already 
' 
been mentioned, the average consumer will quite likely be a ware of 
the broad range of prices which exists for a given commodity~ 
particularly if that commodity is bought with any regularity. 
Similarly, where the customer is in the habit of buying any 
relatively constant combination of commodities~ such as foodstuffs, 
he will probably be aware of the range of prices ruling for such 
combinations in different shops, and will, as a result, have set 
a conscious or unconscious upper limit to the amount that he is 
prepared to pay. In this regard, W.A. Lewis has suggested that: 
11 It would be too much to claim that 
elasticity of demand is infinite for each 
shop, especL~lly in the naive sense that 
a small shaving of price immediately 
expands sales; but it is not too much to 
say that, in trades where the customer 
shops around, shops with cheap prices will 
sooner or J..a ter bankrupt those which try 
to sell similar qualities with similar 
service at a higher price level in the same 
cen:_tre. 11 (2:) 
P.w.s. Andrews(3)concludes that a mere 10 percent of all the 
customers in a given large shopping area need be rational in their 
choices - in that they carefully weigh up prices and qualities 
before committing themselves to purchases - in order to render 
the Demand curve for the goods of any individual shop highly 
elastic. This conclusion is based on the hypothesis that, in 
the average large shopping sector, 10 percent of the consuming 
population will constitute a large proportion of any seller's 
market. If therefore~ it can be argued that any seller faced 
with a-fair number of customers who are sensitive to price will 
have to ensure that his prices do not move out of line with 
those of his competitors~ he has to stick to the market ,price, 
(l) 1 Competition in Retailing', Economica, November 1945, p. 209. 
(2) Ibid.~ p. 210. 
(3) Andrews, Ibid., p. 104 .. 
and about that price he encounters an elastic demand for the 
commodities he sells. 
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For different customers there exist sharp distinctions amongst 
the types of shop yielding greatest satisfaction in shopping. 
l•fany customers, for example_, are prepared to sacrifice the "service" 
element in a shopping expedition in return for a price which does 
not include the cost of supplying such a 11 service11 • On the other 
hand, certain customers are sufficiently desirous of some sort 
of treatment which makes them feel cifferent from others, that 
they do not mind paying any extra. Before proceeding to an 
analysis of this questionrowever, a short digression on the 
nature of 11 services 11 is in order. This is necessary since 
there exist upper and lower limits to the amount of "service" 
for which any customer can rationally be expected to pay .• 
In the present discussion, the word 11 services 11 will be used 
to denote any circumstances surrounding the sale of the product 
at point of purchase which make the product more attractive to 
the purchaser. Such factors as air conditioning, personalized 
selling attention, deliveries, pleasant decor, etc., will serve 
as examples~ But there are other types of service which are not 
consciously provided by the seller and which exist purely as a 
function of the size of the retail outlet. Where large departmental 
stores are able to provide the facilities we have just enumerated, 
the small shopkeeper who relies for his trade on a much smaller 
section of the consuming population is not in a position to afford 
them, or at least, not really to the same extent. On the other 
hand, to a customer in search of pleasant atmosphere, the small 
"corner shop11 is sometimes able to provide satisfaction. In 
many parts of Britain, for example, th~ small shop has traditionally 
been a meeting place for people of the village and it is conceivable 
that many a customer would not change the relatively impersonal 
atmosphere of a city departmental store for the personal exchanges 
which he has regularly with the shopkeeper who knows him well and 
from whom he may even receive good credit facilities. The same 
applies to the small urban shop, but here the ties are likely to 
be somewhat weaker in view of the larger size of the consuming 
populationand the alternative sources of supply~ 
However, at this point, without going into elaborate detail, 
it is necessary to establish the nature of the various 11 services 11 
which may be provided. Another type of service which is particular-
ly significant is that provided by specialists. The difference 
between a small bookstore and a book and stationery counter in 
a large, busy departmental store may lie largely in the fact 
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that more specialized knowledge and a better chosenffiock is provided 
in the bookstore. Therefore, to customers desiring something 
to read and unlikely to be satisfied with anything picked up ' 
whilst n~king other purchases, the specialist bookstore will 
probably provide a more satisfactory service. For casual reading 
matter~ as part of combined purchases along with other items, the 
satisfaction might well be reversed, and the greater convenience 
in time and energy of ; 1one stop11 shopping might outweigh the 
specialist services of the bookshop. 
Whatever the nature of the service, if it is worth having 
(in the case of the bookstore, the information and selection 
available to customers of the specialist shop), the cost of pro-
viding it will generally be included in the price of the goods 
which the service helps to sell. This does not necessarily mean 
that the price of such goods is higher in the shop which provides 
the specialist sercice than it is elsewhere. The provision of 
well-considered specialist services may cut down other elements of 
cost as well as provide greater conveniences. However, normally, 
the departmental aore with a selection of above-average price 
goods requires higher-cost facilities to attract the above-average 
income customer who is prepared to pay for them. Similarly, the 
small corner shop with the personal service and slow turnover of 
goods must allocate a greater proportion of fixed expenses 
per unit of stock sold than must the large superma.rket or 11 discount 
store 11 in which service is kept to a minimum, but prices are much 
lower. 
Since retail trading depends to a large extent on the nature of 
services offered, a body of theory which does not take explicit 
recognition of the cost of, and demand for, such services, does not 
provide the wherewithal for the analysis of retailing at the stage 
which it has currently reached. It does not provide the tools for 
a study of the competition between large and small shops. 
When we turn briefly to the importance of services in attrac-
ting customers, it is evident that, where a specialist store is 
faced with competition from a departmental store stocking a 
commodity which is broadly the same as that upon which the specialist 
depends for his livelihood, the smaller seller will generally have 
to put himself to greater effort than his rival in order to attract 
custom. The large shop will always have greater numbers of 
customers, by virtue of the wide range of goods which it sells. 
The advantage in such circumstances is that any customer attracted 
to the shop by items other than the one in question may in fact 
find himself purchasing the item on impulse. This impulse may 
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be prompted qy any number of processes. The effect is such that 
the departmental store is able to sell goods peripheral to those 
on the customer's shopping list and for which the customer would 
not have searched under other circumstances. In the case .of the 
specialist store,. on the other hand, a customer would have to be 
attracted specifically by the single specialized range of items 
which the shopkeeper offers, and the capacity of the seller to 
attract his buyer is dependent upon the appeal which his stock 
has to the general purchaser. It is, of course, true that the 
11 draw11 ., as far as the specialist store is c~.mcerned, lies in the 
shopping centre itself, and there exist certain external economies. 
It is, however, equally true that there is a greater convenience 
to be derived from purchasing a "basketfull'l of goods under one 
roo~ than from purchasing parts of the basketfull in different parts 
of the shopping centre. This does not apply, of course, to the 
purchase of only a singl~ item. The failure of orthodox analysis 
to conceptualize in terms of \'combinations" is particularly 
evident here. The small bookseller will usually not find it easy 
to attract custom specifically to his shop when the litera~ tastes 
of the average metropolitan reader may generally be satisfied by 
the range available at the departmental store. 
One might say, therefore, that the satisfaction derived by the 
consumer in making a purchase (over and above other general 
purchases) in a specialist store as opposed to a departmental Etore, 
must be sufficiently great to warrant the expenditure of time and 
effort which moving out of the confines of the departmental store 
involved. This is a question of convenience far more relevant 
to retailing than to manufacturing. The consumer who is able to 
obtain the bulk of his requirements under one roof may forego 
certain purchases which would require him to ''shop around". 
Alternatively, he may buy a product slightly less satisfactory 
than something he might have obtained elsewhere-in a specialist 
shop, for example - but which is readily accessible where his 
other purchases are being maee. The nature of the competition 
prevailing between specialist shops and general shops has been 
noted by Andrews: 
"Their (specialist shopst) prices must be 
attractive enough to bring buyers to them 
for their commodities specifically and 
they must always expect to share the trade in 
their goods with general shops stocking 
narrower lines of them, where buyers are 
not affected by any desire to be able to 
make more extensive comparisons or to have 
no expectations of price gains from them.u(l) 
(l) Andrews, Ibid., p. 104. 
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Accepting the view that there does exist an element of com-
petition between small and large shops selling simiL~r commodities, 
we may turn our attention to the question of stocks. As has 
already been suggested, the carrying of stocks by sellers is a 
retailing service. To the purchaser in search of specific items, 
a seller with specialist stocks is in a better position than the 
store which carries a wide but less specialized selection. In 
order to cater for such requirements therefore, the small specialist 
generally has to carry a more expensive assortment of stocks and 
experiences a slcwer rate of turnover than the general stockist -
who caters only for "everyday purchasers11 • This is simply because 
the general dealer will only deal in the more popular and there-
fore more frequently purchased items. 
Since the demand for a particular good in a particular type 
of shop will be a function of the stocks which the seller carries, 
the shape of the De~lnd curve will reflect some characteristics 
specific to the seller. Where, say, the seller does not hold 
stocks of any significant magnitude and deals only in the more 
popular lines, the elasticity of demand for his 11 product 11 is likely 
to be greater than that of the seller catering for the more selec-
tive buyer. This is likely because general lines tend to be 
stocked by a greater number of stockists in any given area than 
specialist lines, and a rise in the price of an item (if it is of 
some importance in the purchases of consumers) which can be obtained 
in almost any shop will elicit a demand reaction of some conse-
quence - greater, at least, than that which would follow from a 
change in the price of a good for which there tends to be fewer 
and more 11 discriminating11 purchasers. This is simply another way 
of putting the proposition that, the more numerous the sellers of 
a particular article, the more competitive will be its price. The 
significance in this case, however, is that it indicates something 
of the importance of stock maintenance in the generation of demand, 
and, more particularly, of the nature of the Demand curve facing 
specialist and general stockists. 
Delaying the discussion of the relationship between the cost 
of stocks and the demand for the good for the time being, we have 
concentrated our attention solely on the relationship between the 
maintenance of stocks and the generation of demand. We have 
established that the greater the specialization of goods, the less 
elastic is likely to be the demand for the stocks of the seller. 
We may legitimately postub.te that, in specialist shops, prices 
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will tend to be higher than elsewhere for SL~ilar items.(l) 
At the same time, turnover will tend to be l~Ter. These issues 
have significant implications for the Cost curves of the seller as 
well, and later analysis will attempt to indicate that there 
exists an important functional relationahip between the Cost qnd 
Demand curves of the individual shop. Examination of the earlier 
chapters on the development of orthodox analysis will reveal that 
this relationship was not recognized. 
If we admit the fact of competition amongst, firstly, retail 
outlets of the same size, i.e. exhibiting the Chamberlinian 
11 uniformity11 of Cost and Revenue curves and selling similar com-
binations, and secondly, outlets of different sizes but selling 
commodities, the broad ranges of which tend to overlap, we create 
problems which orthodox analysis is not equipped to cope with. 
We turn first to the nature of competition amongst retailers 
of the same size. At this stage it will only be necessary to add 
to certain of our observations concerning the nature of the Damand t 
I 
curve facing the seller. Where the sellers in question are of 
the large, general commodity variety, operating in fairly close 
proximity to one another, customers purchasing standard items at 
regular intervals are likely to be very sensitive to price changes. 
Differences in service offered are not to be ignored, but since 
retailers in this instance are selling similar products on a similar 
scale, the type of service offered will probably not vary widely 
from shop to shop. As a result, the total outlay required to 
purchase either single or combined comn1odities may be assumed to 
remain fairly constant throughout the shopping area. 
Now, the relative consistency of this outlay over the particu-
lar area of competitive selling will probably prevail irrespective 
of the number of sellers, provided there be at least two. On the 
assumption that the individual competitors are sufficiently large to 
be able to influence the market by changing their price/output 
policies they are likely to behave in a manner similar to those in 
the Chamberlin 11 small group" case, or those discussed in the Hall 
and Hitch survey. An example might be found in the field of 
(1) H. Smith, Retail Distribution, London, 1949: " ••• on the whole, 
the better stocked the shop relative to the amount of custom 
available, the higher the average prices'it can command •• ~(p. 18) 
Tbis would seem to contradict his statement: 
11 · ••• The article may be one which can only be bought satis-
factorily after the inspection of a wide range of shapes and 
sizes. But in this case it does not follow that the _wider 
the range offered, the higher the price she (the customer) 
will be willing to pay. 11 (p~ 17) 
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11 supermarketing 11 • In this sector of retailing, sellers are rar~ly 
distinguished on the basis of service since there is generally little 
of that. The differences lie mainly in prices and.customers are 
quick to spot variance. For this reason, individual competitors 
will attempt to ensure that generally, prices do not move 11 out of 
line11 with those of other sellers. Minor variations in the· prices 
of individual products are not precluded in such a case, but it is 
likely that the outlay required for the purchase of combinations of 
such products will not differ from one place to another. 
Returning to our proposition that where there are a number of 
large sellers, i.e. 11 large11 in relation to the market, competing 
for the custom of a given market, price will tend to conformity, 
the need for greater precision becomes evident. For one, it is 
necessary to discuss the relevance of the Demand curve from a· 
different point of view. For another, it is important to consider 
the nature of 11 price differences 11 and the requisites for attrac-
ting custom. 
For practical purposes it is not unjustifiable to vie\'l the 
Demand curve for the firm in the theory of Monopolistic Competition. 
as merely reflecting a range of possible prices and outputs, most 
of which will, in fact, never be relevant. That is to say, in 
the majority of .circumstances, a firm will settle upon one price 
and output and the range of possible price/output alternatives 
which exist will not be of great interest. It is not valid to 
postulate that there is any finite relationship between price and 
output along the entire length of the curve, since, as we have 
already noted, changes in price induce changes in certain variables 
other than output. It is obviously an oversimplification to 
suggest that there is any way of ascertaining sales at any 
11 pric e11 (i.e. the outlay asked of consumers for given purchases) 
other than that at which the firm finds itself trading at any 
point in time. The point which emerges from this line·of reasoning 
is that the demand for the output of the individual finn will tend 
to be very elastic in the region of the 11 price11 being asked by the 
majority of sellers. Even in the single product duopoly analysis 
of early theory, or in an imperfect oligopoly situation, each 
seller will suspect that the market for his product i(3 extremely 
sensitive to price and will assume great demnnd elasticity at the 
11 price11 in question. By raising his 11 price11 therefore, the seller 
operating under conditions of oligopoly such as those just 
described will experience a loss of customers, and vice versa for 
a fall in his 11 price11 • 
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Thus far the analysis has been conducted largely in terms of 
11 price differences" as a device for attracting rational customers 
from one seller to another. At this point it is necessary to 
the general body of propositions being developed to associate 
this principle with certain other issues. It has been established 
that, in the large multiple-product retail outlet, customer 
convenience plays a large part in inducing buyers to make all their 
purchases under 11 one roof 11 • In order t·o attract customers to the 
shop in the first place however the retailer may have·to provide an 
item, or items, on more favourable terms than his competitors. 
The actual technique differs from pL~ce to place but could best be 
applied through the use of 11 loss leaders". These are generally 
well-kno~m branded products sold at lower than standard prices in 
order to attract customers. They are frequently sold at a loss 
in the hope that increased sales on other items will compensate. 
Demonstrations and samples are also useful attractions. The 
initial impact of such a device will be to make the demand for the 
goods and services of the retailer in question more inelastic, 
since it will establish preferences in the mL1ds of buyers. 
Such programmes however, are not the prerogatives of individual 
sellers. Since the nature of the metrop9litan retail market is 
such that a lcs s of customers will mrtke itself felt fairly quickly, 
other retailers will also attempt to attract customers along simi-
lar lines. The result will be competition in the provision of 
loss leaders, demonstrations etc., and ultimately, the elasticity 
of demanc: for the goods and services of the initiating seller may 
increase to its former magnitude.(l) 
Superficially, the competition would appear to be based on 
price differences or minor distinctions in service. This is not 
strictly true. The reason for the re-establishment of the con-
ditions of greater elasticity of demand for the goods a~d services 
of individual sellers lies in the principle of cross-elasticity of 
demand. In this case the cross elasticity is the measure of the 
degree of substitutability of the goods and services of one seller 
for those of another.. The extent of such substitutability will 
be far greater in the urban complex than in the country town. 
This situation is obviously contingent upon the large size of the 
population to be served and the inadequacy of small numbers of 
sellers to do it effectively. 
(l) I am indebted for this point to Mr Z.S.A. Gurzynski of the 
Department of Economics at the University of Cape Town. 
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Accepting the view that the area of substitutability may, in 
fact, be significant, and that the capacity of sellers of similar size 
and type to use competitive devices against one another is just 
about the same, one may suggest that the market of any one seller 
w~ll not be enlarged permanently by the use of such devices. 
This is simply because different sellers, using such devices at 
different times, will have the opportunity of gaining customers, 
but will lose them to their rivals, as the latter, in turn, 
innovate. lt is possible that in the early stages of the 11 con-
sumer attraction11 campaign, certain new customers will be induced 
to come into the shop and their general purchases might well 
increase sales temporarily. But the reactions of rivals, par-
ticularly those 11 very close 11 to the seller in question, will be 
prompt and the status quo will quickly be re-established. Whilst 
therefore, the initial 11 spurt11 of devices designed to attract new 
customers to a particular shop may serve to make the overall demand 
for its goods and services less elastic, the capacity of other shops 
to do the same will quickly cause the demand to become more elastic. 
The cycle is continuous and proviGes an incentive to the ambitious 
to stay on top. 
This line of argument would seem to raise once again the 
questions concerning the interdependence of Demand and Cost 
curves. On this point the Chamberlinian approach is valid.(l) 
In a case mentioned earlier it was suggested that the necessity 
for holding stocks is greater for some retailers than for others, 
even though the broad category of gcc-:ds sold may be similar for 
both groups. It was suggested that such stocks could be influen-
tial in creating demand and the functional relationship between 
Cost and Demand curves was postulated. It has been shown that 
Chamberlin recognizes the capacity of Advertising expenditure to 
influence the slope and position of the Demand curve for a product, 
but since the cost of buying stocks is indistinguishable, to the 
retailer, from the cost of buying goods for immediate resale, it is 
not valid to regard the cost of holding stocks as a 11 selling 11 or 
11 advertising11 cost. This reservation does not apply to such 
11 advertising11 campaigns as the demonstrations and samples mentioned 
earlier. 
An issue which merits attention at this point is 11 branding11 • 
Branding is a term used to denote the identification of a particular 
good with a particular source to the extent that the purchaser will 
be aware of the impossibility of buying exactly the same good 
(1) Chapter III, above •. 
elsewhere, Le. from another source. Trademarks, copyrights, 
patents, etc. have been discussed earlier in this context. 
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Much of the Chamberlinian analysis relies upon the principle of 
branding, but it can be shown that the impact of the policy is 
dissipated when it is examined in a retailing context. There 
are two reasons for this. Firstly, the rnanufacturer will generally 
tend to sell his products in a large number of stores even if (as 
is the case with patent medicines sold in pharmacies) they are 
generally of the same retail type. Secondly, where people are 
in close proximity to both the product and the large number of 
substitutes which could possibly be available, they are less 
likely to insist upon a particular type and will frequently be 
inclined to regard most of the varieties on display as being sub-
stitutable. This situation will be most common in supermarkets 
or large general stores. It is certainly different from the cir-
cumstances envisaged by the orthodox theorists who fail to consider 
the possibility that more than one branded product could be sold b,y 
any one seller, or rather, that the demand for any one product 
could affect the demand for another. 
The first observation suggests that where the same branded 
good is sold by a large number of sellers, and is therefore dis-
tributed fairly evenly throughout the market, the existence of 
customers 11 loyal11 to the product should not affect the distribution 
of buyers amongst sellers. Barring restrictions, it should 
simply be a matter of the retailer ensuring that he too stocks the 
product and no seller will be placed at a disadvantage to any 
other. This view is based on the assUm.ption that there is no 
discrimination on the part of the manufacturer on the basis of 
location, size, quantity etc. 
If the distribution is, in fact, even throughout the market, 
the Demand curve facing any single seller will not be less elastic 
than those facing his competitors. If distribution is not even, 
the store stocking the product in question will attract custom 
"loyal'' to the good and, on that basis, a condition for attaching 
buyers will prevail .• The result may be a tendency for buyers 
to prefer the products of one retailer over those of others. This 
case is however, less likely and it may be assumed that for stores 
of the same general type (and, therefore, for stores most likely 
to be in close competition) the range of branded goods sold will 
generally tend to be the same. Under such circumstances Cham-
berlin's analysis is far better applied to the competition amongst 
the manufacturers of the branded goods. The effects of the 
competition amongst their products will be felt less acutely at 
the retail stage. 
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Turning to the second observation, it becomes necessary to 
consider the impact of substitutes. It has been suggested that 
where the range of substitutes available is significantly large 
as would likely be the case in supermarkets - the importance of 
branding as a device to distinguish among the products of individual 
sellers tends to diminish. Whilst it is true that manufacturers 
advertising can create preferences in the minds of consumers, the 
buyer confronted with a wide range of products is also able to 
11 see for himself11 , as it were, the similarities which exist amongst 
products. Even if it is not immediately possible to establish 
all the relevant characteristics of the various goods, it may be 
possible for the buyer to realise that the distinctions drawn 
amongst products are often ~~rgely manufacturer-sponsored on no 
really significant basis whatsoever. This situation is naturally 
less likely to come about where only one variety of the good is 
displayed and where customers have no opportunity to compare or 
respond to mutually cancelling competitive on-the-spot advertising. 
Whatever the validity of this notion, it is not a necessar,y 
condition for weakening the force of branding in retailing. This 
is simply because, if the suggestion that all shops of the same 
type have access to the product in question is valid, it is of 
no importance whether customers display preferences for individual 
varieties within the range sold by the retailer. It is not 
likely that the Demand curve facing the individual seller will be 
very materially altered by a distribution of preferences {n such 
a manner. 
The issue which now arises is that concerning goods branded 
and advertised by the manufacturer. If the manufact-urer is able to 
generate a demand amongst final consumers through advertising, it 
is possible that trade buyers will be tempted to pay higher 
prices than otherwise simply to be in a position to supply the good 
on demand. Retailers might well fear that by not being able to 
provide the good they will lose customers who might have been 
attracted to the shop and therefore to the entire range of goods 
being offered. It is conceivable that the Demand curve facing 
manufacturers under such circumstances would retain the shape 
envisaged by orthodox theory. 
The possibility that such a situation might arise depends 
upon the range of substitutes available and the type of retail 
outlet concerned. It has already been established that the re-
tailer provides a service to his customers. It has also been 
established that since retailers of similar size and type are in 
strong competition with one another, the nature of services offered 
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and prices will tend to be similar. Even if, for some reason, 
the nature of services changes somewhat from shop to shop, the value 
which they have for the consumer will probably be similar in each 
case. 
As a result, the inability of a particular seller to provide a 
specific good sought by the customer will be a disadvantage depending 
on the range of substitutes stocked which may conceivably fulfill 
the functions expected by the customer from the good he originally 
wished to_buy. The substitutes available are an important issue 
in that, if properly displayed, they may be used to divert the 
customer's attention from the original product and he might be 
induc~d to remain in the shop. 
The question of service however, is most relevant. If, as 
is often the case, the customer has been induced to purchase a 
particular commodity because of sume specific quality such as 
"after sales service11 or "dependability" which the manufacturer has 
informed him he will obtain on purchase he will tend to prefer the 
product in question to other brands. The ~~rge retail outlet is 
probably in a position to provide guarantees and after sales 
service of a type which may compensate the consumer for the lack 
of access to the product he originally wanted. Similarly, where 
the shop is selling a product which can in no way be improved by 
any tangible service - a tin of beans, for example - it is in a 
position to inform the consumer of the qualities of the substitute 
good and its similarity to the product being sought but not 
available. This technique of 11 on the spot" advertising can be 
used to compensate somewhat for the advertising by the manufacturer 
of the corrunodity not available and it will certainly tend to render 
the Demand curve for the latter far more elastic than it might 
have been. Taken as an aggregate, it is also highly probable that 
some stores wills tack particular branded goods which others do 
not, and the possibility of substitution amongst all stores 
(of the same type) of branded goods in general will tend to be 
good. As a result, the distribution of custom will probably be 
such as to prevent 11 clusters11 of consumers about specific retailers. 
Examined from this point of view the existence of branding 
processes is not likely to affect the overall demand for the goods 
and services of any one retailer. As a res.ult, retailers are 
not generally likely to adhere blindly to individual manufacturers 
7/s of branded products. The view that, for branded goods, the 
Demand curve is likely to be relatively inelastic should be modified 
for the seller to 11 great elasticity", while the Demand curve facing 
the manufacturer, though perhaps more inelastic, is likely to be 
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much less so than has been generally assumed. 
The nature of the association between manufacturer and retailer 
may vary. It is possible that the retailer may stock only the 
branded or rebranded products of the manufacturer without being in 
any way affiliated with him. Alternatively, the retailer may 
actually own his own source of supply, or vice versa in the case 
of the manufacturer. The implications for the Demand and Cost 
curves of both manufacturer and retailer will be slightly different 
according to circumstance. 
vle turn first to the case where the retailer is merely the 
sole stockist of the manufacturer's goods. If the goods are 
for resale under original brand names and are sold in conjunction 
with the standard lines obtainable at all retailers, the individual 
shop will possess an advantage in the attraction of customers. 
However, the suggestion that competitors lacking a specific branded 
product are generally able to dissipate the impact of their rivals' 
"monopoly!' advantage through the use of alternative brands and "on 
the spot" persuasion still holds true in this case, and the cross 
elasticity of deoand for the goods and services of stores will be 
sufficiently high to ensure a general elasticity of demand for any 
one shop at prevailing prices. Where the manufacturersl goods are 
resold under the retailers' own brand names, the assumption may 
legitimately be made that the same "physical" product is likely to 
appea~ a fairly large number of shops selling similar ranges of 
comnodities (assuming that retailer and manufacturer are not 
directly affiliated) albeit under a different name in each case. 
Since the assumption is that shops are sufficiently similar for 
the cross elasticity of demand to be high, price and quality 
conscious buyers will be likely to respond quickly to price dif-
ferences., There seems no reason to believe that one "brand" 
would be preferred to others on any basis other than price. It 
is therefore probable that branding of the type described in the 
preceding two cases will not stimulate the relatively inelastic 
demand conditions of the general type postulated by Chamberlin, 
at least not in the region of the prevailing market price. 
The second case postulated, i.e. where the retailer controls 
his o~ source of supply or vice versa, concerns issues of cost 
which have not yet been treated and which would best be left until 
the discussion of demand has been completed. 
It is not intended at this point to question the assumptions 
concerning the causal relationships among factors on which tradi-
tional Demand curve analysis is based, but, with specific reference 
to the orthodox view of the Demand curve facing the retailer, the 
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justification for assuming that price changes exert no effect on 
the position of the Demand curve must be analysed further. 
Orthodox Monopolistic Competition theory assumes that changes in 
price merely cause changes in the quantity demanded, without 
admitting the possibility that, over time, price changes may in 
fact play a significant part in determining the position of the 
Demand curve, or better, the quantities which may be sold at 
particular prices. 
One may return briefly to the arguments presented at the 
beginning of this chapter, concerning the nature of the 11 product 11 
in retail theory. It will be remembered that the 11 product 11 is 
regarded really as a combination of different commodities and it 
was ass~~ed that a change in price of a single commodity could 
affect the proportion in which all the commodities would be 
combined. In the arguments developed subsequently it was pointed 
out that an individual retailer, in possession of a wide variety 
of goods cqn attract custom to his shop by reducing the price of a 
single item. The result would be an increase in average revenue. 
The advantage of attracting increased customers to the shop through 
the use of such a technique is that the demand for the retailers 
other goods can be stimulated. The 11 demand curve11 shifts to the 
right. Monopolistic Competition analysis is not equipped to deal 
with concepts of this r:ature, even though it makes use of the valid 
assumption (purely within the lirr~ts of its analytical framework) 
that a fall in price increases the quantity sold. 
A number of assumptions have been made in the preceding 
pages. Firstly, it has been assumed that each seller is in a 
position to increase his sales by differt~ntiating his final product 
slightly. As a result, all sellers will follow suit and the 
result will be differentiation of a vast range of types. The 
result is the highly elastic situation postulated, since consumers 
find it difficult to differentiate and the task becomes impracti-
cal. Secondly, it has been suggested that in certain cases the 
products sold by individual sellers are sufficiently alike in 
most respects to encourage the consumer to differentiate amongst 
them purely on the basis of price. The highly elastic Demand 
curve will result in both situations. 
It has been the intention to examine major portions of the 
Chamberlinian analysis based on the view that Demand curves tend 
to be of finite elasticity. In undertaking such a task, difficul-
ties have arisen. Firstly, one might say that the only meaningful 
approach to a criticism of the generality of orthodox theory 
must be a discussion of exceptions. In doing this, the critic 
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runs the risk of criticism himself, since theorizing on exceptions 
may tend to produce its own generalizations. 
Secondly, and more specifically, the generalization of greatest 
consequence for what is to follow is the notion that the Demand 
curve facing retailers under the normal circumstances of close 
competition (in the Chamberlinian sense) tends to be extremely 
elastic. In order to justify such a conclusion, a number of 
assumptions h:we been require.d. The test of the validity of such 
assumptions lies essentially in a comparison of the 11 realism11 con-
tained in them with that embodied in the orthodox analysis. It 
is simply a matter of examining the premises of existing theories in 
order to ascertain which approximate most closely to the experiences 
of the real world. The final test of acceptability of the analysis 
is an application to cases so that empirical observations may be 
made. 
The assumptions made in this part of the paper must be compared 
with those discussed in Part One. It vull become evident that 
the concepts developed by the original Monopolistic Competition 
theorists have had to be modified in order to render them accep-
table within a very broad frame of reference, i.e .• within the range 
suggested by Chamberlin's notions of 11 interdependence11 amongst 
firms. Such modification, on the basis of different assumptions 
(geared to retailing) has, however, changed peripheral issues 
beyond recognition. The slope of the Demand curve of a 11 seller11 
is no longer the same. The Demand curve is no longer particularly 
inelastic, but rather the opposite; yet the notion of 11 inter-
dependence11 remains, or possibly, because it remains .. 
Whichever the analytical method employed, one issue makes 
itself evident. Chamberlin and the orthodox theorists have 
postulated a Demand curve of finite elasticity without qualifying 
exactly how finite it is intended to be. In the present dis-
cussion a Demand curve of near infinite elasticity has been 
postulated. Perhaps it is useful to regard this as an 11 over-




An analysis of retail activity raises, as we have tried to 
show, doubts concerning the validity of the orthodox view of the 
Demand curves facing individual sellers. It also raises doubts 
concerning aspects of orthodox Cost curves. 
The approach to the theory of the firm adopted by the early 
monopolistic competition theorists embraces the concept of U-
shaped Cost curves and a marginalist equilibrium methodology based 
on the equation of marginal cost and marginal revenue. Briefly~ 
the notion that Cost curves (specifically long run Average Cost 
curves) possess an overall U-shape is derived from the principle 
of economies of scale. An increase in production, up to a point, 
yields successively lower average costs and subsequently, succes-
sively r..:igher average costs. The inference which, within the 
limits of the theory, may legitimately be drawn, is that there 
exists an 11 optimum11 point of lowest cost of production per unit. 
However, the shape of the Demand curve under the conditions of 
monopolistic competition envisaged by the earlier theorists is 
such as to preclude the possibility of the producer ever being 
able to increase his output up to the point where his costs are 
at such a minimum(l) - particularly where there exists unrestricted 
entry into an industry. The point of tangency between the 
Average Revenue and Average Cost curve is located to the left of, 
and therefore at a point higher than, the position of lowest 
average cost. Owing to assumptions - in the "large group11 model -
concerning the capacity of individual sellers to sell at prices 
lower than, and therefore at quantities greater than, their 
competitors, it is possible for such sellers to improve their 
position vis a vis the 11 optimum11 point on the Average Cost curve. 
No seller will be able to achieve the optimum. In contradis-
tinction, the Demand curve facing the seller under conditions of 
perfect competition is held to be perfectly horizontal, withthe 
result that tangency between the Average Revenue and Average Cost 
curves is achieved at the lowest point on the latter. The result 
is that the firm is able to utilize its capacity to the full. 
The closer the position of tangency to the lowest point on the 
(1) See above. 
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Average Cost curve, the better the utilization of capacity and the 
less 11 wastage11 • 
The second major methodological issue which merits attention 
is that of the equation of marginal costs and marginal revenues. 
Whilst the use of this procedure is by no means limited to the 
description of price policy under conditions of monopolistic 
competition, it is in this area where acceptance of the principle 
without question results in severe analytical shortcomings for 
retail theory. Essentially, the MC/MR method of establishing the 
quantity to be produced and the price at which it is to be sold 
has its roots in the view that where MC is greater than ~ffi it will 
not be of any benefit to the producer to continue production, 
and, where MR exceeds MC, continued production will be justified 
since each extra unit of output adds more to total revenue than it 
does to cost. 
Reference has already been made to the views put forward by 
the Hall and Hitch research group. The contention was that, under 
normal circumstances, producers do not, for a number of reasons, 
operate in terms of an equality of marginal costs and marginal 
revenues. Rather, they prefer the principle of 11 cost plus" 
pricing. Attempts will be made at a later stage to show that the 
retailer will "optimize" the use of his capacity by selecting a 
11 markup11 which will clear his stocks. 
We turn first to an examination of the shape and content of 
the Average Cost curves in retail trade. Marginal Costs will be 
dealt with later. We have already introduced Chamberlin's view 
of costs of production as including: 
11 ••• all expenses which must be met in 
order to procide the commodity or 
service, transport it to the buyer, and 
put it into his hands ready to satisfy 
his wants. 11 ( l) 
If we accept such a view of the costs represented by the 
average cost, it becomes necessary to qualify the concept of 
"expenses". vJhilst it is true that Chamberlin does not limit his 
definition of costs of production to the manufacturing firm, the 
very generality of his view makes it necessary to distinguish 
between the type of cost incurred in the manufacturing business and 
that incurred in retailing. It is not necessarily valid to 
assume that the same processes of cost determination should operate 
in both areas. 
(l) The TheorY of Monopolistic Competition, p. 123. 
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In the case of the manufacturing firm the suggestion that the 
Average Cost curve is U-shaped implies that additional units of 
output, after a certain point, can only be achieved at successively 
greater cost to the producer. The concept can be explained 
fairly easily if one accepts the view that, ns the limit of plant 
capacity is approached, the cost of variable factors will start 
to rise. Such variable factors consist generally of physical 
inputs. With fixed costs remaining, so to speak, fixed, it is only 
these variable costs which can, in the short period, contribute to 
an increase in total costs and therefore average costs. 
Fixed costs, however, do not remain fixed. An analysis of 
cost may be divided into two parts, the 11 short11 and 11 long11 run. In 
the short run it is assumed that certain factors such as machinery, 
buildings, land etc., cannot be varied in ~uantity in the process 
or adjusted to the requirements of increasing output. As a result 
these factors constitute 11 fixed costs11 • In the long run however, 
the firm is held to be able to change the proportions in which 
fixed factors are combined and, with increased flexibility, is 
given the potential to produce an output at a lower average cost 
than would be possible in the short run. Fixed costs may there-
fore be regarded as variable with the decision to produce in the 
long run. 
In turning to an examination of the type of costs incurred 
in retailing it is important to determine precisely the nature 
of the commodities sold by both the manufacturer and retailer. 
The manufacturer sells a good which he has produced himself. He 
has, in effect, assembled all the factors necessary for 11 creating 11 
the product. In addition, he has supplied the equipment used in 
the manufacturing process. In a different sense, the retailer 
must also assemble the parts necessary for the 11 creation11 of his 
final product. The product may be regarded as being the range of 
goods which he sells, and the parts m~y be seen as the individual 
goods making up the range. The 11 equipment 11 employed in the 
transformation of the parts into the whole may be regarded as 
the shop itself and any other fixed costs which will be incurred. 
I 
The view is indeed simple, but is all that will be required at 
this stage. 
Orthodox methodology does not however, provide fully for the 
circumstances under which retail trade takes place. It does not 
recognize any functional relationship which might possibly exist 
between the Demand and Cost curves for a product. Such a 
relationship may evidence itself in a number of different ways. 
Firstly - as has already been indicated - it is possible that 
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demand for a product, and the price which consumers are prepared to 
pay for it, 1-rill be a function of the stocks carried by the seller. 
This naturally has implications for Cost curves. Secondly, 
in the same way as the Demand curve for a 11 productn must be viewed 
as a representation of the demand for all items and services 
making up the whole, so the Cost curve must be vimfed as the 
summation of all the individual costs of items being sold. On 
that basis, it must be treated as it it will change its shape with 
a change in the combinations of the goods demanded and sold. 
This situation, i.e. frequent combination changes, is more likely in 
retailing than in manufacturing since the overall 11 product 11 
basketfull can be kept more or less constant even if the propor-
tions in which its parts are combined are changed. 
There is a possibility, where the Average Cost curves are 
concerned, that individual sellers will display great similarity. 
But they might well be faced with completely different Average 
. Revenue curves. Or vice versa • This brings into question the 
limits of intra-seller comparison and with it, the range within 
which firms may be regarded as being in competition with one 
another. The conclusion must be that Chamberlin's analysis is 
only useful in examining competition amongst firms whose Cost and 
Demand curves are very similar. Such examples are rare. (l) 
It would appear that orthodox analysis does not provide the frame-
work necessary for the examination of competition between, say, a 
department in a large store, and a small retailer depending solely 
on the sale of the product common to both. The Cost curves of 
both may be similar, but it is possible that the Demand curves 
reflect different price ranges. Such a situation is common in 
retailing. 
The implication is that orthodox analysis is inadequate in 
the discussion of new entry competition since it assumes that 
all competitors sell similar products under similar conditions. 
As the discussion proceeds these issues will be made clear. 
Once again, questions arise concerning the relationship 
between Demand and Cost curves. Monopolistic Competition theory 
postulates that, where one seller asks a higher price than, and 
sells less than, his competitors, he will be obliged to produce at 
a point which, represented diagrarr®atically, lies to the left of 
that at which he would be optimizing his use of available capacity. 
The implication is that, by asking a lower price, and thereby 
selling greater quantities, he will be able to take advantage of 
(l) The Theory of Honopolistic Competition, p. 110. 
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certain economies. By reducing his price and selling even greater 
quantities however, he will ultimately be unable to meet his costs 
of production. Much, if not all~ of the difficulty lies in the 
shape of the orthodox Demand curve in orthodox analysis, since the 
assumption is made that no seller will be able to achieve the 
production position where his Average Revenue curve lies at a 
tangent to his Average Cost curve at its lowest point. 
The price at which the seller under conditions of monopolistic 
competition is unable to carry on producing at a profit over the 
long period is higher than that at which he would experience this 
difficulty under the conditions of near perfectly elastic demand 
we have postulated. The benefits of bulk buying will, under any 
circumstances, be greater to all concerned under conditions of 
near perfect competition, as we shall attempt to shaw. 
The downward slope of the Average Cost curve of the retailer 
will not necessarily be similar to that of the manufacturer. 
The difficulty of exposition which arises at this point lies in 
the fact that the theory of Monopolistic Competition assumes that 
the Cost curves of all the firms competing within a given range 
of 11 product 11 are similar. (l) A significant adjustment is called 
for if the problems of the real world are to be dealt with par-
ticularly in so far as retailing is concerned. While capital 
requirements in manufacturing may be such as to establish confornrity 
amongst the Cost curves of competiLors, the same range of retail 
commodities may be sold on a larger or smaller scale. Even if 
there are no similarities amongst sellers on a cost basis, com-· 
petition may doubtless be said to exist. 
For such reasons a question arises. The orthodox analysis 
proceeds well (within the limits of its framework) where the 
conditions surrounding the demand for, and the supply of, the 
product are the same for all competitors. Since the fundamental 
purpose of the frrunework is to analyse the effect of competition 
on the sellers of products, it serves no purpose to exclude the 
bulk of the potentially competitive firms from the picture simply 
because they fail to display the desired uniformity. The point is 
that such firms, whether they are exactly alike or not, must be 
regarded as being in competition with one another. Assuming the 
predominant situation away does not make the analysis any more 
valuable, 
(1) Triffin, in his Monopolistic Competition and General Equili-
brium Theory, was the first to dispute this, but failed to 
draw conclusions regarding pricing policy. 
.. 
140 
In actuality, Chamberlin postulates(l) the possibility of 
variation in Cost and Demand curves for variations in product, but 
this serves little p~pose since he continues to conceive of 
'V 
competitiveness in terms of a uniformity of such curves. What 
this amounts to is the view that it is necessary to develop a \ 
technique whereby the interaction of competing firms of different 
sizes can be analysed. From the point of view of costs then, it 
is necessary to establish the "long run" curves of the individual 
sellers and to distinguish betvveen them on the basis of size. 
Examined purely from the practical standpoint, certain issues 
arise. For the large departmental store or supermarket, there 
exist> as we have seen, certain economies in the buying process. 
Depending upon the overall size of the shop and also upon the size 
of the department concerned, it may reasonably be expected that 
the turnover (measured purely on the basis of quantity) of a 
particular commodity is greater in the large outlet than in the 
small one. There are a number of reasons for this. The large 
department store attracts, by virtue of its structure, more 
customers than does the small shop, with the result that more 
consumers are brought "into contact 11 with the commodity in question •. 
As a consequence of larger sales the large retailer is in a 
position to buy greater quantities at any one time (if we assume, 
for practical purposes, that the small seller is not a member of 
a 11 chain11 ) and the principle of the economy of bulk purchasing 
becom~s pertinent. Such economy manifests itself in a number of 
different ways of which quantity discounts are by far the most 
significant. 
Another consideration is the fact that where the single depart-
ment under consideration carries only a small part of the total· 
commodity range stocked by the store, the significance of the 
costs incurred in running it is different from that experienced in 
the case of the small s·eller. It is possible for instance, that 
the department is only maintained as a convenience or even a 
11 draw11 for customers whilst, for the small seller, the product 
concerned could be the sole source of income. The fact then, that 
the cost of running the department can be 11 carried11 by the profits 
to be derived from the sale of the firm 1 s other items, is not to 
be disregarded. It means that the departmental store can keep 
up the commodity 11 line11 long after the small entrepreneur has been 
forced out of business by higher costs. It means that the large 
store can operate at a much narrower profit margin than can the 
(1) The Theory of Honopolistic Competition, p_. 110. 
141 
Srrk'lller one. This consideration is reinforced if the possibility 
of quantity discounts is admitted and the general result is a 
position in which the departmental store (or L~rge retail outlet) 
can afford to operate under worse conditions than can the slllilll 
retailer. 
There is no doubt thD.t certain consumers do indicate pre-
ferences for the service to be obtained in the smaller and more 
personal shop. But this does not invalidate the suggestion that 
the shops concerned are indeed in competition, and in certain 
cases, specifically 11 supermarketing 11 , large outlets are tending to 
capture trade from smaller outlets at an increasing rate. 
As a corollary to this, the question of new entry competition 
should be mentioned. Chamberlin's discussion of the relationship 
between average cost and average revenue - the "tangency" solution 
has already been examined. Briefly, it indicates the position of 
group "equilibrium" at which point sellers will not be inclined 
either to enter or leave the industry. Chamberlin does explain(l) 
that the tangency solution must be considered appropriate only to 
each subgroup of the industry in turn, but such an explanation 
has little value for the theory if one admits that intra-subgroup 
comparisons are important. It becomes obvious t~1.t, whilst the 
notion of tangency is valid in a very restricted sense, it is 
possible that the large firm operating at a lower cost (an aspect 
not yet fully discussed) per unit of the commodities common to all 
sellers and therefore in a position to ask a lower price (or 
possibly forced to ask a lower price owing to the pressure of a 
highly elastic demand) will achieve 11 tangencyu at a lower point 
than its higher cost small competitor. If this is indeed so, the 
use of the tangency solution is limited to exposition. It does 
not serve as an indicator of the competitive relations amongst 
the sellers of the product and is not really necessary. To the 
potential entrant - whatever his size - intra-subgroup competition 
is an important issue and information concerning only his own 
irrunediate class of rival provides an unsuitable reflection of the 
type of competition he is likely to experience. Chamberlin's 
analysis(2 ) postulates circumstances in which the Average Revenue 
curves lie at vnrying distances from, or at different positions 
of tangency on, the Average Cost curves as a result of particular 
(l) Ibid., p. lll. 
(2) Ibid., p. 111. 
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irred~cible monopoly elements possessed by individual sellers. 
The possibility that Cost curves might, however, lie at different 
levels, is not discussed. 
The use of the orthodox Cost curves is misleading. The 
criticism applies to the use of Average Cost curves as well as it 
does to Marginal Cost and ~'l..rginal Revenue curves. The early 
Nonopolistic Competition analysis, running in terms of an equation 
of marginal cost and IIk:'l..rginal revenue in an attempt to 11raax:imize" 
profits, has come, as we have seen, under criticism from the 
protagonists of the "cost plus" method of pricing. The value of 
the latter technique will become evident if it can be shown that 
the orthodox view of the coaparability of indivldual firms' 
Cost curves is invalid. 
Mention fr'l..S already been made of the impact of individual 
commodity prices on the demand for others, and consequently on 
the demand for the "product" of the firm itself. The same 
consideration applies to the Cost curve. irVhere commodity combina-
tions are changed in response to a change in demand resulting 
from a chant,e in prices, there may be said to be a fairly strong 
relationship between demand and cost. As the quantity sold 
increases, the average cost of production will decrease up to a 
point. This principle is in accordance with the U-shaped curve of 
conventional theory~ But since theory is not explicit on the 
question of intra-subgroup competition it is not equipped to deal 
with the issue of new-entry competition resulting from favourable 
costs rather than favourable demand. 
Principally, the position is as follows. If the assumption 
is made that all competitors, potential or actual, are faced with 
the same Demand and Cost curves, the tangency solution will provice 
a useful indicator of the state of the industry. If one assumes 
that new entrants to the industry are faced with the same cost 
prospect as are the competitors already in it one may suggest that 
producers already producing will have an advantage over newcomers. 
The rationale is simple. Examined over a specific time period and 
in terms of the relation between total cost and output, the new 
firm will, theoretically, find itself producing at what might be 
represented diagranm~tically as the upper end of the left hand side 
of the U-shaped Cost curve. Competitors already established will 
be tending to move towards (or may already have passed) the 
11 optimum11 point of production at the lowest point on the curve of 
Average Costs. They rrk'lY therefore possess a more favourable 
relationship between average revenue and average cost than new-
comers. It is in this matter that the theory of Monopolistic 
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Competition lacks clarity. On the one h3!1d, it would appear as 
if the industry is regarded as being composed only of firms which 
have existed for the same length of time (and which are therefore 
operating at about the same points on their respective, and like, 
Average Cost curves) and, on the other, the implication is as we 
have suggested, i.e. that new entrants will, by virtue of their 
smaller output, be at something of a cost disadvo.ntage. 
Neither of these views is strictly valid. The notion that 
new entrants will not be in a position to take advantage of the 
economies of scale which will probably present themselves as 
output increases is based on the idea that such firms are starting 
11 from scratch11 (l). Such a situation is more likely in manufac-
turing, since capital equipment does not lend itself so easily to 
different uses as does floor space in the retail outlet. However, 
there can be no doubt that even the large scale manufacturer is 
often able to commence production of a product hitherto manufac-
tured only by other firms at a cost to himself similar to that 
experienced by such older and better established sellers. A 
seller (whether he be either maimfacturer or retailer) could cover 
or share his new overheads with his other lines. Whatever the 
device he employs it is quite possible that the new entrant, if 
he is a large well-established seller in his own field, might well 
be able to commence production without ~1mediately having to 
overcome the disadvantage of higher costs.(this advantage lies in 
the fact tlli~t MC constitutes a small proportion of TC and he has 
staying power). Even if higher costs do exist for the seller of 
the product in question, they need not constitute an impediment 
to selling at a. competitive price. 
The possibilities of expansion available to a firm (either one 
specialised in another field and entering the m~rket for a specific 
product for the first time, or one already operating in a particular 
field of retailing) depend upon the 11 divisibility11 of capncity. 
The term is used in the accepted economic sense and applies to the 
ability of firms to add to their stock of equipment or product 
lines without having to expand their capacity in large 11 lumps 11 • 
A manufacturer, for example, may frequently be unable to expand 
capacity in order to produce a few more units of output simply 
because such a policy would require large capital outlay not 
necessarily justified in terms of the small increase required. 
The danger of 11 excess capacity" is increased, if output is unlikely 
(l) Andrews, Ibid., p. 78 
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to be expanded sufficiently to make use of the available capital. 
The retailer is less likely to be faced with such a problem. 
Since capital equipment is generally less flexible than retail 
floor space as far as the range of products which can be 11 manu-
factured11 is concerned, the manufacturer is faced with another 
capacity problem. The retailer is in a far better position to 
alter the range of products he carries because he need generally 
only make minor alterations to his allocation of floor space. The 
floor of the retail shop will generally lend itself to the require-
ments for the sale of most products while physical ph~nt will not. 
The retailer would appear to have fewer problems as far as 
the expansion or modification of his capacity is concerned. Such 
a situation will not be without its impact upon the ability of 
retailers to compete. Where, for eocample, a supermarket or 
departmental store wishes to add another line to its range of 
stocks in order to enter into competition with specialist stores, 
it can generally do so at a moderate cost to itself. It is 
quite possible that the expansion of the large retail outlet into 
a particular commodity line would merely require an additional 
counter (or simply a switch of existing stocks) and a few other 
accessories required in the sale of the product. No great cost 
obstacles are likely to exist in anything like the manner which 
has frequently been postulated for new entrants in the area of 
manufacturing. In addition, the size of the retail shop and the 
very nature of its turnover will likely enable it to make bulk 
purchases and costs of buying stocks will be so low as to compen-
sate for any costs incurred in expanding capacity. Combined with 
this factor is the likelihood that the demand for the stocks of 
the seller - once the consumer is actually in the store - tends 
to become relatively inelastic in view of consumer inertia. This 
principle works both ways. Customers, attracted by the particular 
commodity, will increase the sellerts sales by purchasing other 
goods as well, and vice versa. This consideration is, as we 
have already indicated, quite important. Specialist shops may 
not wield the same 11 drawing11 powers as general stores, in spite of 
the external economies to be derived from location in the Central 
Business District(l). Under such circumstances the large retailer 
will generally be at an advantage should he decide to enter into a 
particular competitive field rather than at the disadvantage 
postulated by orthodox analysis. 
(l) The question of such 11 external economies11 is vast and intricate. 
It is not central to the present line of argument and will not 
be pursued here. 
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In turning to a related question, the issue of 11 bulk buying11 
is seen to become more complex. It is sometimes the case, as 
we have seen, that individual manufacturers set up their own 
retail outlets through which they dispose of all or most of their 
goods. The reverse is also true but in a less restricted manner. 
Retailers frequently own some of their own sources of supply. 
They do not, for obvious reasons, generally own all the sources 
providing the goods which they sell. 
The first case provides some interesting considerations con-
cerning costs, both for the w,nufacturer and the retailer (if the 
two are to be considered analytically separate). One might regard 
the retailer and the manufacturer (each with his 01~ Demand curve) 
as merely being two parts of the single unit - the seller. Under 
such circumstances, the relationship between the Demand curve 
facing the retailer and that facing the manufacturer becomes more 
understandable than it is in the case where the two sellers are 
independent of each other. Where the manufacturer is see~g 
to attract the custom of the retailer he will generally lli~ve to 
ensure t~~t he is able to provide the quantity required at the right 
price. On the other hand, the retailer will, under normal cir-
cumstances, feel no compunction in purchasing from the manufacturer1 s 
competitors if he should not obtain satisfactory terms or treat-
ment. The case where the manufacturer is selling directly to 
consumers through his retail outlets is rather more complex. By 
virtue of the structure of his sales the manufacturer 1 s retailing 
side will not have the alternative of buying elsewhere should 
price not be 11 right!'. Under all circumstances, the question of 
whether the price is right will depend on the Demand curve facing 
the retailer. 
Proceeding further an interesting aspect presents itself. 
Where the manufacturer and retailer are independent, each will 
eX'_pect to make "normal profits" over the costs of physical pro-
duction being incurred. These profits are, in effect, rewards 
for 11 risk11 on the pnrt of the entrepreneur, and are accounted for 
in Chamberlin's notion of 11 tangency11 • Where such manufacturers 
and retailers are not independent, it is quite possible that 
.the manufacturer will not expect to take his 11 normal profits" in 
the transaction between himself and his retail dividion, but rather, 
would be content merely to take his share of the profits of the 
final sale. This situation possesses three interesting aspects. 
Firstly, the price asked by the manufacturing section ~~y be lower 
than it would be if the two were independent. Secondly, the 
costs incurred by the retail section would be accordingly lower. 
Thirdly, the manufacturer's incentives to compete with other 
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manufacturers are lessened by the fact that he has assured retail 
outlets. The result is very similar to that of 11 bulk buying11 
by retailers, in so far as the lower cost of purchasingmeans 
that sales prices can also be lower than that of smaller competi-
tors. Under normal circumstances this leads to larger turnover. 
For standard, frequently purchased items however, the cost implica-
tions for manufacturers are slightly different than in the case of 
bulk buying. In such a situation, it may justfiably be assumed 
that the final demand for the product, or range of products, is 
fairly stable at the prevailing level of price and will be likely to 
increase, but only very slightly, as price decreases. 
Assuming that the demand for the product is stable, the manu-
facturer competing with others for the custom of the retailer is 
less likely to be able to anticipate the retailer's purchases from 
himself in particular than is the case where retailer and manu-
facturer are part of the same organization. Individual manu-
facturers will not be certain exactly what their share of the market 
will be. If the reta~l outlet(s) owned by the manufacturer 
constitute a large proporGion of all of supplies of the commodities 
in question, the 11 sales11 of the integrated manufacturers will be 
more stable over time and will lend themselves to more accurate 
budgeting programmes. 
The concept of capacity must be mentioned here. Even where 
bulk discounts are given, the air of uncertainty surrounding the 
retailer's option to purchase from any of the competing manufac-
turers means that no manufacturer will be able to plan the extent 
of his plant capacity with any accuracy. On the other hand, 
manufacturers selling their goods to the public through their own 
outlets will be able to estimate the capacity required purely on 
the basis of final demand and may even be able to achieve operation 
at, or as close as possible to, the point of minimum average costs. 
Proper interdependence of manufacturing and selling divisions 
obviously means careful estimation of, and allowance for, fluc-
tuations in final demand. If the retailing divis.ion is a large 
supplier relative to the market, a change in demand can have more 
severe implications for the manufacturing section than might be 
the case where a number of, perhaps, small manufacturers are 
supplying the independent retailers. The excess capacity which 
could result from a decrease in final demand would be more serious 
in that the effects would not spread themselves over many manu-
facturers. 
Another difficulty which presents itself is the fact that if 
the manufacturer dependent on the retailer finds that he has an 
unsalable excess, he is not generally able to find retRilers else-
where who will buy his stock. On the other hand, the manufacturer 
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who produces for a number of retailers has less difficulty in co-
ordinating his supply with the requirements of his customers in 
that he will generally be able to find someone to take his stocks 
at the right price. 
Where retailers own their own sources of supply, certain cost 
advantages similar to those just described are available. The 
retailer is not required to include in the price he pays a 11 profit 11 
to the manufacturer and is therefore able to obtain goods more 
cheaply. Under such circumstances however, the difficulties of 
capacity adjustment present themselves again, and the poor co-
ordination of manufacturers! supply and retailers' demand over 
the long run can result in excesses or shortages of capacity which 
cannot readily be filled by outside sources. 
The argument put forward so far has quite important implica-
tions for the theory of the retail fir.m. It has already been 
pointed out that the earlier monopolistic competition theorists 
devoted no attention to the question of inter-subgroup competition. 
Triffin was the first to point out the analytically superfluous 
nature of the industry concept by indicating the need for admitting 
different degrees of competitiveness and substitutability amongst 
products. He failed hmvever, to incorporate his modified approach 
into a general body of analysis which could effectively replace 
the tools developed by his immediate predecessors in the field. 
It has been pointed out here that the competition amongst 
firms of different sizes - and therefore faced with clifferent 
average revenues and average costs - is an important characteristic 
of retailing today. At the same time it is conceded that the 
analysis cannot stop at this point. The nature of, and reasons 
for, differences in both average revenue and average cost amongst 
firms has been indicated briefly. It now remains to consider the 
implications of such a situation. 
Whilst it is true that large retailers are often in a better 
position to receive the goods which they finally sell at a price 
lower than that usually, but not always, granted to smaller sellers, 
it is not always likely thqt the selling prices of each may differ. 
It is possible, for example, that the small seller may hqve to 
cover lower overheads or other selling costs per unit sold and he 
is therefore in a position to compete, at least on a price basis, 
with the large seller. He might even possess a 11 compensating11 
locational advantage. 
This paper has attempted to show that demand under specific 
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conditions of retailing is sensitive to price to the extent that 
demand elasticity amongst shops is high. Retailers will be 
aware of the loss of sales resulting from asking prices higher than 
their competitors. As a result their pricing policies will 
reflect the interdependence of demand which prevails for the 
basketfull of each sellerts product. It has been indicated that 
the tangency solution proposed by Chamberlin loses its value as 
soon as it is postulated t~~t the Demand and Average Cost curves of 
individual retailers are linked but do not necessarily display the 
uniformity and symmetry he assumes. Instead, the Walrasian inter-
dependence of Triffin1 s formulation becomes relevant, although the 
analysis has not been sufficiently ~tended. 
Under the conditions envisaged, it is necessary to devise a 
framework which will admit the thesis that (a) the costs and 11 prices 11 
of individual sellers exert an influence on those selling competing 
substitutes, even though such costs and 11 prices 11 are not necessarily 
the same for all sellers and (b) the tangency solution, as it 
stands, must be modified if it is to possess any analytical 
usefulnesse 
Before such a framework can be developed, a reference should 
be made to the question of seller attitudes in retailing. In the 
development of a theory of the manufacturing firm, there is some 
justification for assuming that under nonnal circumstances there 
exist certain obstacles - notably high capital costs - which deter 
indi victuals from entering an industry simply in order to "try their 
hand11 • The effect of such obstacles is to induce potential 
entrants to be more careful in deciding whether to go into business 
or not; since losses might be relatively large. In the case of 
retailing, on the other hand, potential entrants are faced with 
fewer obstacles and the prospect of loss does not make itself as 
evident as it does in manufacturing. The requirements for 
"setting up shop11 are usually limited to the acquisition of a 
small site and the investment of accumulated savings (not necessarily 
large in view of the credit sometimes available) in a small range 
of stocks. The attitude of sellers is often not based on an 
adequate appraisal of the magnitude of possible losses, but rather 
on the belief (frequently unsubstantiated) that it is possible to 
succeed where others have failed. The small corner retailer 
referred to earlier is particularly subject to such sentiment, and 
the "mortality rate11 in retailing is therefore correspondingly 
higher than in manufacturing. 
The tangency solution offered by Chamberlin suggests that, in 
the so-called long run, an industry equilibrium will be reached 
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at the position of tangency between the Average Revenue and Average 
Cost curves for that industry. The principle involved is simply 
t~2t concerning the incentives to sellers either to enter or 
leave the industry. Since the tangency solution proposes that 
all sellers are earning a normal profit, it will require modifica-
tion if it becomes evident that (a) under retailing conditions, 
retailers will generally not enter the industry simply because they 
are attracted by the profits which others are making, but will 
rather do so in the hope that they will be able to succeed where 
their predecessors had failed, and/or (b) that the equilibrium 
position is frequently not maintained because, at any given 
moment, there tends to be a surfeit of retailers in the industry, 
none of vrhom wish to leave, in the hope that conditions will 
improve. Even if one could ascertain that individual sellers 
really do wish to, and succeed in, leaving the industry when their 
prospects begin to look bleaker, there is no reason to believe that 
such action results in a return to equilibrium. In fact, the 
incessant sequence of entry into, and exit from, the industry, and 
the low level of profits per unit sold (or better, the high in-
cidence of losses) tend to indicate a location of the aggregate 
AR curve below the AC curve in most circumstances. The implica-
tion is that the average profit rate in retailing is negative. 
The modification of the concept of tangency which we propose 
will be necessary here, is difficult to define. If there is any 
justification for concluding that, overall, retail trade is not 
characterized by normal profits for a large number of its members 
and yet that such members are not necess~rily influenced in their 
decisions either to enter or leave by such an observation, it will 
be necessary to alter the content of the Average Cost curve. 
It will obviously be necessary to recast the concept of 
11 normal profit11 if such profit is not regarded as being the bench-
mark for sellers for deciding whether to remain in, or move out of, 
the industry. Since it is also not the profit which typifies the 
activities of the average retailer, it must be assumed that tangency, 
if it is to be achieved at all (in the sense that such an industry 
is unlikely to be characterized by any equilibrium of sellers) 
will have to be achieved with the Average Revenue curve on the 
Average Cost curve which is free of any profit content, i.e. Which 
does not embody any allowance for 11 normal profit11 • Under such 
circumstances, tangency would merely imply that certain of the 
sellers1 costs are covered by his receipts but that he is not 
actually making any profit. Naturally, such a notion renders the 
tangency solution useless for the type of analysis which retailing 
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requires. It does not reflect the profit position which would 
induce sellers either to enter or to leave the industry. The 
analysis would therefore require an additional curve of Normal 
Profits which in all likelihood would have to lie above the Average 
Cost curve, and which would, in any case, not be covered. This 
leaves the meaning of tangency, and therefore equilibrium, rather 
vague. It certainly would seem as it possesses little usefulness 
as a guide to analysis. It makes little difference whether an AC 
curve (inclusive of normal profits) or an AC curve and a separate 
11 profits curve 11 are drawn if the fact that tangency with the AR 
curve is achieved in neither case means that equilibrium cannot be 
attained. 
If we accept the proposition that the Cost curve of the in-
dividual seller possesses the U-shape discussed earlier, the 
analysis of pricing policy becomes more complex. We assume, for 
the moment, that individual sellers do not determine the price they 
are going to ask and the quantity they are to sell with reference 
to the intersection of the MC and ~ffi curves. Rather, we may 
postulate that they determine these on the basis of the "cost 
plus" method of pricing - a device which relies on the selection 
of a price which bears a fixed relation9hip to average costs and the 
imputation of a margin of 11fair profit" (ascertained in advance) 
between average costs and selling price. If this is indeed the 
case it will be evident that, where AC decreases with increases 
in output, sellers will either be in a position to increase their 
profits through keeping their prices constant, or will have to lower 
their selling prices at intervals in order to maintain constant 
profit margins. 
Another difficulty lies purely on the administrative side. 
It has already been accepted that most retailers offer a range of 
commodities. If an attempt is made at AC pricing, certain 
difficulties become apparent. There is no sense in applying the 
same profit margin to all goods indiscriminately. The elasticity 
of demand for individual goods within a combination or range of 
commodities is not the same~ For the higher priced goods - and 
those not indispensable to the average consumer - the elasticity 
of demand may be regarded as being fairly high, and vice versa. 
The causes of such elasticity and the commodities most affected are 
not central to the argument. All that need be considered here is 
the fact that elasticities do differ. For such reason, the pricing 
of commodities on a cost plus basis must be none individually. The 
difficulty lies naturally in assessing the variable costs incurred 
in the sal.~ of a particular product.. Such details are not 
easily ascertained& 
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A difficulty arises from those we have just examined. A 
seller might experience c~ifficulty in bringing his prices 11 into 
line 11 with those of his competitors. Merely because he has 
settled upon a price to ask for an item, and his competitors have 
done the same does not mean anything at all from the point of view 
of either the actual or the potential competition with which he 
is faced. The minor differences in the ranges of commodities 
carried by different competitors may mean that ~mere the one seller 
is obliged to ask a higher price for an item, his competitors 
may not be. Such a situation could be the result of any of a 
number of circumstances, ranging from differences in the size 
of the retail outlets to the degree of s~ecialization or emphasis 
on the commodity etc. Such circumstances will most probably 
exert a disequilibriating influence on, or make the task of esta-
blishing, his price difficult. The problem is naturally aggra-
vated in those instc:mces where the seller, or his competitors, are 
using a single commodity as a 11 loss leader11 • In many cases, 
the co~~odity is a relatively minor one in the range of the price 
cutter, but may constitute a large part of the sales of one or 
more of his rivals. Pricing policy must take account of this. 
The difficulty facing the retailer is one of (a) deciding on 
a basis for price and (b) ensuring that his price policy takes 
account of the prices being asked for similar commodities by his 
rivals, not necessarily of the same size as himself. Both the 
orthodox marginalist and cost plus frameworks are not completely 
adequate, and the solution is likely to lie inbetween. 
CHAPTER VII 
TOWARDS A RETAILING HYPOTHESIS (l) 
In the development of a theory of retailing. a degree of. 
generality must be maintained within clearly specified limits. 
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In order to achieve this it has been necessary to question the 
applicability of monopolistic competition methodology as employed 
by Professors Chamberlin and Robinson. In the earlier analyses, 
the theoretical framework, although claimed by its progenitors to 
be of a general nature, did not provide a sufficient guide to the 
world of retailing. For such reason~ the theory which will be 
developed in this study will provide generalisations within a 
specific area of commercial activity and will not presuppose any 
level of applicability outside of the terms of reference. 
Returning briefly to the discussion of demand in earlier 
chapters, it becomes necessary to make a few observations. If 
it is accepted that the cross-elasticity of demand for the goods 
and services of individual shops under normal conditions of retail-
ing is higher than in the case of the manufacturers envisaged by 
Chamberlin, there are significant implications for sellers. If, 
more specifically, it is accepted that the erose-elasticity of 
demand is great, not only for the goods and services of similar 
shops selling similar commodities, but also for shops of different 
sizes selling similar commodities, the implications for sellers 
will also be significant. 
On the cost side, certain inferences can be drawn. It has 
been established that the costs facing individual sellers of 
different sizes are likely to differ. Such costs may be regarded 
as any expenses incurred in the purchase of stocks from suppliers 
or in the sale of stocks to consumers, and will therefore include 
advertising~ Advertising qua advertising has not been included in 
the discussion, since the difficulty of distinguishing, along 
Chamberlinian lines, between "production" and 11 selling11 costs in 
retailing is greater than in manufacturing. The principle pro-
posed qy Chamberlin, however, holds good and does not materially 
(1) The ideas presented in this chapter, whilst originating in 
my suggestion that the competitive relations amongst retailers 
must be viewed in the light of their costs, have benefitted 
greatly from discussions with Mr Z.S.A. Gurzynski. 
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affect the analysis, since advertising costs of any sort (whether 
incurred through the use of accepted media such as newspapers etc., 
or through the use of cut prices or other tangible attractions) 
will raise costs and influence the Demand curve facing the adver-
tiser. 
In so far as the shape of the average Cost curve is concerned, 
there seems to be little purpose in abandoning the basically U-
shaped curves of the orthodox analysis, since although the retail 
outlet may experience less steeply falling or less steeply rising 
costs as output increases than would the manufacturing finn, the 
principle of scale economies does not lose its fundamental validity. 
In order to establish any worthwhile notion of retail pricing, 
it must be assumed that sellers typically wish to maximise their 
long run returns under prevailing <Jircumstances. Such 11 circum-
stances11 naturally embrace the considerations which must be given 
to the pricing policies of competitors, differences in the emphasis 
on commodities sold etc. Such a view is not without justification. 
In the long run, every seller will be anxious to 11 optimize11 his 
position by earning as much money as he can for as long as possible. 
The assumption which follows therefore, is that no sellers enter 
the industry with the intention of making a quick profit and a 
rapid exit, but rather, that most sellers are even prepared to 
forego profit opportunities in the short run if they feel that they 
would be jeopardising their chances over the long period. 
Whatever the method of pricing, an analysis of the Demand 
curve for the retailer reveals an interdependence of demand for the 
different commodities sold, and therefore, a tendency for changes 
in the prices of individual items to affect the demand for others. 
In addition, the retailer's price will reveal an interdependence 
between itself and those prices asked by his rivals. 
In developing a theory of the finn in retailing along lines 
which admit the possibility that the majority of firms do consider 
the reactions of their actual or potential competitors, the problem 
of assessing the determinacy or otherwise of final outcomes arises. 
By "final outcomes" is meant the situation resulting from an 
interaction of competitors. There is some justification for 
assuming that the competition amongst such firms yields indeter-
minate results and that consequently the construction of anything 
but the vaguest analytical framework is of no value. Such a view 
would be directly opposed to that expressed in the work of Chamber-
lin and Robinson. Their competitive analyses for the large groups 
operating under conditions of monopolistic competition yield deter-
minate results in so far as equilibrium is achieved for both the 
firm and the industr,y and their solutions are therefore not dynamic. 
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There is however, some reason to believe that under normal 
circumstances firms in competition - specifically retail firms -
will attain some sort of equilibrium which will render the position 
determinate. Determinate equilibrium need not necessarily be a 
function of the number of firms in competition nor of their size. 
The smaller the number of competitors, the higher the price will 
be below which no-one will descend since each seller will be aware 
of the direct impact that a lowering of his price will have on his 
competitors and, in return, on his own total revenue. 
Such an assumption is in conflict with that made by Chamberlin 
in the discussion of his large group case. In his analysis, 
Chamberlin made the assumption that each seller would lower his 
price simply to obtain a larger share of the market for himself, 
and in the belief that his competitors would not follow suit. The 
analysis subsequently concluded that all sellers would ultimately 
lower price in keeping with this principle. It appears therefore 
that Chamberlin's large group case does not apply to retailing. 
The analysis provided in this study would conclude otherwise. 
In view of the mobility characteristic displayed qy consumers, 
the tendency is for retailers to think differently. Retailers 
are appreciative of the advantages which the growth of urban 
shopping centres offers to consumers. Consumers are now in a 
position to find the cheapest source of supply at far less effort 
to themselves ~han previously envisaged by theorists. It is as 
a result of this that retailers are becoming increasingly conscious 
and will continue to do so at a greater rate in view of the rapid 
growth of shopping concentrations - of the impact of their rivalst 
price/output policies on their own, and vice versa. It is no 
longer rational to analyse the behaviour of competitors - whether 
they be either large or small in number - as if they paid no 
attention to the interactions of the price and output policies of 
their fraternity. 
For this reason, it is necessary to develop a theory which 
lies between two broad areas of agreement. Chamberlints analysis 
of the 1930's proposed just such a framework. It took upon 
itself the task of describing the realistic case lying almost midway 
between the theory of ferfect Competition and the theory of Mono-
poly. It is now necessary to provide a framework which lies almost 
midway between the theory of Nonopolistic Competition and the 
theory of Oligopoly. 
Much of the theory of Monopolistic Competition as developed 
prior to the work of Triffin has been rejected as not adequate for 
an analysis of competition in retailing. At the same time an 
oligopoly analysis yielding a broadly indeterminate solution and 
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providing no analysis of dissimilar size firms in competition 
also requires elaboration if. it is to be incorporated into a 
meaningful framework. The prime objective of any theory must be 
to provide a key to the processes experienced in the real world. 
It has already been pointed out, in the discussion of Triffints 
contribution, and the extensions implied by this study, that the 
Chamberlin analysis must incorporate the cross-elasticity system -
both horizontal and vertical - if it is to be of any use. 
We may now place the issues in perspective. There can be no 
doubt that the elasticity of demand for the goods and services of 
different sizes and types of retail outlet are not the same. In 
our discussion of the smal~ specialist shop, we have ex~ned 
the proposition that the seller is in a position to attract and 
retain clientele because he offers customers a range and type 
of product which the non-specialist store cannot. By the same token, 
the non-specialist store is in a position to cater for the buyer 
-
who does not require any out-of-the-ordinary items. 
Such a position reflects itself in the Cost and Demand curves 
facing individual sellers. Where the specialist seller can charge 
a higher than average price for the range of products which he 
sells, so his costs will probably be correspondingly larger in the 
light of the fact that he requires bigger, possibly more expensive 
stocks and experiences a slower rate of turnover. The large 
non-specialist store, catering for the 11 average 11 customer - and 
therefore for the majority of buyers - has a considerably larger 
turnover and generally lower average costs. 
Whether the systems of price-determination employed in each 
case will ultimately result in a similarity of the profit margin 
I 
for both categories of sellers, is difficult to say, but the 
possibility should not be excluded and can be incorporated into 
the analysis. Obviously total profits are highly unlikely to be 
similar. 
The result of such a situation, broadly speaking, is that the 
Demand and Cost curves facing sellers of different sizes and 
catering for somewhat different types of customer (although the 
commodities sold might be similar in physical characteristics) 
will be different and interdependent within and amongst firms. 
If one were to compare, for example, the Demand and Cost 
curves facing two firms only, a number of conclusions could be 
drawn. One firm could be assumed to represent that type of 
retail outlet currently known as a 11 supermarket11 and displaying 
such characteristics as low prices, little 11 service11 , a wide 
range of popular items and a dependence upon the broad mass of 
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customers for its existence. The other might be regarded'as the 
11 corner grocerts shop", selling items broadly similar to those of 
the other, but at higher prices, in more limited quantity and with 
a stronger element of 11 service 11 • From most points of view, the 
products sold by each are "dissimilar" in the minds of consumers, 
but, if need be, eminently substitutable. The Demand and Cost 
curves are dissimilar. The small shop may be regarded as 
possessing a higher level of average costs and a more inelastic 
demand for its stock, implying t~~t it may charge a higher price 
for its goods, on average, than the s upermnrket, but not necessa-
rily higher than a competitor similar to itself. 
The principle is as follows. Assuming factors of location to 
be irrelevant in view of the mobility of buyers(l), the higher r-
the price charged by the supermarket, the more likely are consumers 
to transfer (or spread) their custom to the small shop, since 
price will no longer be a cause for preferring one shop to another. 
The opposite holds true. If the small shop lowers prices and 
presumably therefore, the 11 service11 content of its "product" 
the customer will not be averse to transferring his custom to 
the supermarket. 
The more similar the expenditures asked of consumers for a 
1basketfull" in the two outlets, the less likely is 11 service11 to 
differ. Customers are, under such circumstances, not likely to 
prefer one seller to another. This situation raises some inter-
esting analytical questions: (a) to what extent are the goods 
and services of the two sellers interchangeable, i.e. what is the 
magnitude of the cross elasticity of demand and what is the rate 
of change in cross elasticity of demand with a change in prices, 
and consequently (b) how is the range of operations with which 
each seller will be satisfied, determined? What role do the Cost 
and Demand curves of individual sellers play in the analysis? 
Before proceeding to a discussion of these questions, another 
issue should be raised. Mention has already been made of the high 
cross-elasticity of demand for the goods and services of similar 
size and "product" shops. The Chamberlinian analysis, it has been 
shown, stopped short of intra-subgroup comparisons, while Triffin's 
analysis failed to build adequately on them. If we agree with the 
proposition that the cross-elasticity of demand for the 11 product11 
of shops selling the same commodities at roughly the same prices 
is high, we must also assume that the Demand curve facing the 
individual seller is highly elastic. The Chamberlinian argument 
(l) See Che1.pter V above. 
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then, using the uniformity and syrrmetry assumptions on the issue 
of average costs and average revenue is therefore not strictly 
valid where it postulates the relative inelasticity of Demand 
curves. 
It is valid, as we have attempted to show, if it is applied 
in the analysis of competi: ~ firms of different sizes - as was the 
ca~e in the preceding example. Within a range of prices, 11 pro-
ducts11 will be dissimilar to· the extent that cross-elastitdties of 
demand are low. The Chamberlinian analysis of Demand would then 
appear to be valid (in acceptable analytic terms) only for the 
case which it did not postulate. It would, consequently, appear 
to be a fair reflection of Triffin's proposition. As soon as 
retail outlets of similar size and 11 product 11 are introduced into 
the analysis, the elasticity of demand for the 11 product11 of any 
one seller increases quite significantly. 
It should be stressed that the observations concerning the 
elasticity of demand for the two different varieties of shop are 
tenuous. The specialist small ·shop is more likely than the large 
shop to experience a relatively inelastic demand if it stocks the 
same or similar physical commodities, si:p.ce it does provide 
a service which need not necessarily cost the shopowner very much. 
The large shop will, however, if it provides little service, be 
more likely to experience a relatively elastic demand, since a 
rise in prices may induce customers to shop at the smaller outlet. 
Whether this is the case or not, the argument is not signifi-
cantly altered. The proposition remains. Sellers of different 
sizes (and, more specifically, with different 11 AC curves11 ) will be 
faced with relatively inelastic Demand curves when in competition 
with one another. Firms of the same size will possess highly 
elastic Demand curves when in competition 1.vith one another in view 
of the high cross-elasticity of demand for their products. 
In developing a viable theory of the retail firm, therefore, 
it is necessary to incorporate into the analysis, a· system whereby 
the competitive relations among similar and dissimilar sized (but 
similar commodity) firms can be established in a reasonably 
determinate manner. 
THE DEMAND CURVE: 
The Demand curve for the orthodox monopolistic competitor, 
as postulated by Chamberlin and Robinson, cannot reflect the 
existence of sellers selling at lower or higher prices. Such a 
situation does not fulfill the requirements of retail theory. 
With a decrease in the price asked by a seller, it is quite 
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possible that some buyers might decide to take their c~stom else-
where. This could result from a deterioration in the quality of 
serwice offered and the fact that the new conditions make other 
outlets more similar in the minds of buyers. Alternatively, it 
could result from a change in the capacity of the price reducing 
seller to stock goods different from others with the implication 
that, once again, the price-reducing shop becomes more like its 
competitors - to the point where consumers no longer distinguish 
between it and its former relatively lower-priced rivals. 
Broadly speaking, then, a lowering of price by a seller need not 
always result in an increase in the number of buyers purchasing 
from him, particularly if, as often happens in retailing,, lower 
prices mean less service - service being, in most cases, the only 
reason for the continued support of particular customers. 
With an increase in prices, the reaction of consumers will 
depend largely on the type of alternative seller. . Should a 
specifically low-priced seller raise his prices, he might very 
well be bringing them "into line" with those of the 11 traditionally11 
higher priced seller. The result could be a loss of customers to 
the high priced seller, since customers will now be unable to 
discriminate on the basis of price. 
The principle is as follows: The AR curve - if we assume for 
the moment t~~t it is of finite elasticity - facing the small 
(higher price/cost) seller, and the AR curve facing the large 
(lower price/cost) seller, will naturally cover ~ifferent ranges 
of price, except if the lower segment of the small sellerts AR 
curve crosses the upper segment of the large sellerts AR curve. 
The situation may be represented graphically with the aid of 
orthodox Demand curves. 
It will be obvious that the Demand curves facing the two 
sellers do not, in the accepted sense, reflect the various price/ 
output alternatives for the same 11 product 11 •• However, in our 
discussions of the cross-elasticity of demand for goods and ser-
vices, an attempt was made to indicate the high rate of substitu-
tability for such goods and services and to regard this substitu-
tability as a function of price. It has been pointed out that 
such interdependence of demand cannot be ignored. What is being 
reflected here is simply the point at which buyers will tend to 
regard one seller as being roughly equivalent to another for 
practical purposes. The number of buyers who respond to such an 
increase in price on the part of the low price seller (and vice 
versa on the part of the high price seller) need only be marginal, 
i.e. small, to affect the sales of the small seller quite app-
reciably. 
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If, therefore, it is assumed that the "differences" between 
the ''products 11 of the two sellers are reflected in the relationship 
to one another of their respective Average Revenue curves, it 
will be evident that, as soon as the lo-vrer priced seller raises 
his price or the higher price seller lowers his, or bath~. the pro-
ducts become more similar in the minds of consumers. The result 
is that the cross-elasticity of demand for the respective products 
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In the diagram DH and DL represent the Demand curves of the 
"small" and 11 large11 seller respectively. The small seller may be 
assumed to possess a certain advantage over the larger in that he is 
able to locate himself in areas in which the ~~rge seller could 
not. In view of the 11 convenience11 which he represents to the 
consumer in his locality, it is reasonable to postulate a less 
elastic Demand curve in his case than in that of the large store 
when the two are examined in 11 competition11 with each other and with 
rivals of the same size. The cross-elasticity of demand for the 
goods and services of large stores is great, and, as a result, a 
more elastic Demand curve must be postulated for the large store. 
The diagram represents the position described. The small 
shop will possess a monopoly advantage - although not necessarily 
as strong as envisaged by orthodox theory - over the larger store, 
providing it offers a service to ~onsumers greater (in the eyes of 
the consumer) than that provided by the latter. For this, it is 
entitled to ask a higher 11 price11 • Under such circumstances, the 
small seller will be relatively insulated from the effects of 
competition with the L~rger rival. Similarly, the large shop, 
asking generally lower prices, and providing less service, will 
be selling a "product" somewhat different from his smaller rival's. 
He, too, will tend to be competing more with rivals of his own 
size and variety rather than the small shop. 
I 
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The two sellers, however, are selling similar physical commo-
dities and must be regarded as being able to influence each 
other 1 s shares of the market. The result is that, as the higher 
priced seller lowers his price along the Demand curve DH, he is 
making his 11 product 11 more similar to that sold by his lower priced 
rival(s). This is simply,because the "prices" of the two sellers 
are being brought "into line11 with each other and, because the 
higher priced seller is lowering his price, he is presumably also 
reducing the element of "service" in his 11 product 11 • In other 
words, customers will no longer be able to differentiate effec-
tively between the two sellers on the basis of 11 price11 or 11 service11 • 
As the higher priced seller lowers his price along the curve DH 
towards X, the elasticity of demand for his 11 product11 increases, 
since it becomes increasingly substitutable, in the mind of the 
consumer, for the "product" of the lower priced seller. The 
same process may be thought to operate in reverse, since a rise in 
price along DL will also increase the substitutability of the two 
11 products11 • 
As the higher priced seller lowers his 11 price11 he will not 
only have to concern himself with the reactions of his close 
rivals (i.e. rivals of similar size), but will also have to con-
sider the fact that he is bringing himself into direct competition 
with traditionally lower-priced sellers. 
In such a situation, certain issues concerning elasticity 
arise. Principally, it is possible that the elasticity of demand 
for individual sellers, or for the group of similar competitors as 
a whole, may change in a hitherto unexpected direction as price 
changes. For example, the higher priced seller might, in ter.ms of 
the orthodox analysis, be inclined to regard a price decrease on 
his part - unaccompanied by any similar action on the part of his 
immediate rivals - as being conducive to a reasonably marked 
expansion in his market. It has been attempted to show that this 
is not necessarily the case, for a specific reason. The individual 
who embarks on such a programme may in fact be bringing his prices 
more 11 into line" with those of the traditionally lower priced 
seller, with the result that his customers - actual or potential -
no longer distinguish between his goods and those of his 11 new 
competitors" (the lower priced seller). It is possible that, not 
only would he fail to gain sufficiently large numbers of new 
customers to compensate, in total revenue terms, for his lower 
prices, but he might even lose some of his old customers, who 
no longer regard his goods as being sufficiently different.iated 
from his competitor 1 s to warrant any particular shopping effort on 
their part. 
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Where a traditionally lower priced seller raises his price 
while his immediate rivals ~~intain theirs - he would, in orthodox 
terms, be expected to shed some of his customers. This is also 
not necessarily so. By raising his price, he is bringing his 
prices 11 into line11 with those of higher priced sellers, and may 
even gain customers who no longer distinguish between their 
former suppliers and himself. The gain may be large enough to 
compensate him for any of his own customers he might have lost 
when raising his price. 
It is extremely difficult to determine, with great accuracy, 
the reaction of demand to changes in price in the manner described. 
It is difficult to establish whether the sellers discussed will in 
fact gain or lose customers - and if so, to what degree - with 
changes in price. All that can be said is that, for individual 
sellers (others keeping their prices constant) there exists a 
price range (the market price for the relevant categor,y) at which 
the· elasticity of substitution amongst sellers is great; largely 
below which it is likely that the seller will not gain many addi-
tional customers and largely above which it is likely that the seller 
will not lose many customers. On the other hand, there is the 
important zone surrounding the market price for the specific 
category of retailer, within which price increases will cause a 
significant loss of customers and price decreases, a significant 
gain, for individual sellers. This zone is one in which there is 
no real competition from sellers belonging to other categories but 
in which influence is only exerted by those sellers who display 
similar characteristics to the retailer concerned. 
At X in the diagram, the "product" switches demand from DH 
to DL. The total demand for the 11 product 11 is therefore 
DH-X-DL. In this manner a bre~k with orthodox theory may be 
indicated. The Demand curve is not a Demand curve for the single 
"product" of a single seller (or group of sellers characterized 
by unifor.m AC and AR curves). Instead, it is a composite Demand 
curve, made up of the individual curves characterizing categories 
of seller - from small to large - in competition within and across 
the "boundaries" of subgroups. 
THE COST CURVE: 
We have noted at various points that, 'in retail practice., 
each seller will price in a manner according to the influence . 
which he thinks he will exert on his competitors, and vice 
versa. The principle is similar to that proposed by oligopoly 
theorists. Each seller will recognise the interdependence of both 
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' similar and less similar sellers in the market, and will act 
accordingly. Such an attitude will be evident from the 11 markup11 
which he regards as providing him with a suitable return. The 
higher the 11 markup11 (cost plus) percentage (and therefore, other 
things being equal, the price) that he asks, the greater the risk 
he takes in that his customers might desert him for similar, 
but lower priced suppliers. Similarly, the lower the' 11markup11 
he asks, and the lower the price, as a consequence, the more likely 
are his rivals to cut as well in an effort to retain their markets. 
It is possible that rival sellers might retaliate by cutting the 
price of other products, but even here, the seller will attempt 
to adjust his markup to the average prices asked. The markup 
then, will depend upon the individual seller1 s estimate of market 
reaction to his policies. 
Another issue requires attention. It has already been 
suggested that the retailer is generally in a better position to 
adjust his 11 capacity11 than is the manufacturer. This is simply 
because of the fewer indivisibilities which attend the s~le of 
individual mainly small, commodities, than the output of large 
or 11 lumpy11 capital equipment. As a result, the seller is generally 
able to adjust his capacity to the level which will yield him 
roughly the lowest average costs. With changes in the prevailing 
level of prices, adjustments may also be fairly rapid so that the 
individual seller is able to alter his stocks in order to sell 
an output which implies the lowest average costs. 
At the same time, the assumption has been made that, under 
most circumstances, the Demand curve facing the individual seller 
in a competitive retail environment is almost horizontal. If 
then, the retailer is able to adjust his stock turnover and the 
cost of holding stocks he may be able to avoid the 11 excess capacity11 
envisaged by the early theorists. The application and modifica-
tion of the Chamberlinian concept of tangency is obvious. The 
distinction lies simply in the fact that Chamberlints excess 
capacity postulate loses much of its significance when the AR 
curve is viewed as being similar in slope to that found under 
conditions of perfect competition. 
Looked at from the point of view of 11 group equilibrium11 -
in this case simply the equilibrium of the group of competitors 
of the same size - the situation is less clear cut. If we are 
justified in assuming that retailers frequently find themselves 
operating at a price (i.e. of the 11 basketfull11 which they sell) 
which does not cover average costs, let alone 11 normal profits 11 , 
and that this situation is not necessarily one which will ultima-
tely converge upon the equilibrium position envisaged by Chamberlin 
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because it does not invariably deter new entrants from coming into 
the group or encourage old firms to leave, we cannot accept the 
notion of a tangency solution for the 11 group 11 as a whole. 
For this reason, it is necessary to establish a view of 
equilibrium not for individual groups, but for all categories of 
sellers selling similar commodities, considered together. This 
equilibrium will relate closely to the oligopolistic appraisal of 
the retail market and the notion that individual firms, and se-
parate groups, realise their interdependence. 
Assuming .that the two groups of sellers we are currently 
examining may be distinguished more easily on the basis of Cost 




In the diagram, curves ACI, ACII and ACIII are the Average 
Cost curves appropriate to sellers of different sizes, respectively. 
Costs are the determinant of output, and the lower level of costs 
incurred by the large retailer enables him to sell larger quan-
tities at lower prices than his smaller rivals in alternative 
categories. Price is asked on the basis of direct cost plus 
mark:up This markup must be sufficiently large to cover 
indirect costs and a margin of 11 fair11 profit, and will imply a 
subjective maximization of profit. 
The Demand curves for each of the shops of different sizes 
are equal to the slope of the Average Cost curves at the tangency 
points. Under such circumstances, as sellers moved in size 
from 11 small" to 11 large11 , the elasticity of demand for their 
goods and services would change. This is illustrated by the 
slopes of the Demand curves, AB, CD and EF. The Average Cost 
curve is thus a locus of points (at which sellers are able to sell 
11 profitably11 ) on a number of competitive Demand curves, each charac-
terizing a different price for the 11 basketfull" offered by the shop. 
At any output greater than X1, the higher priced seller 
would find his AC exceeding his AR unless he were prepared to 
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accept a lower markup than before. By doing so, he would naturally 
induce his rivals to cut their prices as well. However, at any 
output less than X2, the AC of the lower priced seller would be 
higher than his AR, and possibly equal to, or greater than, the 
lowest AC of the higher priced seller. The same observations 
may be applied to the largest seller (3). One might imagine 
that there exists for a wide range of prices lying between those 
asked by the sellers in question, Average Revenue and Cost curves 
which could conceivably represent positions in which categories 
of sellers are being considered. Amongst these broad ~ategories 
lies the range of possible AR/AC relationships relevant to the 
different types of seller. 
It will be noted that, if any one seller selling at a low 
price, decides to raise his price, he will lcs e customers at 
that price to his immediate :rivals, provided they continue to sell 
at the lower price. By raising his price, he will be obliged to 
accept a decrease in sales in any case, since at that price the 
demand for the group of products being sold - irrespective of the 
size of the seller - is less than it is at a lower price. In 
other words, the "sales curve11 (a locus of the tangency points on 
the AC curves) facing all the sellers in the 11 industry11 (i.e. the. 
group composed of all sellers selling commodities for which the 
cross-elasticity of demand is great) is of finite elasticity. 
Even if his AC are lower over a wide range than are those of his 
higher priced rivals, he vdll be unable to a vail himself of the 
opportunity to make excess profits since, by raising his price, he 
will be restricting his output. His Average costs therefore, 
are higher than they were at a larger output. Similarly, by 
restricting his output, he will cause his Average costs to rise and 
will have to raise his price to cover his costs and ensure a 
margin of profit. 
By raising his price, a competitor in any subgroup (category) 
will be bringing it 11 into line11 with sellers in other subgroups. 
It will not be possible for any seller whose AR curve is lying at 
a tangent to his AC at a position near its lowest point, to lower 
his price to compete with sellers in lower price groups, since he 
will incur losses. Similarly, under no circumstances will a low 
cost seller be in a position to raise his price at any gain to 
himself. No matter what the position of the Average Cost curve, 
any seller raising his price will lose customers to that categor,y 
of sellers charging a price below his. 
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Turning now to the question of 11 markup11 , it is possible that 
a seller will be able to change his price by deciding to accept 
a lower or higher markup. Under such circumstances~ no modifica-
tion of the analysis is required. There will naturally be a limit 
below which such a markup cannot be reduced. Until that point 
is reached however, the individual seller will be vulnerable to the 
competition of sellers just like himself, and the concept of cross-
elasticity of demand provides a guide in such a situation. His 
competitors will react~ since his actions will affect their business. 
They will therefore be inclined to reduce their prices a.s well. 
If a seller .decides to raise hio markup, his AC will rise and the 
process already described becomes relevant. 
No seller knows the 11 demand11 for his commodities at any price, 
and pricing is therefore largely a matter of 11 trial and error". 
If, awing to better buying facilities~ the AC. curve of any seller 
shifts downward, price will fall, and the seller - or category of 
sellers - will move into competition with a lower price group. 
The range within which any subgroups of retailers are in competi-
tion with one another depends on the position of their Average 
Cost curves. The zone- of 11 indeterminacy", such as it is, would lie 
between points on different AC curves. 
Returning to our diagram 
p ····--
At 11 price11 range p, the area of indeterminacy will prevail. 
Since the 11 prices11 and "products" of both sellers are now similar 
(i.e. both sellers ask prices in 11 range11 p, and by our analysis, 
provide similar products), the number of customers available to 
each seller is indeterminate. It is only in this region that 
uncertainty will exist because in no other price range are the 
basketsful of the sellers sufficiently similar for the cross-
elasticity of demand for the goods and services of each to be so 
great. In this region, therefore, each seller will contemplate 
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higher or lower markups in order to attract more of the customers 
available at the price. The 11 price11 of the 11 basketfuln under 
these circumst~nces is really therefore a narrow r?~ge of price 
alternatives which will depend upon the 11 markup" chosen by indivi-
dual sellers. The process is one of trial and error since (a) 
no seller knows what the 11 derncmd· curve11 for his 11 basketfuP is 
and (b) no seller knows how changes in the prices of individual 
items are going to affect his overall sales and (c) no seller 
knows all the prices prevailing in his neighbourhood. He will 
therefore adjust his markup on an ad hoc basis. The higher priced 
seller selling in the.range of indeterminacy would have to decide 
whether to lower price (markup) to sell more without reducing 
his AR below his AC. The lower priced seller would naturally 
have to do the same. 
Whatever the reasoning, this area of indeterminacy represents 
the zone in which sellers of different sizes will be directly 
competitive. Since there exist a wide range of different sizes 
and prices characterizing different categories of sellers, there 
exists also a wide range of such zones. At every possible price 
and output then, each seller - or category of sellers - will be 
inviting competition from others in their awn as well as different 
categories. Within each zone, the capacity of sellers to compete 
will depend upon the markup they are prepared to accept. This 
they will bear in mind. 
The real significance of the diagram lies in the 11 scalloped11 
concept of the Sr.les curve as represented by the heavy line side 
of the individual AC curves. It is at V3rious points along this 
11 s:1les curve" that the significant price/output positions of all 
categories of sellers will lie. It has already been seen that 
the position on the curve at >vhich any seller will find himself is 
indeterminate in so far as it will depend upon what ~•rkup he 
and his competitors will choose. Fran this analytical point of 
view, it does provide a picture of the market situation with 
which any seller embarking on a price-setting progranme is faced. 
In setting a price - and thereby selecting a markup - the seller 
will have to consider the reactions of rivals similar in size 
to himself, and the reactions of rivals of different sizes. 
Turning now to the question of equilibrium, it becomes 
necessary to modify the original Chamberlinian concept, owing to 
the modified structure of the 11 industry11 • It may be assumed that 
each seller will wish to optimize the use of his capacity by pro-
ducing at the lowest point that he is able to achieve on his AC 
curve. Only at this point will .he be sure that no one in his 
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category will be in a position to sell more cheaply than himself. 
If the seller finds it·necessary to lower his markup in order to 
compete with rivals in the same catego~, he will do so. On the 
other hand, no seller will long be able to reduce his prices to be 
able to compete with significantly lower cost sellers, since he 
will then be operating below the point where he covers average 
costs. If he wished to continue in business under such circum-
stances, he would have to find a way of lowering his AC either 
through bulk buying or better selling techniques. 
The high level of failures in the retail field results from 
the belief - held by large numbers of newcomers - that they are 
able to be more 11 acceptable11 than predecessors who have failed. 
The fact is that most retailers are not able to lower their average 
costs and attempt to improve their position by accepting a lower 
markup in an effort to compete with lower cost/price shops. The 
result is that they find themselves competing in a catego~ in 
which they have no justificQtion (as far as AC are concerned) to 
be. Since retailing is intensely competitive in the manner we 
have already discussed, other sellers are induced to cut prices 
as well, and entire categories of sellers fail to cover their 
average costs 11 adequately11 • 
The consequent issue then, is how industry equilibrium is 
established. It is possible to say that competition amongst 
subgroups yields an indeterminate equilibrium lying somewhere 
between the prices at which higher cost sellers will go no lower 
in price~ and lower cost sellers will go no higher. It is a 
justifiable notion that, for competing subgroups as a whole - as 
opposed to individual memb0rs of such subgroups - this is a zone 
in which a certain stability could possibly arise. It is however, 
difficult to establish this zone ex ante since the markups which 
sellers are prepared to accept will vary. 
As far as group equilibrium is concerned, it is only possible 
to say that the responsiveness of demand to changes in price will 
make each seller keenly avrare of the sales opportunities available 
to him if he should lower price. Even though he is aware of his 
competitors 1 reactions to such a situation, the pressure to lower 
prices will - even if he does not succumb to it always be greater 
than the pressure to raise them. 11 Undercutting11 is common prac-
tice in retailing. 
The tendency then, is for each subgroup to attempt an expansion 
of capacity, a lowering of Average costs and therefore the oppor-
tunity to move into a lower cost subgroup to provide a justifica-
tion for lower prices. For each seller within a subgroup this 
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will be the aim, and the responsiveness of demand and competition 
to the individual seller's change in price will reinforce this 
downward tendency. 
The disequilibria then, which occur 11 intra-subgroup11 in 
retailing are really only a part of a long run tendency toward 
equilibrium at the lowest point on the AC curve of the lowest 
cost seller in any competitive area, provided, of course, that the 
output at this point will fill the.market. The size, costs, 
prices and sales of the largest seller will always appear as a 
target upon which the higher cost sellers will cozwciously or 
unconsciously attempt to converge. They will adjust their 
policies accordingly. The disequilibria char~cteristic of retail 
competition at various levels of activity may be regarded simply 
as issues which work themselves out on the descending side of the 
industry AC curve, the lowest point on which will ultimately be 
the zone of industry equilibrium. Simply stated~ whilst these 
disequilibrL~ prevail, they may be regarded as indications that 
the downward movement of prices and costs has not yet reached its 
perigee at the lowest AC curve. Since few firms are in a position 
to operate at such a low cost, most other, smaller firms will 
have eliminated themselves in the process of price reduction and 
the low cost firms - once they have resolved the question of their 
markup - will no longer attempt to lower prices further. At 
this point, equilibrium will have been reached. The stage at 
which firms will 11 eliminate11 themselves naturally depends upon 
the size of the 11market 11 in which they are operating, but, since 
the tendency to reduce prices is strong, the danger that AR will 
be reduced below AC prevails at all times. 
It becomes obvious that the number of firms in the industry 
is only a part of the explanation of equilibrium, in so far as 
their exit enables others to expand. It may, however, be the 
understanding at the point of equilibrium~ that lower prices 
will ruin business for all, that assists in the maintenance of 
equilibrium.. Similarly, at the point of equilibrium, the individual 
firms within a category will not find it advantageous to raise 
prices since their competitors will not follow suit and the cross-
elasticity of demand will be such as to cause a loss of customers. 
There is no reason to believe that a permanent equilibrium 
is ever reached. No sellers can be certain that their prices 
and costs are the lowest possible. All that can be said is that 
there will be a tendency in the direction of equilibrium. 
CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER VIII · 
Since the publication of both The The<:)r;y of :r-1onopolistic 
Competition and The Econoroics of Imperfect Competition, a vast 
literature has appeared in an attempt to qualify the original 
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concepts. The purpose of this paper has been to trace the develop-
ment of these works and to assess the modifications necessary to 
make them more generally applicable, albeit in a theoretical 
context, to the situations which characterise the firm in Retail 
Trade. 
Since, however, trye task of adapting existing theory could 
only be effectively undertaken once all relevant issues had been 
discussed as a coherent body of thought, the first section of this 
paper concerned itself with an analysis of the major theses and 
the distinctions between them. The subsequent sections have 
dealt with the more significant criticisms which have emerged, 
and the selection of those aspects which the present writer 
considered necessary for further analysis and incorporation in an 
alternative framework. 
The entire analysis has been presented at a level of abstrac-
tion similar to that found in the works of Chamberlin and Robinson, 
and no attempt has been made to employ empirical techniques in 
order to validate or invalidate hypotheses. 
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Prior to the development of a theory of the firm which enabled 
economists to create - for purposes of analysis - a set of con-
ditions under which the concepts of ttmonopoly11 and 11 competition11 
could be blended, traditional theory had come to regard the two 
as being mutually exclusive. The product of this 11\rleltanschauung11 
was an analytical technique inadequately equipped for the task of 
explaining the phenomena of everyday experience, since the assump-
tions~ on which the framework rested were either too narrow or 
too wide to fit the reality of the situation. 
It was the explicit recognition of the need for a theory 
admitting the 11 imperfections 11 of the real world - previously 
relegated to vaguely defined sections on Monopoly and generally 
regarded as problam$ relating to short periods - which resulted 
in the new approach to the theory of the firm. 
The theory of Monopolistic Competition occupied its.elf with 
a study of the firm and developed the analysis of 11 industrial 
equilibrium11 • 
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The objective of this method of approach was to consider the 
cost and revenue factors which assist in the establishment of the 
internal equilibrium of the firm and, subsequently, t,o exa.mi.ile the 
position of the firm within the general equilibrium framework. 
To achieve this, the theory had to encompass the competitive 
relationships which exist amongst firms and provide a means of 
analysing the effects of the price/output decisions of individual 
producers upon one another. 
The notion of 11 interdependence11 amongst firms formed a corner-
stone of the theory and was largely a.n elaboration of the elementary 
Cournot and Edgevmrth models of duopoly, which provided some of 
the rarer classical insights into the possibility of a market 
position lying between pure monopoly and competition. The 
recognition of the fact that consumers, for a number of possible 
reasons, distinguish amongst the individual 11 products" of each · 
member of a group of competing manufacturers, has meant that each 
producer should be regarded as possessing a "monopoly" over his 
particular good, even though the cross-elasticities of demand for 
his product and others might be sufficiently high to warrant the 
description of closely competing substitutes. 
The conceptual framework built upon this fundamental obser-
vation has been shown to be vast and intricate. At the same time, 
structural inadequacies have evidenced themselves in the attempt 
to apply the unmodified theory to the general facts of 11 Retailing11 • 
The difficulty of applying important areas of the analysis in 
its present state to such a significant sector of convnercial 
activity has necessitated a review of the basic tools of orthodox 
theory. 
Surprisingly, the literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
concerning the general validity of the theories of Imperfect 
Competition in the field of retailing is limited. It has 
therefore, been necessary to provide a brief review of the areas 
in which the orthodox approach requires attention and, subse-
quently, to state the issues most relevant to the development of 
a modified analysis. 
The thesis, as it has been developed here, is directed 
partly at indicating the nature of the 11 demand 11 facing individual 
retailers in competition with one another. In this respect a 
curve displaying characteristics different from those envisaged 
by orthodox analyste, has been postulated. This structure, 
combined with a reappraisal of the nature of the competition which 
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may be thought to exist amongst retailers~ has provided a differ(~nt 
view of the question of 11 Imperfect11 competition. For this 
reason, it is hoped that the present study will have broken some 
new ground. 
Much remains to be done. 
in its empirical palatmbility. 
The proof of the theory must lie 
It has unfortunately not been 
possible to establish an empirical basis of any sort, but it 
I 
is hoped that the vi6N~expressed in this paper will recommend 
themselves to further reflection. Only in this way can the work 
be of its fullest value. 
-o-o-oOo-o-o-
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